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Time: 09:
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First Judicial District Court - Bonner County

M

ROA Report
Case: CV-2013-0001342 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell
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City of Sandpoint vs. Independent Highway District

of

vs.

District
Judge

Date

Code

User

8/16/2013

NCOC

JACKSON

New Case Filed - Other Claims

Barbara A Buchanan

APER

JACKSON

Plaintiff: City of Sandpoint Appearance Scot R.
Campbell

Barbara A. Buchanan

JACKSON

Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not Barbara A Buchanan
listed in categories B-H, or the other A listings
below Paid by: City of Sandpoint (plaintiff)
Receipt number: 0495386 Dated: 8/16/2013
Amount: $.00 (Cash) For: City of Sandpoint
(plaintiff)

COMP

JACKSON

Complaint and Request for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief

Barbara A Buchanan

SMIS

JACKSON

Summons Issued - Original in file

Barbara A. Buchanan

8/20/2013

AFSV

HENDRICKSO

Affidavit Of Service - incomplete
contacted Attorney Campbell re: needing an
amended affidavit of service, service date was
not entered on this document
left voice mail 8-23-2013 11 Opm

Barbara A Buchanan

8/22/2013

MODQ

HENDRICKSO

Motion to Oisquality without Cause- Judge
Buchanan

Barbara A Buchanan

APER

HENDRICKSO

Defendant: Independent Highway District
Appearance David E Wynkoop

John T. Mitchell

AFFD

HENDRICKSO

Amended Affidavit of Service - Julie Bishop
accepted service for Independent Highway Dist
8-19-13

Barbara A. Buchanan

ORDQ

OPPELT

Disqualification - Judge Buchanan

Barbara A. Buchanan

DISA

OPPELT

Disqualification Of Judge - Automatic - Judge
Buchanan

Barbara A. Buchanan

CHJG

OPPELT

Change Assigned Judge

District Court Clerks

ORDR

OPPELT

Order of Reassignment

Lansing Haynes

CHJG

OPPELT

Change Assigned Judge

John T. Mitchell

MOTN

HENDRICKSO

Motion to Dismiss

John T. Mitchell

APER

HENDRICKSO

Defendant: Independent Highway District
Appearance Susan P. Weeks

John T. Mitchell

MOTN

HENDRICKSO

Defendant's Motion for Enlargement of Time to
File Brief

John T. Mitchell

NOHG

HENDRICKSO

Notice of Hearing
re: Defendant's Motion for Enlargement of Time
to FIie Brief

John T. Mitchell

HRSC

HENDRICKSO

John T. Mitchell
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/23/2013 02:00
PM) Defendant's Motion for Enlargement of Time
to File Brief
Kootenai County Courthouse

NOHG

HENDRICKSO

Notice of Hearing
re: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

8/28/2013

8/29/2013

9/9/2013

'9/20/2013

John T. Mitchell
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of

vs.

District

Date

Code

User

9/26/2013

HRSC

HENDRICKSO

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss
11/13/2013 04:00 PM) Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss
Kootenai County

John T. Mitchell

9i30/2013

APER

HENDRiCKSO

Piaintiff: City of Sandpoint Appearance C.
Matthew Andersen

John T. Mitchell

NOTC

HENDRICKSO

Notice of Association -Attorney C. Matthew
Andersen for Plaintiff

John T. Mitchell

10/11/2013

BREF

HENDRICKSO

Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss

John T. Mitchell

10/17/2013

FIOC

OPPELT

File Out of County - Judge Mitchell

John T. Mitchell

10/22/2013

MISC

HENDRICKSO

Plaintiffs No Objection to Defendant's Motion for
Enlargment of Time to File Brief

John T. Mitchell

10/23/2013

HRVC

OPPELT

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
10/23/2013 02:00 PM: Hearing Vacated
Defendant's Motion for Enlargement of Time to
File Brief
Kootenai County Courthouse - Per Judge
Mitchell's Chambers

John T. Mitchell

HRSC

OPPELT

Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference
11/13/2013 04:00 PM) In Kootenai County

John T. Mitchell

OPPELT

Judge

Notice Of Hearing

John T. Mitchell

RSPN

HENDRICKSO

Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss

John T. Mitchell

AFFD

HENDRICKSO

Affidavit of Scot R. Campbell

John T. Mitchell

AFFD

HENDRICKSO

Affidavit of Shannon Syth

John T. Mitchell

MOTN

HENDRICKSO

Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs Response
Brief and Affidavits

John T. Mitchell

MOTN

HENDRICKSO

Motion to Shorten Time

John T. Mitchell

NOHG

HENDRICKSO

Notice of Hearing
on Defendant's Motion to Strike and Motion to
Shorten Time

John T. Mitchell

HRSC

HENDRICKSO

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/13/2013 04:00
PM)

John T. Mitchell

11/12/2013

REPL

HENDRICKSO

Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss

John T. Mitchell

·11/13/2013

MISC

HENDRICKSO

Plaintiffs Supplemental Citation to Authority

John T. Mitchell

RSPN

HENDRICKSO

Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to
Strike Response Brief and Affidavits

John T. Mitchell

CTLG

OPPELT

Court Log- From Kootenai County

John T. Mitchell

DCHH

OPPELT

John T. Mitchell
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled
on 11/13/2013 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Julie Foland
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
100 Pages
Kootenai

11/7/2013

11/8/2013
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11/13/2013

DCHH

OPPELT

Hearing result for Scheduling Conference
scheduled on 11/13/2013 04:00 PM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Julie Foland
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: In Kootenai County - Less Than 100
Pages

John T. Mitchell

GRNT

OPPELT

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
11/13/2013 04:00 PM: Motion Granted Motion
to Shorten Time and Motion to Strike Portions of
Plaintiffs Response Brief and Affidavits

John T. Mitchell

SCHE

OPPELT

Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and
Initial Pretrial Order

John T. Mitchell

HRSC

OPPELT

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial - 5 Days
03/25/2014 09:00 AM)

John T. Mitchell

12/9/2013

MEMO

HENDRICKSO

Memorandum Decision and Order Denying
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

John T. Mitchell

12/18/2013

STIP

OPPELT

Stipulation for Reciprocal Preliminary Injunction

John T. Mitchell

ORDR

OPPELT

Reciprocal Preliminary Injunction Order

John T. Mitchell

CINF

KRAMES

Faxed Reciprocal Preliminary Injunction Order,
Stipulation for Reciprocal Preliminary Injunction
and Scheduling Order to Judge Mitchell per
request

John T. Mitchell

MOVA

KRAMES

Stipulated Motion To Vacate Trial Date

John T. Mitchell

ORDR

OPPELT

Order Vacating Trial Date

John T. Mitchell

CONT

OPPELT

Hearing result for Jury Trial - 5 Days scheduled
on 03/25/2014 09:00 AM: Continued

John T. Mitchell

HRSC

OPPELT

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial - 5 Days
10/28/2014 09:00 AM)

John T. Mitchell

NOHG

HENDRICKSO

Notice of Hearing
re: Defenant's Motionfor Leave to File
Interlocutory Appeal

John T. Mitchell

HRSC

HENDRICKSO

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/21/2014 03:30
John T. Mitchell
PM) Kootenai County
Defendant's Motion for Leave to File Interlocutory
Appeal

5/8/2014

MEMO

HENDRICKSO

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to
File Interlocutory Appeal (I.AR 12(a))

John T. Mitchell

5/14/2014

MISC

OPPELT

City of Sand point's Response to Defendant's
Motion for Leave to File Interlocutory Appeal

John T. Mitchell

5/15/2014

FIOC

OPPELT

File Out Of County- Judge Mitchell

John T. Mitchell

5/19/2014

REPL

HENDRICKSO

Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for
leave to File Interlocutory Appeal

John T. Mitchell

12/3/2013

·3/3/2014

3/4/2014

5/7/2014

Judge
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City

District

Date

Code

User

5/21/2014

DCHH

HENDRICKSO

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
John T Mitchell
05/21/2014 03:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hel<
Court Reporter: Julie Foland
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Kootenai County
Defendant's Motion for Leave to File Interlocutory
Appeal

5/27/2014

NOHG

KRAMES

Notice Of Hearing
re: Pit's Motion for Summary Judgment

John T. Mitchell

HRSC

KRAMES

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 07/22/2014 04:00 PM) Plaintiffs
Motion

John T. Mitchell

MOTN

HENDRICKSO

City of Sandpoint's Motion for Summary Judgmen1 John T. Mitchell
[Oral Argument Requested]

MEMO

HENDRICKSO

City of Sandpoint's Memorandum in Support of
Summary Judgment

John T. Mitchell

6/12/2014

ORDR

HENDRICKSO

Order Granting Rule 12 Interlocutory Appeal
Certification

John T. Mitchell

6/23/2014

MOTN

HUMRICH

Motion for Appeal by Permission and Stay of
Proceedings - filed with ISC

John T. Mitchell

MEMO

HUMRICH

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Appeal by John T. Mitchell
Permission - filed with ISC

7/7/2014

CINF

HUMRICH

Clerk Information - Still before ISC; have not
made a decision on Motion yet

John T. Mitchell

7/8/2014

AFFD

HENDRICKSO

Affidavit of Marj Tilley

John T. Mitchell

AFFD

HENDRICKSO

Second Affidavit of Marj Tilley

John T. Mitchell

AFFD

HENDRICKSO

Affidavit of Julie Bishop

John T. Mitchell

MEMO

HENDRICKSO

Memorandum in Response to City of Sanpoint's
Motion for Summary Judgment

John T. Mitchell

7/9/2014

MEMO

HUMRICH

City of Sandpoint's Memorandum in Opposition to John T. Mitchell
Motion for Appeal by Permission (filed with ISC)

7/15/2014

REPL

HENDRICKSO

City of Sanpoint's Reply in Support of Summary
Judgment

7/22/2014

DCHH

OPPELT

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell
scheduled on 07/22/2014 04:00 PM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Julie Foland
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Plaintiffs Motion - Less Than 100
Pages
(To be held in Kootenai County)

6/4/2014

John T. Mitchell
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City of Sandpoint vs. Independent Highway District
of

District

VS.

Date

Code

User

7/22/2014

CMIN

OPPELT

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion for Summary Judgment
Hearing date: 7/22/2014
Time: 4:01 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Julie Foland
Minutes Clerk: Jeanne Clausen
Tape Number: Kootenai Co.
Susan Weeks
Mr. Anderson for the plaintiff

John T. Mitchell

7/29/2014

ORDR

HUMRICH

Order Denying Motion for Appeal by Permission

John T. Mitchell

SCDF

HUMRICH

Supreme Court Document Filed- Order Denying
Motion for Appeal by Permission

John T. Mitchell

MEMO

OPPELT

Memorandum Decision and Order Granting
Plaintiff City of Sandpoint's Motion for Summary
Judgment

John T. Mitchell

ORDR

OPPELT

Order Granting Declaratory Relief

John T. Mitchell

MISC

HENDRICKSO

******END OF FILE #1******BEGIN FILE #2******

John T. Mitchell

NOTC

HENDRICKSO

Notice of Presentment
(without oral argument)

John T. Mitchell

MOTN

HENDRICKSO

City of Sandpoint's Motion for Award of Attorney's John T. Mitchell
Fees and Costs

MEMO

HENDRICKSO

City of Sandpoint's Memorandum in Support of
Attorney's Fees anc Costs

John T. Mitchell

MEMO

HENDRICKSO

Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit of C.
Matthew Andersen in Support of Attoney's Fees
and Costs

John T. Mitchell

ORDR

CMOORE

Order Granting Request for Attorney's Fees and
Costs

John T. Mitchell

JDMT

CMOORE

Declaratory and Monetary Judgment

John T. Mitchell

ORDR

CMOORE

Amended Order Granting Request for Attorney's
Fees and Costs

John T. Mitchell

JDMT

CMOORE

Amended Declaratory and Monetary Judgment

John T. Mitchell

MOTN

HENDRICKSO

Motion for Reconsideration

John T. Mitchell

OBJC

HENDRICKSO

Objection to Memorandum of Costs and Attorney John T. Mitchell
Fees and Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney
Fees

AFFD

HENDRICKSO

Affidavit of Susan P. Weeks in Opposition to
Motion for Attorney Fees

John T. Mitchell

MEMO

HENDRiCKSO

Memorandum in Support of Objection to
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees and
Motin to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees

John T. Mitchell

AFFD

HENDRICKSO

Affiavit of Brent Featherston

John T. Mitchell

7/31/2014

8/13/2014

8/21/2014

8/22/2014

8/27/2014

8/28/2014
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of
Date

District
Code

User

Judge

BRACKETT

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to John T. Mitchell
Supreme Court Paid by: Weeks, Susan P.
(attorney for Independent Highway District)
Receipt number: 0014399 Dated: 9/4/2014
Amount $129.00 (Check) For Independent
Highway District (defendant)

BNDC

BRACKETT

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 14400 Dated
9/4/2014 for 100.00)

John T. Mitchell

APSC

HUMRICH

Appealed To The Supreme Court

John T. Mitchell

NOTA

HUMRICH

NOTICE OF APPEAL

John T. Mitchell

9/8/2014

AFFD

HENDRICKSO

Affidavit of Douglas S. Marfice

John T. Mitchell

9/9/2014

NOHG

HENDRICKSO

John T. Mitchell
Notice of Hearing
re: Plaintiffs Motion for Permanent Injunction and
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for
Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs

HRSC

HENDRICKSO

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/23/2014 02:30
PM) to be heard in Kootenai County
Plaintiffs Motion for Permanent Injunction and
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for
Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs

John T. Mitchell

9/15/2014

MISC

HUMRICH

Clerk's Records due 11/19/2014 to ISC

John T. Mitchell

9/18/2014

REQU

HENDRICKSO

Request for Additional Record

John T. Mitchell

9/19/2014

REQU

HUMRICH

Request for Additional Record (certified copy
mailed to ISC 9/24/2014)

John T. Mitchell

9/23/2014

SCDF

HUMRICH

Supreme Court Document Filed- "ORDER
CONDITIONALLY DISMISSING APPEAL"

John T. Mitchell

9/25/2014

CCOA

HUMRICH

Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal

John T. Mitchell

10/7/2014

ORDR

OPPELT

Order Vacating Trial

John T. Mitchell

HRVC

OPPELT

Hearing result for Jury Trial - 5 Days scheduled
on 10/28/2014 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated

John T. Mitchell

FIOC

OPPELT

File Out Of County - Judge Mitchell

John T. Mitchell

RSPN

HENDRICKSO

City of Sandpoint's Reponse to Motion for
Reconsideration and Reply to Opposition to
Attorney Fees Award

John T. Mitchell

SCDF

HUMRICH

Supreme Court Document Filed- "Response to
Conditional Dismissal and Request Appeal Be
Retained"

John T. Mitchell

CINF

HUMRICH

Appellant requested an extension of time to
10/30/2014 to obtain final judgment

John T. Mitchell

9/4/2014

10/8/2014

10/17/2014

Date: 6/19/2015
Time: 09:

First Judicial District Court - Bonner County

M

User:

ROA Report
Case: CV-2013-0001342 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell
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City of Sandpoint vs. Independent Highway District

City of

vs.

Highway District

Date

Code

User

10/23/2014

DCHH

OPPELT

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
John T. Mitchell
10/23/2014 02:30 PM: District Court Hearing He!<
Court Reporter: Julie Foland
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: to be heard in Kootenai County
Plaintiff's Motion for Permanent Injunction and
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for
Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs - Less Than
100 Pages

10/24/2014

MEMO

OPPELT

Memorandum Decision and Order Granting in
Part (As to Timing of this Court's Prior Decision)
and Denying in Part (as to Amount of Attorney
Fees Previously Awarded) Defendant IHD's
Motion for Reconsideration of Attorney Fees

John T. Mitchell

10/28/2014

CMIN

OPPELT

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion for Attorneys Fees
Hearing date: 10/28/2014
Time: 10:28 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Linda Oppelt
Tape Number:
Susan Weeks

John T. Mitchell

NOFH

OPPELT

Notice Of Hearing Re: Defendant's Motion for
Presentment of Judgment

John T. Mitchell

HRSC

OPPELT

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Presentment of
Judgment 11/19/2014 02:00 PM) In Kootenai
County

John T. Mitchell

11/4/2014

SCDF

HUMRICH

Supreme Court Document Filed- Order Granting
Extension of Time to Obtain a Final Judgment

John T. Mitchell

11/13/2014

JDMT

OPPELT

Second Amended Declaratory and Monetary
Judgment [Proposed]

John T. Mitchell

MISC

HUMRICH

Email dated 11/13/2014 from ISC to Counsels

John T. Mitchell

CDIS

HENDRICKSO

Civil Disposition entered for: Independent
Highway District, Defendant; City of Sandpoint,
Plaintiff. Filing date: 11/13/2014

John T. Mitchell

11/18/2014

CINF

HUMRICH

Certified "Second Amended Declaratory and
Monetary Judgment [Proposed]" mailed to ISC

John T. Mitchell

11/21/2014

FIRT

HENDRICKSO

File Returned

John T. Mitchell

11/24/2014

JDMT

CMOORE

Final Judgment

John T. Mitchell

12/2/2014

FIOC

OPPELT

File Out Of County - Judge Mitchell

John T. Mitchell

12/8/2014

MEMO

HENDRICKSO

Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to John T. Mitchell
Alter or Amend Judgment

MEMO

HENDRICKSO

John T. Mitchell
Amended Memorandum in Support of
Defendant's Motion top Alter or Amend Judgment

CINF

HUMRICH

Email Kootenai county for copy of Final Judgment John T. Mitchell
filed 11/24/2014

12/16/2014

Date: 6/19/2015

First Judicial District Court - Bonner County

Time: 09:1

ROA Report
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User: HUMRICH

City of Sandpoint vs. Independent Highway District

of

District

vs.

Date

Code

User

12/30/2014

RSPN

HENDRICKSO

City of Sandpoints Response to Defendant's
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment

John T. Mitchell

MISC

HENDRICKSO

Declaration of C. Matthew Andersen

John T. Mitchell

NOHG

HENDRICKSO

Notice of Hearing
re: Defendant's Motion to Alter or
AmendJudgment

John T Mitchell

HRSC

HENDRICKSO

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/03/2015 02:30
PM) Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment

John T. Mitchell

2/5/2015

NOHG

HENDRICKSO

Notice Of Hearing
re: {correcting Changer Facsimile Number)

John T. Mitchell

2/17/2015

MISC

HUMRICH

Reset due dates for clerk's records - due to ISC
4/21/2015

John T. Mitchell

3/26/2015

NOHG

HENDRICKSO

John T. Mitchell
Second Amended Notice of Hearing
re: Independent Highway District's Motion to Alter
or Amend Judgment

HRSC

HENDRICKSO

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/08/2015 04:00
PM) Independent Highway District 's Motion to
Alter or Amend Judgment

John T. Mitchell

4/2/2015

MEMO

OPPELT

Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment

John T. Mitchell

4/8/2015

CTLG

OPPELT

Court Log- From Kootenai County

John T. Mitchell

DCHH

OPPELT

John T. Mitchell
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
04/08/2015 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel<
Court Reporter: Julie Foland
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Independent Highway District's
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment - Less Than
100 Pages

DENY

OPPELT

John T. Mitchell
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
04/08/2015 04:00 PM: Motion Denied
Independent Highway District's Motion to Alter or
Amend Judgment

4/10/2015

ORDR

HENDRICKSO

Order Denying Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment

John T. Mitchell

5/28/2015

FIRT

OPPELT

File Returned

John T. Mitchell

6/17/2015

MOTN

HUMRICH

Motion for Extension of Time by Clerk of District
Court or Administrative Agency

John T. Mitchell

2/4/2015

Judge

Street
Sandpoint,
83864
Telephone: 208.263.0534
Facsimile: 208.255.1368
scampbell@ci.sandpoint.id.us
Bar No. 4121

!N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal corporation
of

State

Idaho,
Plaintiff,
COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

vs.
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho,

Filing Fee A: Exempt

Defendant

COMES NOW Plaintiff, City of Sandpoint, by and through the undersigned City Attorney,
for a cause of action and claim for relief against the Defendant, Independent Highway District,
and hereby complains and alleges as follows:

PARTIES
1.

existing under
County, Idaho.

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff City of Sandpoint {"City") is a municipal corporation
by virtue of the laws of the State of Idaho and is located
\Nas incorporated in

and

a current population

org~nized and
Bonner

was

2.

as

State

II
JURISDICTION ANO VENUE

conduct which forms the basis for the causes of action set forth 1-ierein

3.
occurred

Bonner County Idaho. Accordingly, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction
1

over this matter pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 1-701 and 1-705. In addition, the legal rights
of the parties are affected by a Stipulation for Settlement dated

3, 2003, a Joint Powers

Agreement by and between City and District dated July 8, 2003, as amended by a
Memorandum of Understanding executed on or about September 14, 2005. A copy of the
Stipulation for Settlement is attached hereto as

. A copy of the Joint Powers

Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". A copy of the Memorandum of Understanding is
attached hereto as Exhibit "C". Exhibits "B" and "C" are collectively referred to as the
"Agreements
4.
Accordingly,

11
•

Defendant is a highway district located wholly within Bonner County, Idaho.
is court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant pursuant to Idaho Code Section

5-514.

5.

Declaratory relief is presently necessary and appropriate so that the

determine and exercise its rights under the Agreements.

COMPLAINT

2

may

Iii

CITY OF SANDPOINT v SANDPOINT !NDEPENDFNT HIGHWAY DISTRICT

Docket Nos. 19618 & 20749
126 Idaho 145,879 P.2d 1078 (Idaho 1994)

7.

On or about August 1994,

Idaho Supreme Court decided, in a consolidation

of two appeals, the respective responsibilities for streets in the City.
8.

The Court determined that (1) The District has supervisory authority to maintain

streets within the District absent a showing by the City that it has a functioning street
department (emphasis added), and

The District has exclusive power to vacate st-eets

its boundaries where the City does not have a functioning street department (emphasis added).
9.

By Memorandum of Understanding effective September 14, 2005 the District

granted the City the right and power to vacate streets and rights-of-way within City limits,
subject to the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding and Idaho Code.

SANDPOINT INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT v BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
Docket No. 27194
138 Idaho 887, 71 P.3d 1034 {Idaho 2003)

10.

On or about April 2000, citizens in Bonner County submitted a petition to the

Board of Commissioners for Bonner County requesting that the District be dissolved and that
Street Department be placed in charge of all streets in the City.

11.

Following multiple

and public testimony, the County Commissioners

by the voters.
COMPLAINT

3

to

court.
upon

14.

District appealed the district court opinion to the Idaho Supreme Court.
On June 4, 2003,

15.

Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commissioners,

dissolution of the District could be determined by the voters. 138 Idaho 887, 71

holding

P.3d 1034 (2003).

16.

Sandpoint could not be

1811

in Section (

that "all surplus moneys of the dissolved highway district remaining

of the dissolved
operation

succeeding operational unit because Idaho Code 40-

and Section

shall immediately be delivered to the treasurer of the
states that "No city whose incorporated limits lie

or partially within the boundaries of a dissolved highway district shall be entitled to
receive any share of the moneys of the dissolved highway district."
17.

case was remanded to the district court for further action consistent with

Idaho Supreme Court's opinion.

CITY OF SANDPOINTV SANDPOINT INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT

Docket No. 27441
139 Idaho 65, 72 P.3d 905 (Idaho 2003)

18.
support

During the same time that the residents of the City obtained signatures of
dissolution of the District, the City was developing a fully functioning street

department.

COMPLAINT

4

storm water

snow

street

20.

2000,

On

functional street

suit

a

judgment

it has a

and therefore has exclusive general supervisory authority for

its streets.
21.
function
streets,

Idaho Supreme Court determined that although the City of Sandpoint had a
street department, the District continued to have jurisdiction over the City
the District's jurisdiction over those streets is lawfully terminated.
STIPULATION FOR SETTLEMENT

22.
Court

For a period of approximately three years 1 pending resolution by the Supreme

Dockets 27194 and 27441, the City controlled and maintained the streets within the

23.

During this same period, without annexation into the District, the District

controlled and maintained certain streets outside the City of Sandpoint in Ponderay and Dover.
24.

As a result of the Supreme Court opinion in Docket 27194, the County

Commission was continuing with dissolution of the District.
25.

To avoid complete dissolution 1 the District agreed with the City that the City

continue to operate and maintain its own streets and the District would continue in
existence

COMPLAiNT

opportunity to annex neighboring cities.

5

was a

26.

11,

27

a.

Streets.

and control over current

shall retain

Recognition of the City jurisdiction shall be set forth in a

Powers

Agreement.

c. Joint Powers Agreement will provide for

division of all ad valorem funds

received under Idaho Code 8-40.
d.

Joint Powers Agreement is a permanent resolution subject to
termination only by mutual agreement of both parties.

e.

Division of funds shall be made twice yearly.
(emphasis added) ad valorem property tax

District to pay over to

received from levies by the District upon all property located
the City.
g. The City would not continue to seek dissolution of the District.
h

The City would not oppose annexation elections sought

i.

The current lawsuit would be dismissed with prejudice.

District.

immediately enter into a Joint Powers Agreement to carry
out the terms of the Stipulation for Settlement.

COMPLAINT

6

JOINT POWERS AGREEMENT

a
sections 67
Joint powers agreements enable state and public agencies to

29.
use

powers and cooperate to
purpose

30.

most

advantage.

the Joint Powers

was to divide the

maintenance and control of streets and public rights of way, and compensate the City by
transferring all tax revenues collected from properties within the City, for street work
performed by in the City.

3L

Idaho Code §67-2332 provides

public agencies may contract

to "perform any governmental service, activity, or undertaking which each
contract is authorized by

to

induding1 but not

each other
agency
to joint

contracting for services, supplies and capital equipment, provided that such contract shall be
authorized by the governing body of each party to the contract."
32.

The City has fully functioning Street and Planning Departments enabling the City

to fully perform the functions anticipated by the Joint Powers Agreement.

IV
COUNT ONE

(Breach of Contract)

33.

City realieges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in

Paragraphs one

COMPLAINT

above.

7

entities.
at

a Joint Powers

35.
the Court.

36.

The purpose

the Agreement vvas to resolve issues bet\lveen

37.

in exchange

not seeking the complete dissolution

District, the District

negotiated a compromise settlement agreement with the City.

38.
approved

The Stipulation for Settlement between the City and the District that was
District Court states: "Said joint powers agreement is intended to be

by mutual agreement of both parties.

to termination
Powers Agreement dated

39.

agreement shall be perpetual or

a

8, 2003 states:

of

such time as the District and the City jointly and together

agree to amend or terminate the same."

40.

On July 11, 2013, the District notified the City that they were withholding funds

were not going to perform a material term
attached as

41.

the agreement. A copy of the notice is

ibit
On July 25, 2013,

District notified the City that they were unilaterally

terminating the entire Joint Powers Agreement in violation of the court directive and the terms
A copy of the notice is attached as Exhibit "E".

of the

42.

Without prior notice, or any discussions with the City, and with the intent of
needed by

COMPLAINT

8

to

into

43.

may not be able to

As a
not

current

projects determined necessary

able to construct

the

Street
contends:

44.

a.

The Joint Powers Agreement is a lawful division of governmental powers.
City is entitled

Idaho Code § 40-801(1}(a) to receive one half

ad

valorem property taxed collected by the District in the City.
C.

City is

by contract to receive an additional one half of the ad

valorem property tax, including penalties and

collected in the

as a result of having a fully functioning street department and in
compensation for performing all the duties agreed to in the Joint Powers
Agreement.
d. The transfer by the District, a governmental entity, of the additional one half
of the ad valorem property tax to the City, another governmental entity, is
not an indebtedness or liability of the District under Article Eight, Section
Three of the Idaho Constitution.

e.

even if the collection and distribution of the ad
considered

COMPLAINT

it falls

9

tax is
as an

and

expense

state

streets

V

DECLARATION OF PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS
45.

District's notice of intent not to honor the Joint Power Agreement (See Exhibits
Code§§ 67-2326

that governs relations between

governmental entities.

46.

District's actions

the Supreme

a fully

a
Cases

street department at set

recognition

powers retained

in previous Supreme Court

the parties, as cited above.
actions

47.

terms of the Settlement Agreement wherein

City

compromised its claims against the District in favor of a joint resolution as directed by the Court
is entitled to a judicial determination and declaration that:

48.

a. City is

to

benefit of its bargain negotiated between the City and

the District;
b. The Joint Powers Agreement does not violate Article Eight, Section Three of
the Idaho Constitution;

COMPLAINT

C.

Settlement does not violate Idaho Code §40-801; and

d.

Joint Powers Agreement is a valid and enforceable contract between the

10

VI
PRl=I IMINL!.RV ANn

Joint Power Agreement

50.

to

duties pursuant to Idaho Code §50-301.
the

51.
of a

in
a.

Powers Agreement entitles

to

permanent injunction requiring District to:

Cease

the City1s operation and maintenance

its streets

Joint Powers Agreement; and

Immediately

to the

all tax revenues, including penalties and
and currently being withheld from the City.

interest

VII
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS

action, and

required to expend funds to retain counsel to prosecute

has

52.

to recover reasonable costs and attorney fees as provided by

therefore,

law and the Idaho Rules of
§

and

of

Procedure, induding but not limited to, Idaho Code Sections
1

Procedure 54.

VIII
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff

Sandpoint prays for judgment against Defendant Independent

as

COMPLAINT

11

2.

Powers

a
pursuant to

exercise

3.
into

For a

4.

For an order

maintenance

5.

2005 is a

to

Understanding

exercise of governmental

the District

its streets

interference

the City's operation

Joint Powers

For an order requiring the District to immediately transfer to the City all ad

valorem taxes collected

6.

Code§§ 67-2326 through 67-2332;
Memorandum

parties on

is a

District and

being withheld by the District;

For a

requiring

District to comply

by
7.

For costs

including

fees; and

8.

For such other relief as the Court deems appropriate and proper.

CITY OF SANDPOINT

R. Campbell
"
Attorney for the City of Sandpoint

COMPLAINT

12

She is the Mayor for the City of Sandpoint, the Plaintiff in the above entitled matter;
She has read and understands the contents of the forgoing complaint;
The statements and allegations contained therein are true and correct to the best of her
personal knowledge, information and belief.
DATED the

Marsha Ogilvie, Mayor

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonner

) ss
)

ON THIS_,__ day of
2013, before me, a Notary Public in and for the
State of Idaho, appeared Marsha Ogilvie and acknowledged to me that she is the Mayor of the
City of Sandpoint and that the foregoing complaint is true and correct to the best of her
knowledge, information and belief.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereto set my hand and affixed my official seal the date
and year in this certificate first above written.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at: _.;.._............;._;.___ _ _~

COMPLAINT

ORIGINAL

Attorney at Law
'P, 0, Box A

Coeur d1AJene, ID 83816
PhOne (Z08) 664-2161
FAX (208) 765~5117
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT CO'VllT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN A."lD FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal
corporation of the State of !d'aho,

)
)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

\IS,

)

SANDPOINT INDEPENDE~"T

)

HIGHWAY DIST1UCT, a political
subdivision of the State cf Idaho1

)

Case No, CV..00-00615

STIPULATION FOR SETTL,EMENT

)

)

)

Defendant.

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff City of Sandpoint and defendant Sandpoint Independent

Highway District, acting through respective counsel and with the approval of
the governing board of each present to the Court the following findings:
L

In this case, the judgment of District Judge James F. Judd granting

summary judgment ·to the City of Sandpoint entered November 28, 2000

awarded to the City of Sandpoint exclusive jurisdiction and control cf
maintenance of all streets within the city limits of the City cf Sandpoint
S'I1PULA.Tl'.ON FOR SETTLEMENT

l

!

I

a

2.

streets.

3.

The Sandpoint Independent H1ghway District has jurisdiction

control certain streets and roads outside of the city limits.
4,

The City of Sandpoint and the Sandpoint Independent Highway

District have cooperated in the funding of certain projects within the city limits.
5.

The Sandpoint Independent Highway District has been providing

semces to the City of Pond~ray and the CitY of Dover and has sought through
the Bonner County Board of Commissioners to annex both cities. The county

has deferred action upon the annexations.
6.

On June 19. 2003, th.e Idaho Supreme Court reversed the judgment

of Judge Judd remanding this case to the district court. Idaho Supreme Court
Docket No. 27441.

1.

In a companion case, Sandpoint Independent Highway District v.

Board of Commissioners of Bonnet County, in which the City of Sandpoint is

an intervenor. District Judge .fames F. Judd entered partial summary judgment
on December 29. 2000 affirming the order of the Bonner· County
Commissioners that an election on dissolution of the Sandpoint Independent

Highway District should be held, Bonner County Case No. CV--00-00788,
STIPULATION FOR SETILEMEt-.i'T

2
rsvz 99z aoe

8.
oart
"

affirmed the order of Judge Judd directing that a dissolution election should
be held. Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 27194,
9.

The opinion.of the Idaho Supreme Court remanded the case to the

Bonner County Board of Commissioners which is now considering setting a
date for a dissolution election.
10.

The City of Sandpoint and the Sandpoint Independent Highway

District have now determined, based upon their respective experiences with

street control and maintenance engaged in each since the district court decision

was entered and the City of Sandpoint assumed jurisdiction and contro!

1

that

the interests of the taxpayers within the respective entities and of the road
users would best be served by ¢0ntinuation of the present arrangement. Based
upon the experience of the past three years, it is agreed that the City of
Sandpoint should maintain its own streets and the Sandpoint Independent

Highway District should continue in existence with the opportunity to expand
to neighboring cities by annexation.

STIPULATION FOR SEITLEMENT

3

SO'd

concur
not
best interest& of the public.

Based upon these findings. the parties stipulate and agree to the

following;
L

The City of Sandpoint shall retain jurisdiction and control over all

streets now within its city limits and as may subsequently be annexed into the

city.

Recognition of the city jurisdiction shall be set forth in a joint powers

agreement as provided hereafter.

2.

The Sandpoint Independent Highway District and the City of

Sandpoint shall enter into a joint powers agreement made pursuant to Chapter
23, Title 67, Idaho Code which will provide for division of all ad valorem funds

received under Chapter B, Title 40, Idaho Code. Said joint powers agreement
is intended to be a permanent resolution subject to termination only by mutual .
..

agreement of both parties. The division of funds shall be made twice yearly,

The joint powers agreement would provide that the Sandpoint Independent

Highway District pay over to the City of Sandpoint all ad valorem property tax
funds received from levies by the District upon all property located within the

city limits. The joint powers agreement would cover other matters as are
appropriate. The tax revenues from district levies upon property within the city
STIPULATION FOR SE'ITLEMENT

4
!JO'd

"'.'V 'J

to

cu:r:rent

3.

The City of Sandpoint, which joined as a petitioner in seeking the

dissolution election, would now request the Bonner County Board of
Commissioners to vacate the dissolution elec.tion and stipulate to dismiss case
No. CV-00-00?ss with prejudice.
4.

The City of Sandpoint will not oppose annexation elections sought

by the Sandpoint Independent Highway District-

5.

The Sandpoint Independent Highway District would waive costs

awarded on appeal by the Idaho Supreme Court in Docket No. 27441,
6.

The parties will immediately proceed to enter into a joint powers

agreement to carry out the terms of this stipulation for settlement.
7.

This case may be dismissed with prejudice, ~1th each party to bear

its own costs and attorney's fees,
Dated this

-2.. d?,y of July, 2003.

~

:.':a.J'"'•......' ,.,,,,,-~-""'

(..,._
~

\

C:::~--~~

1

?~_f)
/

Scott W, R e e d ·

~

Bruce H. Greene
Attorney for Sandpoint Independent
Highway District

STIPtJLATION FOR SETI'LEMf.NT

EXHIBIT B

And
SA1"\JTIPOINT INTIEPENDE~'T IDGHW AY

RRC'TTAI.~

_g!_

This Joint Powers Agreement is made this
day of July, 2003, between
the Sandpoint Independent Highway District, P. 0. Box 1047, Sandpoint, Idaho
83864 (hereinafter referred to as HDISTR1CT"), and the City of Sandpoint, 1123
Lake Street, Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 (hereinafter referred to as "CITY"), who enter
this agreement pursuant to the provisions, terms and conditions of Idaho Chapter 23,
Title 67, Idaho Code.

DURATION:

The duration of this agreement shall be perpetual or until
such time as the District and the City jointly and together
agree to amend or terminate the same.

PREAMBLE:

The parties have entered into a stipulation filed of record
in City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent .l{ighway
District, Bonner County Case No. CV-00-00615 which
provides for execution of this joint powers agreement.

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this agreement is to divide the jurisdiction,
maintenance and control of streets and public rights of
way within the boundaries of the district between the
District and the City an.d provide for sharing of ad
valorem tax revenue.

JURJSDICTION,
MAINTENANCE
A..~1) CO:N"'TR.OL: The City shall exercise exclusive general supervisory authority
over all the streets and public rights of way within the city
limits of the City of Sandpoint including any property
subsequently annexed.

-1-

The District shall exercise exclusive general supervisory
authority over all streets and public rights of way within
the boundaries of the District lying outside of the city
limits of the City of Sandpoint
SlJPERV1SORY
AUTHORITY:

The supervisory authority of the City and of the District,
each within the boundaries described above, shall include
the follovving:
1.

2.
3.

5.
6,
7.
8.

9.

10.
11.

12.
13.
14.

Acquisitions, vacations and abandonments.
Acceptance of streets and rights of way.
Construction, creation a.Tid opening of streets and
rights of ways.
Extension, modifications and realignments of same.
Controlling access to streets and rights of ways,
encroachment pennits.
Design and use standards.
Traffic control, striping and signage.
Review of proposed subdivisions as regards to
streets and storm drain systems and inspection of
construction as the same proceeds.
Sidewalks.
Parking.
Street lights and such utilities as may be located
within the public streets and right of way.
All ordinary and necessary maintenance of streets
a..'ld rights of way.
Franchise involving street rights of way.
Police regulations.

,..,,
-L-

Between

Exercise of the above supervisory authority does not

.preclude cooneration between the entities for the com..111on
~

benefit of the residents. Cooperation and shared services
will be expected.
The City will have the final say over all street matters
within its boundaries, and the District over those streets
outside the City

REVENlJE
DISTRIBlJTION. l,

The District at the present time and in the future will levy
and apply for ad valorem property taxes under the
autJ1ority granted in Chapter 13, Title 40, Idaho Code. The
District will pay over to the City all property tax funds
such District IeVIes on ail property located within the
city limits.
On the basis of present tax rates this amount is presently
approximately $350,000 per year. District, upon receipt of
tax revenues, forward to the City all tax revenues
received by the District collected from properties vvithin
the City on November 1st, February 1st, May 1st and
August 1st respectively. The first required payment

herein shall commence with the funds budgeted for 2003,
and receivable in January 2004. This shall include
transfer of funds in 2003, when such money is available
and not already con:u"llitted by the District.
2.

District agrees to additionally provide highway services
with or without equipment vv:ithin the City. Such services
may include regular maintenance, assistance on special
projects, or other assistance as may be agreed to by the
City1s Public Works Director or Mayor, and the Districfs
Board of Directors or Foreman. Services to be provided
will be on an as needed and as available basis.
-3-

COOPERATION: The parties recognize that road maintenance requirements on
occasion require more personnel and equipment th::ln the
responsible entity may have at that time. The parties
agree to share personnel and equipment upon an as
needed and available basis for road maintenance projects
within the city limits of Sandpoint
INTIE:t\1NIFICATION:
1.
City agrees to defend, indemnify and hold harmless
the District from all liability or expense on account of
claims, suits, and costs growing out of or connected with
the City's negligent or 'Wrongful exercise of rights granted
herein, if any, provided the District will not be relieved of
liability for its own wrongful acts and negligence and that
of its employees, agents, and assigns.
2.
District agrees to indemnify, defend and hold the
City harmless from all liabilities, judgments, costs,
damages and expenses which may accrue against, be
charged to, or recovered from City by reason of or on
account of damage to City property, or the property of,
inJury to, or death of any person, when such damage or
injury is caused by District's employees, subcontractors,
or agents while within the City for maintenance or other
District work

PERSONNEL:

The parties agree that District personnel operating '\-Vithin
the City are in no way employees or agents of City and
are not entitled.to worker's compensation or any benefit of
employment with the City, and that City persormel are in
no way employees or agents of District and are not
entitled to worker's compensation or any benefit of
employment with the District

-4-

Between

lliTIEPENDENT HlGH\VAY

DISSOLUTION:

This Agreement wiH automatically terminate if th.e District is
dissolved. It will also tenninate if the City supports any
future petition for dissolution of District

SE\lERABILITY
CLAUSE:

If any portion of this Agreement is held to be invalid or
unenforceable for any reason, the remaining provisions
shall continue to be valid &TJ.d enforceable. If a Court
finds that any provision of this Agreement 1s mvalid or
unenforceable, but that by limiting such provision, it
would become valid and enforceable, then such provision
shall be deemed to be written, construed, and enforced as
so limited.

IN W1ThTESS WHEREOF, the District, by and through its commissioners
and the City, by and through its Mayor and City Clerk have executed this
Agreement to be effective the first date indicated above.
DATED this

_2.!!:day of July, 2003.

HIGHWAY DISTRICT
~ARD OF CO:M:MISSIONERS

~
hllinnan

Commissioner

CITY OF SANDPOINT

EXHIBIT C

TITLE:

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING

WHEREAS: The Independent Highway District has title to the streets and rights-of-way
within the city but by mutual agreement the city has control of all streets
and rights-of-ways within the city; and,
VVHEREAS: It has become necessary to simplify and clarify the process of vacating
streets and rights-of-way within the City limits by notifying the Independent
Highway District prior to public hearing to allow the District to object.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED THAT: The Memorandum of Understanding
between the Independent Highway District and the City of Sandpoint, a
copy of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof as if fully
incorporated herein, be approved and the mayor and City Clerk be
authorized to execute same on behalf of the City.

ATTEST:

m~P~

Maree Peck, City Clerk
City Council Members:

1
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Elliott
Motion
Ogilvie
Second
Boge
Burgstahler

Spickelmire
Lamson

YES
X
X

NO

ABSTAIN

ABSENT

X
X

X
X

MEMORANDUM OF U1'1DERSTA1'1>ING
THIS AGREEI'v1EN1, entered into between the City of Sandpoint, I 123 Lake Street,
Sandpoint, Bonner County, Idaho a municipal corporation of the State of Idaho herein referred to
as "CITY" and the Independent Highway District, a Governmental Subdivision of the State of
Idaho, P.O. Box 1047, Sandpoint, Idaho, herein referred to as "IlID",
WHEREAS, the IfID has title to the streets and rights-of-way within the city but by

mutual agreement the CITY has control of all streets and rights-of-way within the CITY; and
V\"HEREAS, the boundaries of the CITY remain within the boundaries of the IlID; and
\V'HEREAS, it is necessary, from time to time, to vacate streets and rights-of-way within
the CITY.
NOW THEREFORE, the CITY and the IlID hereby agree as follows:
1.

The CITY shall have the right and power to vacate streets and rights-of-way
within CITY limits subject to the provisions of this Agreement and Idaho Code.

2.

The CITY shall notify IlID in writing prior to any public hearing regarding the
vacating of a right-of-way within CITY limits.

3.

If no written objection to the request to vacate is received from IHD within thirty
(30) days of said notice, the CITY may proceed with such vacation. The IHO
shall also sign off as need be on any documents relinquishing title to the vacated
way.

4.

If written objection is received from IHD stating the reasons for the objection, the
CITY shall deny the request to vacate.

5.

IlID shall defend any claim related to a IHD objection to vacation re-quest

at

vacate

streets and rights-of-way within CITY limits including provisions

required

notices and public hearings.

DATED this _ _ day of _ _ _ ___, 2005.

ATTEST:

)l10~ ~
JvlAREE PECK
CITY CLERK

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT

~0--0-4t
B

MAX

J;LL, CHAIRMA-N

9-1,;-06
DATE

9-1v-o<

DATE

&</Y_.....,,_..,..jf;eA ~ ~/~--6
SSION"'ER

<

DATE

law Offices

EXHIBIT D

SHERER & WYNKOOP, LLP
Sherer
uav1C! !::. wynKoop
at Law

730 N. Main Street
P.O. Box 3·i
Meridian. Idaho 83680-2604

_,

i"-<"""J!"',

,...,,...._,,

,<f"'>f",f"";

rrHJftt: 4Uo-oot -~ovv

Fax 208-887-4865

11, 2013

City of Sandpoint
Scot R. Campbell
Sandpoint City Attorney
11
Lake St.
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864-0871

Via ·First Class Jfail attd
Via e-mail to scampbell(a),d.sandpoint.id. us

Re: Notice (ifTerminarion (?{Revenue Sharing Agreemenl
Qffer ofSel!lemem -- IRE 408
Dear ML Campbell:
I write as attorney for the Independent Highway District ("IHD"). IHD has asked my
office to review the legality of the agreement between IHD and the City of Sandpoint ("City");
which agreement provides that IHD wilt transfer to the City all IHD levy proceeds collected
from City properties.
Our office has opined to IHD that the agreement violates Idaho law. The agreement runs
afoul of Article Eight, Section Three of the Idaho Constitution, as wel1 as Idaho Code §40-801
and several other important legal principles.
This provides formal notice that IHD wiH no longer make these illegal payments to the
City, effective immediate]y.

Offer of Settlement - Rule 408 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence,
The HID Commissioners hope to amicably and finally resolve this matter by also settling
several additional issues which remain outstanding between the City and IHD. IHD has
authorized me to make the following settlement offer to resolve these issues in return for the
City's agreement that the provisions of Idaho Code §40-801 will control future property tax
revenue sharing.

3

Also, as part of the settlement, IHD
forego any claim to recoup from the
those
amounts previously illegally paid to the City in violation ofldaho law. It is my understanding
that this amount is
million dollars.
Please respond at your earliest convenience whether the City is agreeable to IHD' s
proposed settlement agreernenL The IHD Commissioners are willing to meet with the City to
discuss and finalize the proposed settlement agreement.
Sincerely,
SHERER & WYNKOOP, LLP

Independent Highway District

Law Offices

Vilt e-mail to

was not validly entered into that it
Powers Act.
Idaho Code §67-2328.

A g, L

LU 1j

l:

r1 d! nderl rte

AM

! / :
i/

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF mE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

BONNER

FOR THE

J'

)

Plaintiff,
vs.

Th1DEPENnENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT,
Defendant.

CASE NO. CV 2013-1341

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

The Honorable Barbara Buchanan having been disqualified pursuant to Idaho Rule
40(d)(l) in the above matter now,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above matter is assigned to the Honorable

John T. Mitchell> District Judge, for the disposition of any pending and further proceeding.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following alternate judges are hereby assigned ro
preside in this case: Rich Christensen, Lansing L. Haynes, John P. Luster, Benjamin R. Simpson,
Fred M. Gibler, Charles W. Hosack, George R, Reinhardt, III, Steve Yerby. Jeff Brudie, Carl
Kerrick, John Stegner; Michael Griffin.
DATED this

y..9

dayof~2013.

L

O,AM
LANSING L.

~ESr...

k\ ~ I\ u2> -

Administrative District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAJLING
I hereby certify that on the_v_day of
was sent via facsimile, U.S. Mail, or interoffice mail

ORDER OP REASSIGNMENT:
CV

2013, a true and con-ect copy of the foregoing

to the following:

j

" r
L
'.I

DAVIDE. WYNKOOP

208-887-4800
FAX 208-887-4865
I.S.B. 2429
SUSAN P. WEEKS
JAMES, VERl~ON & WEEKS, PA
1626 LINCOLN WAY
COEUR D-ALENE, IDliliO 83814
208-667-0683
FAX 208-664-I 684
I.S.B. 4255

Attorneys for Defendant
Independent Highway District

IN THE DISTRICT

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND OF THE COUNTY OF BONNER

CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal corporation
of the State ofidaho,
Plaintiff;

vs.
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State of Idaho,
Defendant
COMES NOW Independent Highway

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO, CV 2013-01342
MOTION TO DISMISS

)
)

("District")

David E. Wynkoop of SHERER & WYNKOOP, LLP and Susan

and through its attorneys

Weeks of JAMES, VERNON

& WEEKS, P.A. and hereby moves this Court for an order dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint;

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

reasons that:

-l

Idaho Rules

Procedure.

motion is brought for the

o.

:')

0 0

a cause

statutes.
Briefing will be supplied to the com1

accordance with I.R.C.P. 7. Oral argument is

requested_

DATED this

1 fh

day of September, 2013.
SHERER & WYNKOOP, LLP

David . Wynkoop, of the fir
Attorneys for Independent Hi

MOTION TO DISMISS - 2

/) IA

I HEREBY
that on
~ day September,
I served a true and
cmTect copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS upon the following} by the method
indicated below:

Scot R Campbell
Sandpoint City Attorney
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864

MOTION TO

XX via facsimile to 208-255-1368

~S/20/2013

13:59

20855457d

JAMES VERN

PAGE

Box
Meridian, ID 83680
Te1ephone: (208) 887-4800

Facsimile (208) 887-4865
ISB No. 2429
Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A.
l 626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-0683

Facsimile: (208) 664-1684
ISB No. 4255
Attorneys for Defendant Independent Highway District

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF

IDAHDO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF BONNER
CITY OF SAl'\TDPOINT, a municipal
corporation of the State ofidaho,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ICASE NO. CV-2013~01342
DEFENDAl~T'S MOTTON FOR
ENLARGEMENT OF TIME TO FILE
BRJEF

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State of Idaho,
Defendant.

COMES NOW Defendant, Independent Highway District, by and through its attorneys of
record, David E. Wynkoop of Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP and Susan P. Weeks of James, Vernon &
Weeks, P.A. and hereby moves th.is Court, pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 6(b), for an
enlargement oftirne to October 14~ 2013, in which to file its memorandum in support ofits motion
to dismiss. This motion is made by and for the reason that counsel's case load is significant at this
time and the issues raised

the motion to dismiss are complex and require extensive research and

01/02

3

3:59

JAMES VERN

2085545741

PAGE

on

Orai argument is requested.
DATED this 20th day of September, 2013.

JAMES. VER!"-TON & WEEKS, P

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 20th day
copy of the foregoing instrument by

September. 2013, I caused to be served a true and correct
method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

•o

Scot R. Campbell
Sa.11dpoint City Attorney

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered

:D

1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, ID 83 864

Overnight Mail

/~

Telecopy (FAX) (208) 255-1368

!

1

u.S. Mail

Hon. John T. Mitchell (chamber courtesy copy)
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
T elecopy (FAX) (208) 664-1188

/I

~fuc(.&1~

DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT

TIME TO

BRIEF:2

02/02

4:00

09/

2085646741

JAMES VERN

PAGE

Menoian,
83680
Telephone: (208) 887-4800
Facsimile (208) 887-4865
ISB
2429
Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A

626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-0683
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684
ISB No. 4255
Attorneys for Defendant Independent Highway District

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST .TL"DICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHDO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BO"l\i'NER
CITY OF SANDPO]:!\;T, a municipal
corporation of the State of Idaho,

CASE NO. CV-2013-01342
NOTICE OF HEARING RE:
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
ENLP...RGEMENT OF TIME TO FILE
BRIEF

Plaintiff.

vs.
INDEPEKDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a.
political subdivision of the State of Idaho,

Date: October 23, 2013

Defendant.
Time: 2:00 p.m.

l Place:

Kootenai County Courtbouse

I
PLEASE TAKE KOTICE that on October 23, 2013, at the hour of2:00 p.m., or as soon
thereafter as the matter may be heard, in the Kootena.i County Courthouse, Defendant
Independent Highway District shall present for hearing its Motion for Enlargement of Time to

Fiie Brief before the Honorable John T. Mitchell, Defendant does not object to Plainti.ffs
NOTICE OF HEARING RE: DEFE"!\1DA.'J'T'S :MOTION FOR ENLARGEr.AENT
TO FILE BRIEF: 1

TIME

01/02

20/2013

4: 00

day

PAGE

JAMES VERN

2086646741

September,

3,

J.AJvfES, VER.i'JON & WEEKS. P.A

~

Susan P. Weeks

(2 ~d&:'.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of September, 2013, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing instrument by the met.11od indicated below, and addressed to the following:

; Scot R. Campbell
Sandpoint City Attorney
1123 Lake Street

Sandpoint, ID 83864
Hon. John T. Mitchell (chamber courtesy copy)

D

D
~/

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Te1ecopy (FAX) (208) 255-1368

P.O. Box 9000

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered

Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 81 6

Overnight l\.-fail
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 664-1188

NOTICE OF HEARING RE:

TO FILE BR1EF: 2

FOR ENLARGEMENT OF

02/02

WYNKOOP

SHERER&
McR1vIAN,
208-887-4800
FAX 208-887 -4865
I.S.B. 2429

83680

SUSAN P. WEEKS
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 838
208-667-0683
FAX 208-664-1684
I.S.B. 4255
Attorneys for Defendant
Independent Highway District
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND OF THE COUNTY OF BONNER
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal corporation
of the State of Idaho,
Plaintiff,
vs.
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State ofidaho,
Defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 2013-01342
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS

Introduction
This lawsuit follows two prior lawsuits filed by the City against the Independent
Highway District ("IHD"). Both suits went to the Idaho Supreme Court and resulted in decisions

BRIEF IN SUPPORT

MOTION TO DISMISS - l

HID

11 UH
--

geographical boundaries, including properties located within the City. Pursuant to

City is entitled to one half of the property tax proceeds collected

§40-801,

II-lD fron1

properties, and IHD is entitled to the other half.
h1 2003 the City and IHD entered into an agreement ("Agreement") purp01iing to alter
the distribution. mandated in I.C. §40-801. Based upon the Agreement, IHD turned over to the
City 100% of the IHD property tax revenue collected by IHD from City properties. The
Agreement pm·ports to create a perpetual indebtedness and liability ofIHD in favor of the City
whereby IHD shaH tum over to the City all revenues collected from City properties, one-half
the statute requires remain with IHD.

notice of termination

Agreement based upon IHD's belief that the Agreement violates Idaho's Constitution and
statutes. The City then filed this lawsuit seeking to enforce the illegal Agreement.
IHD respectfully submits that the City's lawsuit should be dismissed pursuant to I.R.C.P.
l 2(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Agreement at issue

violates Idaho's Constitution, several Idaho statutes, and public policy, and is unenforceable for
lack of consideration. Thus, the Agreement ls illegal, void and unenforceable as a matter of law.

Background
Beginning

the early 1930's IHD maintained Sandpoint City streets. The City initiated

judicial action in the early 1990's to attempt to gain control over City streets, resulting in an
Idaho Supreme Court decision of City ofSandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway District,
1

See City ofSandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist., 126 Idaho
879 P.2d 1078
Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist., l 39 Idaho 65, 72 P3d 905 (2003)

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 2

over

1323,

310

streets

is

jurisdiction" over Sandpoint streets because the

did not have a functioning street

department City

In 2000, the City passed various resolutions establishing a City street department. The
City then initiated a second lawsuit once again claiming jurisdiction over City streets. The City
sought to enjoin IHD from exercising any supervisory authority over City streets and to enjoin
IHD from making any levy upon the real property within

City. In City ofSandpoint v.

Sandpoint Independent Highway District, 139 Idaho 65, 72 P .3d 905 (2003) ("Sandpoint If'), the
Idaho Supreme Couit again held that IHD had exclusive general supervisory authority over the
City streets, again citing as authority Idaho Code §§40-1310 and 40-1323. The

held that

"the city cannot obtain jurisdiction over city streets that are within the boundaries of the
Highway District unless the High\vay District's jurisdiction over those streets is first lawfully
terminated under the appropriate statutory provisions." Sandpoint Il 139 Idaho at 70, 72 P.3d at

910.

Agreement
Following issuance of the decision in Sandpoint
illegal Agreement in 2003.

the City and IHD entered into the

had been filed and litigation ensued. The

City intervened in the litigation to support the dissolution of I.HD. As part of a settlement of that
litigation, the City and

entered into the Agreement ,vhich provided IHD would perpetually

turn over to the City aH property taxes IHD collected from City properties, thus creating for IHD
a pennanent liability

BRIEF

indebtedness

favor

SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 3

3.
IHD terminated the Agreement because the Agreement violates Idaho's Constitution, statutes,
public policy,

IHD respectfully submits that the City's Imvsuit should be dismissed pursuant to I.R.C.P.
12(b)(6) for the reason that the Agreement is illegal on

face. The Agreement violates Article

VIII, §3 of the Idaho Constitution, Idaho Code §§40-801 and 40-1333, et seq; the Joint Powers
Act, and public policy.

Idaho Constitution, Article VIII, §3

Any agreernent entered into by an Idaho public agency must be consistent
Constitution. Article

§3, which provides

incur any indebtedness, or liability,

any manner, or for

the Idaho

"'"''""'"" of the state, shall
purpose, exceeding

that year the

income and revenue provided for it in such year, without the assent of two thirds (2/3) of the
qualified electors ... Any indebtedness or liability incurred contrary to this provision shall be

void:' (Emphasis added). In the present case, the Agreement was entered into without a vote of
two-thirds of the qualified IHD electors. Since the 2003 Agreement created an indebtedness or
liability without a vote of the electors, it is void and unenforceable.
The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted Aliicle

§3 to preclude multi-

year obligations such as the illegal Agreement at issue in this case. The Idaho Supreme Court
firnt addressed this issue 100 years ago in the case of Charles Feil v.

of Coeur d'Alene, 23

Idaho 32, 129 P. 643 (1912). In that case, the city entered into a twenty year contract to purchase

BRIEF IN SUPPORT

MOTION TO DISMISS - 4

court
holding that the agreement constituted an "indebtedness or liability" extending beyond the city's
§3 of the

budget year in vi0Iatio11

history of Article VIII, §3 and noted that its language is more restrictive than virtually any other
state's constitution. The Court rejected the city's argument

because numerous other states

had upheld similar agreements that the Idaho Court should do so.
The Idaho Supreme Court noted that "[ o]ur constitution speci:ficany ~==~~~~£
the income or revenue for more than the current year." (emphasis added) Feil, 23 Idaho at 45.
"[T]he framers of our constitution employed more sweeping and prohibitive language in framing
sec. 3 of art. 8, and pronounced a more
is to be found in any other constitution to which our attention has been directed:' Feil, 23 Idaho
at 49. "The constitution not only prohibits incurring any indebtedness, but it also prohibits
incurring any liability." Feil, 23 Idaho at 49. The Court further noted that the intent of the
framers was to prevent the pledging of future income including "aU sources and kinds ofincome
or revenue" (Ibid) and that no public agency "shall incur any indebtedness or liability

any

manner, or for any purpose" beyond the budget year. Feil, 23 Idaho at 50.
The Comi then discussed the breadth of the term "liability", noting several definitions,
including " ... the state of one who is bound in law and justice to

something which

enforced by action" and "the state of being bound or obliged in law or justice to do, pay or make
good something; legal responsibility." (Ibid) This language certainly applies to the case at bar

BRIEF IN SUPPORT
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discussed

reasons

to

financially obligate future governing bodies.

Suppose, now, after purchasing this prope1iy, another city council hereafter
to be elected should decline to comply with the promises, agreements and
covenants of this ordinance. If the ordinance is legal and valid, would not
the courts intervene to compel the city authorities to comply with the
provisions and terms of this ordinance and to take such steps as might be
necessary to raise the required revenue to meet these obligations ...

Feil, 23 Idaho at 53.
The city in Feil argued that the agreement should be declared valid since it obligated only
the future revenues to be received from the water system to be financed and did not obligate the
general revenues of the city. The

rejected the city's position, responding

" .. the

receipts from this source wm at once become an income, under the provisions of sec. 3, art 8, of
the constitution, which it is forbidden to pledge or hypothecate for more than the ctment year.,."
(emphasis added) Feil, 23 Idaho at 55; and "[a]fter it owns that property, the receipts from water
rents would clearly be an income or revenue within the purview and meaning of the constitution,
but in advance of the purchase it undertakes to appropriate and hypothecate that income for a
period of twenty years so that it may not be an income after the purchase is made." (Ibid)
The Comi went on to state that the constitution provides the exclusive method for
incurring long tenn obligations; specifically, a vote of two-thirds of the electors of the taxing
district. Absent such a vote, no obligation may be incmTed beyond the current b1.1dget year.
Based upon the holding in Feil, it is clear the Agreement at issue in this case violates the

Idaho Constitution. The illegal Agreement purp01is to obligate

BRIEF IN SUPPORT
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revenues

Boards
liability created by the 2003 IHD Board without the required voter approval.

is not

pem1itted by the Idaho Constitution.
Another test of Article VIII, §3 occurred in the case of Grant .M.iller v.

ofBuhl, 48

Idaho 668,284 P. 843 (1930). The City of Buhl attempted to purchase an electricity generating
system. The city pledged the future revenues from the sale of power to pay off the purchase
price of the system. Citing Feil, the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed that Article

§3 of the

Idaho Constitution prohibited Idaho public agencies from incurring multi-year obligations. The
Com1 declined the city's invitation to overrule

but rather reaffirmed the reasoning of Feil.

of Sandpoint

It is anticipated that

claim that the illegal Agreement is saved

by the "ordinary and necessary" exception to A11icle VIII, §3. The Idaho Supreme Court has
twice recently ruled on the "ordinary and necessary" exception to A11icle VIII, §3. In City of

Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 137 P.3d 388 (2006) the Court first reaffirmed the holding in Feil,
prohibiting multi-year obligations by Idaho's public agencies. In response to the city's argument
that the ordinary and necessary exception saved the agreement, the Court held that the ordinary
and necessary exception clause did not apply. Rather, the ordinary and necessary exception was
limited only to expenditures made during the budget year and only if the necessity is truly
urgent.
Here, we return to the test stated in Dunbar and hold that order for an
expenditure to qualify as "necessary" under the proviso clause of Article
VIII, §3 there must exist a necessity for making the expenditure at or
during such year. (emphasis added)
143

at
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went on

an

§3. Because the obligation did not meet the "necessary" criteria within the current budget
year in which the obligation was incurred, the Court held that the agreement incurring the multiobligation was illegaL The Comi emphasized that such a long-tem1 obligation was only
valid if first approved by a two-thirds vote of the electors. Future years' needs were held not to
fall into the ordinary and necessary exception in the year in which the liability or indebtedness
was created.
The most recent Article VIII, §3 case relevant to the facts in the present case is City of

Idaho Falls v. Fuhriman, 149 Idaho 574,237 P.3d 1200 (2010). In this case, the city entered
into a 17-year agreement that obligated the city to future purchases of electricity. The Court held
that the agreement violated A1iicle VIII, §3 and did not fall within the "ordinary and necessary"
exception. The Court noted that the city could incur sh01t-te11n obligations within the budget
year, but that the city could not incur an obligation extending beyond the current budget year.
The city argued in Fuhriman that its taxpayers would benefit from the certainty of a long
term contract for the pmchase of electricity. The Supreme Court responded that the city may not
incur a long-tenn liability for a short term need. The Court reiterated that the Idaho Constitution
"imposes upon the political subdivisions of the state a pay as you go system of finance." 149
Idaho at 579, citing Frazier.

In this case, the iHegal Agreement purports to transfer all IHD levy proceeds from City
properties to the City. This liability is permanent and not limited to a fixed number of years such
as

Feil, Frazier and Fuhriman cases, but rather into perpetuity. The obligation by a past
Board

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 8

Boards

ever
to

perpetuity.

For instance, assuming that revenues collected

City properties pursuant to the IHD

Plaintiff's Cornpiaint), then the 2003 Agreement would create over a 20 year period an
indebtedness and liability against IHD and in favor of the City in the amount of $7 million
dollars based upon the assessed values in 2003. This is a huge liability for a small agency like
IHD.
None of the current

Commissioners signed the Agreement. Yet, cun-ent and future

IHD Commissioners must cut checks, four times a year, to the City for funds that statutoiily
current and future

belong to IHD. This

Commissioners of the ability to exercise

the judgment they were elected to exercise in how best to spend the IHD revenue they are
entrusted with by law.
Any agreement which violates Article VIII, §3 of the Idaho Constitution is "void" under
the express language of this Constitutional provision. See e.g. Deer Creek Highway Dist. v.

Doumecq Highway Dist., 37 Idaho 601, 218, P. 371 (1923) and Boise Dev. Co. v. City ofBoise,
26 Idaho 347, 143 P. 531

914) (affirming that agreements entered into violation of Article

VIII, §3 are void.) In conclusion, the Agreement violates the express language of Article VIII,
§3, the policy behind Article VIII, §3, and the Idaho Supreme Comt cases interpreting Aliicle
VIII, §3 and is therefore void.
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Idaho

case is
Code §40-801(1)(a) which provides that:
A utho,·ity and pr,r,l"PilnrP for lf'vif'<:.

ThP <'ommi<:.;:iom~r,;: of~ c:rnmty

highway system, the commissioners of a county-wide highway district, and
the commissioners ofhigfo.vay districts are empowered, for the purpose of
construction and maintenance of highways and bridges under their
respective jurisdictions, to make the following highway ad valorem tax
levies as applied to the market value for assessment purposes within their
districts:
(a) Two-tenths per cent (0.2%) of market value for assessment purposes
for construction and maintenance of highways and bridges; provided that
if the levy is made upon prope1iy within the limits of any incorporated
city, fifty per cent (50%) of the funds shall be app01iioned to that
incorporated city. [emphasis added]
This statute empowers highway districts and counties to levy a property tax to raise revenues for
road construction and maintenance. (Cities also have independent authority under Title 50,
Idaho Code, to levy property taxes for road building and maintenance by their city street
depmtments. See specifically Idaho Code §50-235 and §50-236.) It is IHD's property tax
revenues that are at issue in this litigation, not City tax revenues.
Idaho Code §40-801(1)(a) provides that if a city maintains city streets, then 50% of the
revenue from city properties shall be retained by the highway district and the other 50% shall be
distributed to the city for construction and maintenance of city streets. It is impo1tant to
understand that the property tax revenue collected pursuant to this statute is IHD's revenue, and
it has a statutory obligation to distribute a poition to a city as set forth in the statute. However,
the remaining po1tion is revenue to the highway district, and any distribution must comply with
the Idaho constitution and the statute.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - l 0

t~x

tenns

statute

agreeing to some

tax

would violate the Article 8, Section III of the constitution. The statute does not authorize a 75/25
split or a i 00/0 split This tax distribution ratio has been in

since at ieast 1963. See City of

Rexburg v. kfadison County, 115 Idaho 88, 764 P.2d 838 (1988). The rationale for imposing the

highway tax on city prope1iies is that city residents use the streets maintained by counties and
highway districts and so should help finance the maintenance ofthe roads on which they drive.
By entering into an Agreement purporting to provide for a tax distribution ratio other than
the mandated 50/50 split, IHD and the City violated Idaho Code §40-801 and the Idaho
constitution. An ag1:eement entered into in violation of a statute is iHegal and unenforceable.
"[A] contract [that] cannot be performed without violating applicable law is illegal and void."

City ofMeridian v. Petra, Inc., 154 Idaho 425,299 P.3d 232,252 (2013). "The general rule is
that a contract prohibited by law is illegal and hence unenforceable." J. Baynard 1\1iller, MD. v.

Frederick R. Haller, lvf.D., et ed., 129 Idaho 345,351,924 P.2d 607,613.

Joint Powers Act
The Agreement in this case involves an agreement that purports to be a Joint Powers
Agreement. The Joint Powers Act, Idaho Code §67-2326, et seq ("JPA"), authorizes local
government agencies, in limited circumstances, to cooperate and share responsibilities. For
example, if two road agencies share a common boundary, it may be inefficient for each agency to
maintain, plow and chip seal one side of a road. Accordingly, it may be a wise use of taxpayer
fonds for the two agencies to agree that one agency will perform all maintenance on one shared

BR1EF IN SUPPORT
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return

use

are

first is that an

agency cannot delegate away or exceed its statutory or constitutional authority when entering
a joint agreement Nor can the JPA be used

c1.

mmmi;;r

tu

..;uu:sc u v iubtiuu

vf ::;t<1tutu1y ur

constitutional provisions. No such agreement can extend "beyond the limitation of such powers,
privileges or authority" of the agencies involved. LC. §67-2328. The JPA cannot be used as a
bootstrap to make legal an agreement which is otherwise illegal.
Second, the

requires that ali agreements entered into under the JPA have a

teimination clause. LC. §67-2328 rnandates that:
(c) Any such agreement shall specify the following:

***
(5) The permissible method or methods to be employed in accomplishing
the partial or complete tel'mination of the agreement and for disposing of
property upon such partial or complete termination. [emphasis added]
The Agreement the City seeks to enforce provides that "[t]he duration of this agreement
shall be perpetual or until such time as the District and the City jointly and together agree to
amend or tenninate the same." (emphasis added). Under the language of the Agreement, no
method is provided to tenninate the Agreement. Rather, the Agreement places a prohibition on
the termination of the Agreement absent mutual agreement. There is no way for IHD to
terminate the Agreement and the substantial liability it'11posed on IHD thereby, unless the City
agrees. There is no logical reason for the City to tenninate an agreement under which it receives
financial benefits far in excess of what the statutes authorize. Thus, there is no effective method
to terminate the Agreement provided

BRIEF IN SUPPORT

the termination clause in the Agreement Without an
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a prupt:r

§3 of the Idaho Constitution. Elected

joint power Agreement is inconsistent
officials are forc\rcr bound

decisio11s

their predecessors obligating the

expenditure of all future revenue collected from city properties. In such a case, it is apparent that
subsequent elected IHD Commissioners cannot fulfill the role to which they were elected. This
is inconsistent with Idaho statutes and the Idaho Constitution.
This rationale is particularly compelling

this case.

noted in the letter the City

attached to its Complaint as an exhibit, IHD has already paid over to the City several millions of
dollars in revenues under the Agreement. If the Agreement is enforceable with no practical
uu,,u.n.HJH

clause, foture 1HD

obligated to pay over to the City

additional millions of dollars of revenue from

propeity tax receipts of a relatively smaH

agency with a relatively small budget. As a result, cunent and future IHD Commissioners would
not have the revenues to fund the priorities they believe to be most important to the taxpayers
and voters they were elected to serve. This financial liability greatly diminishes their ability as
elected officials to act in the public interest. As discussed above, this situation without voter
approval is the very reason that Article VIU and the JPA do not permit such an agreement.

Idaho Courts Disfavor Perpetual Agreements
Idaho courts hold perpetuity clauses such as the one in the Agreement to be illegal in
violation of public policy. In Barton v. State, 104 Idaho 338,659 P.2d 92 (1983), the Idaho
Supreme Comt declined to read a contract as containing a perpetuity clause that bound the State
Transportation Department

perpetuity.

our
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a term

1

30 Idaho 440, 1

1

purporting to be binding into perpetuity is paliicularly compeiling when our Idaho Constitution
and case

specifically·· proltlbit multi-year co11tracts b)' pt1blic agencies~

Idaho Code §40-1333
Idaho Code §40-1333 provides:
Cities, with city highway systems, shall be responsible for the
construction, reconstruction and maintenance of highways in their
respective city systems, except as provided in section 40-607, Idaho Code. 2
Cities may make agreements with a county, highway district or the state
for their highway work, or a portion of it, but they shaH compensate the
county, district or state fairly for any work performed. (emphasis added)
The Idaho legislature has established a clear policy that a city must use its own revenues
to maintain city streets and may not use highway district revenues to do so, except as provided in
I.C. §40-801. A city cannot expect highway district revenues to fund the maintenance of city
streets. If a highway district constructs or maintains a city street, the city must repay the
highway district for all expenditures made within the city by the highway district.
The City seems to suggest IHD is receiving a benefit by virtue of the City maintaining
City streets. This is not trne since the City has a statutory duty to maintain City streets. IHD
receives nothing from the City in return for the IHD revenue paid over to the City.

Lack of Consideration
It has long been held as a matter of contract law that a contract must be supported by
legal consideration in order to be enforceable. The City has provided no new consideration in
2

Idaho Code §40-607 applies only to cities under 5,000 population. The
in paragraph 1 ofits ..,v,u,n,""" stated
that Sandpoint City's population is 7,400, therefore LC. §40-607 does not apply to these facts.
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l

streets.
lacks merit as the City already has a statutory duty to maintain

streets. See Idaho Code §40-

1333 . .l:i. contract vil1icl1 contai11s 110 co11sideration is ilh1sory and therefore ur1enforceable~ See
e.g. lvfartinez v. JCRMP, 134 Idaho 247,999 P.2d 902 (2000), wherein the Comi reaffi1111ed this

common law principal but then found an exception for insurance contracts because they were
contracts of adhesion.
Pursuantto Idaho Code §§40-801(1)(a)

40-1333, the City maintains its City streets

and is entitled to receive a 50% distribution of the tax revenues collected by IHD from City
illegal Agreement purports to require

prope11ies. Contrary to these statutes, the language
IHD to turn over to the City 100% of the revenue

receives from City properties.

newly elected IHD Board is obligated to provide significant IHD funds to the City based upon an
illegal Agreement to ,which the current and future Commissioners were not a party. The legal
problem is that the City provides no new consideration to IHD during the current budget year or
during that Commissioner's term of office. Under Article VIII, §3, no obligation can legally be
made beyond the budget year by public agencies. Any past consideration which may have been
provided to IHD by the City cannot be used as consideration for the obligation to pay to the City
IHD revenues outside the year the agreement was reached.

CONCLUSION
The Agreement the City seeks to enforce violates the Idaho constitution, numerous Idaho
statutes, and public policy, and accordingly is void, illegal and unenforceable. Therefore,
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I HEREBY
that on
day
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
following, by the method indicated below:

I
a trne and
DISMISS upon the

Scot R. Ca111pbell
Sandpoint City Attorney
I 123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864

XX via facsin1ile to 208-255-1368

C. Matthew Anderson
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS
250 Nmihwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 814

XX via facsimile to 208-765-2121
XX via U.S. first class mail, postage prepaid

XX via U.S. first class mail, postage prepaid
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11

I

2 j 1123 Lake Street
3 Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Telephone: (208) 263-0534
4 Facsimile: (208) 255-1368
scampbell(a),ci.sandpoint.id.us
5 '

6
7

8

9

10
11

C. MATTHEW ANDERSEN, ISB No. 3581
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS,
a Professional Service Corporation
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-2103
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121
cma@winstoncashatt.com
Attorneys for City of Sandpoint

12
13

IN

14
15

DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal
corporation of the State of Idaho,

16

Case No. CV-13-01342
Plaintiff,

17
18

19

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State of Idaho,

20
21

22

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.

Defendant.
1.

INTRODUCTION
This action was brought to enforce a lawful executed Joint Powers Agreement ("JPA!t) (See

23
Complaint, Ex. B) entered into between the City of Sandpoint ("City") and the Independent Highway

24

25

District ("District"), signed on July 8, 2003. The motivation for the JPA was simple and undisputed: the

26
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2
3

taxpayers' election to dissolve the

The District had sued the Bonner County Commissioners to

stop the dissolution election, but it was unsuccessful. (See, Complaint,

,r,r 20-25; ,r 37; and Sandpoint

4

Independent Highway District v. Board of County Commissioners of Bonner County and the City of
5
6

Sandpoint, Intervenor, 138 Idaho 887, 71 P.3d 1034 (2003).)

The JPA was a compromise of the very

7

issues raised in this case. The substance and motivation for the JPA was set out in a filed stipulation that

8

was approved by this Court.

9

Stipulation for Settlement, this Court entered a final Order of Dismissal. (Copy attached to this brief.)

10

11

(See, Stipulation for Settlement, Complaint, Ex. A)

Based on the

It is undisputed that the JPA was an idea advocated by the District. (Aff. of S. Campbell, Ex. 1)
The efficacy of the JPA was endorsed by the District, and it specifically agreed the JPA was in the best

12
interests of the taxpayers. (Complaint, Ex. A; ,r10) The JPA requires joint mutual assent if it is to be
13

14

terminated or amended. (Complaint, Ex. B, "DURATION", p. 1) It is undisputed that the District has

15

unilaterally stated the JPA has been terminated. (Complaint, Ex. E; Defendant's Memorandum, p. 2)

16

The District has now breached its obligation to make disbursements. (Aff. of S. Syth, Ex. 2) This action

17

was commenced for a dedaration of rights so the City can demand that the District comply with the JPA

18
19

obligations.
The District has filed an I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss that should be denied because:

20
21
22

1.

The JP A is lawful, constitutional and enforceable between two public entities.

2.

The JPA was the product of willful negotiation to compromise pending litigation for

23

significant consideration, and after the District represented to the Court the JPA

24

would be in the best interests of the taxpayers of Bonner County.

25
26
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2

equitably estopped

3

4.

denying its efficacy.

The City is entitled to a hearing for a Declaration of its rights in the JPA, its damages

4

arising out of the breach by the District and an injunction.
5
6

7

2.

UNDISPUTED OPERATIVE FACTS
The starting point for this action is the recognition that it involves a lawful agreement between

8

two political subdivisions of the State of Idaho. The District's boundaries include the City of Sandpoint

9

and its taxpayers. By law the City and the District are charged with representing the interests of the

10
11

taxpayers of the City concerning highways within the City limits.

Whatever may be the current

motivation of the District for ceasing the disbursement to the City, the fact remains there is only one pot

12
of dollars from which to draw, i.e., the money paid by the City taxpayers. This case is not about a debt
13

14

j or new taxes. This is not a civil action between private parties, or a public entity versus a private party.

15

The case is about how the District legally chooses to divide tax money that has been apportioned to it in

16

the best interests of the taxpayers of the City when it signed the JPA.

17
18
19

A county collects property taxes each year based upon levies approved by districts or other

taxing units. LC. §40-801(a) and I.C. §40- 803. A highway district can approve an ad valorem tax levy
on the county property not to exceed 0.2% of the assessed market value. I.C. §40-801(1)(a). The

20

21

22

collected amount is then "apportioned" to a district, unless there is an incorporated city within its
boundaries; then the "apportioned" amount is reduced to 50%, with the other 50% of collected taxes

23

"apportioned" to the city.

24

district, including delinquent payments, interest, costs on all tax sales and redemptions. I.C. §40-805.

LC. §40-801(l)(a). The apportioned funds are paid over to the highway

25
26
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to the
2
3
4

$241,000 to $338,000.

of S. Syth, 16-8; Ex.

That money is used exclusively for the operation,

maintenance and snow removal of the streets in the City. (Aff. of S. Syth, 19) How the parties arrived at

Ithe agreement to divide the revenue paid to the District each year is not a secret.

5

6

2.1

History of the Dispute.

7

The dispute brought forth in this case has had a long judicial history that played out before the

8

Supreme Court in three separate matters. The first matter was ruled on in 1994 (identified by the

9

District as Sandpoint D: City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway District, 126 Idaho 145,

10

879 P.2d 1078 (1994). That action addressed who had ultimate authority over the street maintenance

11

and their day-to-day operations within the City limits. The Supreme Court concluded that because the

12
City did not have a :functioning street department, the District retained general supervisory authority to

13
14
15

maintain the streets. Sandpoint I at pp. 150-151.
The second matter was identified by the District as Sandpoint II: City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint

16

Independent Highway District, 139 Idaho 65, 72 P.3d 905 (2003).

17

Sandpoint I, the City did organize a functioning street department by ordinance passed May 17, 2000. It

18
19

In response to the ruling in

then commenced a declaratory judgment asking whether it had executive general supervisory authority
over the City's public streets, since it had a fully functioning street department. The District Court ruled

20

21

22

in favor of the City, but certified the question to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in Sandpoint II
determined the statutory clause was silent as to the mechanism of transferring jurisdiction between the

23

Highway District and the City; but reasoning that a multi-step process existed to divest a Highway

24

District's liabilities, it would be inconsistent with the legislative intent to permit a City to exclude its

25
26
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS -- 4

~~~~ada4
A PROFESSIONAL SEWlCE CORPORATION
2.00 No!lhwest Blvd.• Suits 206
Coeur d' Alan&, kklho 83814
Phone: (208) 667-2103

ll

·1

I/ taxpayers
2 l1 that statutory dissolution
3

the District

be necessary before the City

obtain jurisdiction

over the City streets within its boundaries. Sandpoint II, 139 Idaho at 70. The summary judgment

4

issued by the District Court was reversed, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings on
5
6

7

June 19, 2003.
While largely ignored by the District, there is a third key decision in these related actions, which

8

lead directly to the JPA.

9

Independent Highway District v. Board of County Commissioners of Bonner County and Bonner

10

Countv and City of Sandpoint, 138 Idaho 887, 71 P.3d 1034 (2003). The action was to enjoin the

11

On June 4, 2003, the Supreme Court entered its opinion in Sandpoint

County from conducting the very election to dissolve the District that was called for in Sandpoint II.

12

The City was an Intervenor in that case, as well as one of the petitioners to dissolve the District that had

13
14

been filed in April 2000. The question on appeal was whether the County Commissioners properly

15

determined it was in the best interest for the entire District to be dissolved and then schedule an election

16

for a vote on the dissolution. The Supreme Court concurred that the Commissioners' findings were

17

correct; dissolution would be in the best interest of the public. The Court sent the matter back, allowing

18
19

an election.
With the almost simultaneous remands of Sandpoint II and Sandpoint III confronting the parties,

20
21
22

cooler heads prevailed; the City and the District negotiated a compromise that resolved both companion
cases. The District proposed a settlement that included entry into a Joint Powers Agreement (Aff. of

23

Campbell, Ex. 1) The settlement was entered of record on July 3, 2003 as a Stipulation for Settlement.

24

(Complaint, Ex. A) During the three years of appeal of Sandpoint II and Sandpoint III, the parties had

25

26
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1

agreed to an arrangement that divided the labor; the City maintained the streets within its boundaries,

2

while the District maintained all other streets outside the City but within the District boundaries. This

3

arrangement was memorialized in the Stipulation for Settlement, which also provided that the City and

4

the District would enter into the JPA for future work and funding disbursements. The District and the
5

6

7
8

City represented on the record that they agreed to the following verities that cannot now be disputed by
the District:
1.

9
10

"[T]hat the interests of the taxpayers within the respective entities and of the road
users would best be served by continuation of the present arrangements."

2.

11

"Based on experience, the City should maintain its own streets and the District
should expand its service area by annexation."

12
3.

"That continued litigation and the anticipated dissolution election would be costly

13

14

and would not be in the best interests of the public."

15

(Complaint, Ex. A) The terms of the settlement called for a joint statement of road jurisdiction, entry

16

into the JPA, that the City would join to vacate the dissolution election, and would not object to future

17

annexations into the District. Id.

18
19

20
21
22

23
24

25

The Court approved Stipulation provides:
2.
The Sandpoint Independent Highway District and the City of
Sandpoint shall enter into a joint powers agreement made.pursuant to Chapter 23,
Title 67, Idaho Code which will provide for division of all ad valorem funds
received under Chapter 8, Title 40, Idaho Code. Said joint powers agreement is
intended to be a permanent resolution subject to termination only by mutual
agreement of both parties. The division of funds shall be made twice yearly.
The joint powers agreement would provide that the Sandpoint Independent
Highway District pay over to the City of Sandpoint all ad valorem property tax
funds received from levies by the District upon all property located within the city
limits. The joint powers agreement would cover other matters as are appropriate.

26
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II
2

tax revenues
the current fiscal
be
the 2003 levy. (Emphasis added.)

1

3

This Court approved the Stipulation by Order dated July 11, 2003. (See, Attached A to this

4

brief, signed by this Court and subject to Judicial Notice, ER 201.)

Sandpoint II was dismissed with

5
6

prejudice by this Court on June 4, 2004 (CV-00-788).

The parties thereafter complied with the

7

Stipulation and entered into the JPA. As a consideration for entering into the JPA, the City agreed to

8

assist in withdrawing the petition to dissolve the District and agreed not to challenge future annexations

9

to the District. The election did not occur. Future annexations have occurred over the past ten years and

lO

include such communities as Dover and Ponderay.

11

2.2

Current Litigation - Sandpoint IV.

12
On July 11, 2013, exactly ten (10) years after this Court approved the stipulation, the District

13

14

notified the City that it was unilaterally withholding funds and refused to perform its obligations under

15

the JPA.

16

"elected" to terminate the JPA. (Complaint, Ex. E) The City filed its Complaint in this action on

17

August 16, 2013, (Sandpoint IV) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the District to

18

19

(Complaint, Ex. D)

On July 25, 2013, the District notified the City that it unilaterally

comply with the terms of the JPA

The District is now seeking to dismiss the Sandpoint IV under

I.R.C.P. I2(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

20
21

3.

MOTION TO DISMISS Ac~D SlJMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

22

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must view the facts and reasonable inferences in the

23

light most favorable to t.1ie plaintiff. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 637, 778 P.2d 757

24

(1989). For a complaint to be dismissed under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), it must appear beyond doubt that the

25
26
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support

no set
Hemenway & Moser Co.,
3

Idaho

946,

it

its
P.2d 996 (Ct App.

In determining whether a

complaint does or does not state a cause of action, every reasonable construction will be made to sustain

4

it Curtis v. Siebrand Bros. Circus & Carnival Co., 68 Idaho 285,303, 194 P.2d 281 (1948). Moreover,
5
6

if matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, a motion to dismiss shall

7

be treated as one for summary judgment and "disposed of as provided in Rule 56".

8

Thus, if a trial court considers factual allegations outside the pleadings on a motion to dismiss for failure

9

to state a claim, it errs if it fails to convert the motion to one for summary judgment Hellickson v.

10
11

I.R.C.P. 12(b).

Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273,276, 796 P.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1990).
In Response to the motion, the City has filed the Affidavits of Scot R. Campbell and Shannon

12
Syth. Both set forth operative facts relevant to the issues raised in the motion. First, as shown by the

13
14

attachment to Mr. Campbell's affidavit, the use of a JPA at issue was advocated by the District. Second,

15

the amounts disbursed by the District each year are not at a set amount; they vary annually, include

16

delinquent payments from prior tax years and thus cannot as

17

asserted by the District. In addition, the City is relying upon the attachments to the Complaint as

18
19

a matter of fact and law constitute a debt as

evidence of the parties' intent to be bound by the JPA, and the reliance that the City has invested in the
JPA. These documents establish the fact that the JPA is in the best interests of the taxpayers of the City

20
21
22

and of the District, that there was valuable consideration for the JPA and there is more than ample
mutual advantage to both the City and the District by utilizing the JPA to serve the taxpayer. If any of

23

these material facts are disputed, then the pending motion must be denied, discovery should ensue as

24

permitted by I.R.C.P. 56(f), and the matter proceed to trial.

Otherwise, the law outlined herein.

25
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as a matter
2
3

Motion to Dismiss

4.

failure to state a

must

denied.

ARGUMENT AND POINTS OF AUTHORITY

The District's motion is based on assertions that the JPA to which it agreed to ten (10) years ago
6

is legally void. To reach its wrong conclusions, the District has misapplied constitutional and statutory

7

provisions, ignored the stated valid duration and consideration provisions in the JPA, as well as ignoring

8

the fact that it is judicially and equitably estopped from asserting the invalidity of the JPA.

9

4.1

10

The Joint Powers Agreement is legal, and the parties are entitled to provide
for apportionment of taxes pursuant to that JPA.

11

Idaho's Legislature has provided a statutory scheme that allows the state and public agencies ''to

12

make the most efficient use of their powers by enabling them to cooperate to their mutual advantage ... "

13

LC. §67-2326. "Public agency" includes both cities and highway districts. I.C. §67-2327. Public

14
15

agencies may enter into agreements with one another for joint or cooperative action (a 'joint powers
agreement" or "JPA") for the "joint use, ownership and/or operation agreements." The agreements may

16
17
18

be for any power, privilege or authority "enjoyed jointly." LC. §67-2328. The District enjoys its power
over the City streets pursuant to LC. §40-801. The City enjoys its power over its streets pursuant to

19

I.C. §40-201. The improvement of highways is "permanent policy" of the State ofldaho. An agreement

20

to care for the highways of the City is without question legal. LC. §67-2328(b).

21
22

Idaho's Legislature has also provided a statutory scheme relating to the levy of taxes by highway
districts.

Highway districts are authorized, "for the purpose of construction and maintenance of

23

highways and bridges under their respective jurisdictions," to make a highway ad valorem tax levy of up

24
25

to two-tenths percent (0.2%) of market value for assessment purposes. I.C. §40-801(1)(a). The levy ,

26
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I

amount may
2
3

vote

I scheme does not proscribe the highway district

revenues.

§40-819.

statutory

allocating the remaining revenues to the city by

agreement or otherwise. Nor does the statutory scheme in any way limit or proscribe the use of a joint

4

powers agreement to divide funds for the mutual benefit of the very taxpayer who foots the bill for the
5
6

local roads consistent with the State's permanent policy.

7

Without attacking the purpose of the JPA, the District fashions an argument to say the

8

mechanism of the JPA is illegal. The District is wrong. The District interprets LC. §40-801 et. seq. to

9

mean "if a city maintains city streets, then 50% of the revenue from city properties shall be retained by

10

the highway district and the other 50% shall be distributed to the city for construction and maintenance

11

of city streets." Defendant's Memorandum, p. 10. This is a mistatement. The statute does not make

12
city maintenance of city streets a condition precedent for the 50% distribution requirement to take effect.

13
14

Further, the statute does not command that the highway district "retain" the remaining tax revenues from

15

properties collected on properties located in the city. A court may not insert terms into statutes which

16

are not there. Barnes v. Hinton, 103 Idaho 619,620,651 P.2d 553 (1982). More importantly, the statute

17

does not state the District is absolved from expending funds to maintain roads in the cities lying within

18
19

its District. To the contrary, such would be gross malfeasance and a violation of the District's sole
purpose of, "construction and maintenance of highways and bridges under their respective jurisdictions".

20

21
22

I.C. §40-801.
The District cites Citv of Rexburg v. Madison Cnty., 115 Idaho 88, 764 P.2d 838 (1988),

23

apparently to support the idea that the statute does not permit anythi.11g but a 50/50 tax distribution ratio.

24

The District misreads the case, as the case dealt with an inadvertent decimal point error, resulting in the

25
26
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rather
2
3

1

revenue,

taxes.

Idaho at 88-89. The court in City of Rexburg did not address wnem,er a disbursement larger than

50% would have violated the statute; it merely stated that the county had a statutory duty to at least

4

allocate the 50%. 115 Idaho at 89-90.
5
6

In reality, there is no law that states the 50% allocation of tax revenues required by LC. §40-

7

801(a) are the sole funds available for a City to maintain its roads. The issue in this case is not an

8

ephemeral academic argument. The practical reality is that the District needed to avoid an election that

9

would have dissolved it The City needed funds to maintain its streets and the District was not doing its

10

job. To avoid the election, the District devised a court approved settlement to set out how it would meet

11

its statutory duty to maintain City roads.

The District agreed to divide its total revenue from the

12
13
14

taxpayers by disbursing to the City the funds paid City taxpayers, but not a dime more. This is
significant because the District's legal obligation is to maintain all of the roads within its jurisdiction,

15

including the City's roads. See, Sandpoint I, supra. The 50% disbursement to the City required by IC

16

§40-801 does not absolve the District of its obligations to City streets. Rhetorically it can be asked, is

17

the District arguing it has no fmancial obligation to the City because of the mandatory disbursement

18

19

required by I.C. §40-801(a)? Taking the District's argument to a logical conclusion; if the City did not
spend its apportioned funds on roads, or the amount was inadequate, then it would be the City's tough

20

21

luck as the District would have no further fmancial responsibility to maintain City roads. The District's

22

argument is circular and not supported by the law. There is certainly no law to suggest that the District

23

and City are prohibited from capping what will be divided from District revenue to the District, or

24

memorializing the cap on the division in a joint powers agreement. The JPA does not violate IC §40-

25
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I

2
3

I

to

it

I responsibilities of the parties to fix the roads and write the check.
4.2

The Joint Powers Agreement did not create an "indebtedness."

4

This case does not involve a debt. This case is about how the District has agreed to "divide" the
5

6

funds it statutorily has available annually to meet its statutory duty to maintain the streets in its
Thus the District's constitutional argument about Article VIII §3 is based on a false

7

boundaries.

8

premise. Very simply, the District has the power to levy a tax. I.C. §40-801(a). If that levy is made

9

upon property within the limits of any incorporated city, 50% of the funds are apportioned to that

10

incorporated city. The District has no control over those funds. Id. As to the balance of the revenue

11

raised from the total District wide taxes, the District agreed it would divide from its funds any money

12
received from the City taxpayer and disburse it to the City, but no more. The levy is a burden on all the
13

14

taxpayers in the District. The levy amount can freely change as circumstances change. The amount can

15

be up, or it can go doVvn. (Aff. of S. Syth, 16) This case is not about a fixed amount the District must

16

pay annually in perpetuity. This case is about dividing an annual pot of money and who is going to

17

write the check from that pot of money to fix the roads in Sandpoint, Idaho. The parties agreed ten (10)

18

19

years ago in a Court approved agreement how the revenue would be divided to maintain the streets of
Sandpoint. That is not a debt.

20
21
22

23

The District's argument that this case is about indebtedness is pure sophistry. The JPA does not
create an ongoing indebtedness or liability for

District. The periodic disbursements to the City are

based solely upon revenues raised by law to maintain highways. The amount divided to the City is not

24
25
26
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I
2

receiving appropriations

IConstitution when referencing indebtedness.

3

1

The fact the disbursement is not a debt is easily seen when comparing the JPA disbursement to a

4

municipal bond. A bond is for a fixed term. It is for a fixed amount. It has a fixed interest rate. It has a
5
fixed date for interest payn;ients.

6

bargained for even if there is a short fall in tax revenue. That is a debt.

7

Here, the District has the statutory duty to maintain the roads within its jurisdiction. The District

8

9
10

11

It has provisions for security that will pay the precise amount

argues this is a "liability" it has incurred. Defendant's Memorandum, p. 5.

Maintaining the roads of

the City of Sandpoint is not a "debt" or "liability", it is an obligation set out as the sole purpose of the
District. LC. §40-801. How the District spends its revenue to meet the statutory duty is its business and

12
the legislature has left it to the District to do such. The District has already agreed how it will fulfill that

13
14

duty in the best interests of the City taxpayers. It signed a JPA with the City.

15

Article VIII §3 of the Idaho Constitution prohibits municipal governments, including cities and

16

other subdivisions of the state, from incurring indebtedness or liability exceeding that year's revenues

17

without a two-thirds approval by the voters. The purpose of the section is "to prevent local government

18
19

entities from incurring debts without approval from the voters and a clear plan to retire those debts.

11

City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 3, 137 P.3d 388 {2006); Taxpayers for Improving Pub. Safety v.

20

21
22

Schwarzenegger, 172 Cal. App. 4th 749, 761, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 370, 377 (2009). Idaho's limitation on
indebtedness was modeled after California's constitution. Frazier, 143 Idaho at 3. California courts

23
1

24
25

If District contends that the JPA creates an ongoing indebtedness by virtue of regular division of its revenue given to the
City, it must similarly contend that I.C. §40-801, which requires a 500/o remittance to the City, is an unconstitutional "debt''.
The District has not, and indeed cannot, demonstrate the unconstitutionality ofI.C. §40-801 while using the statute to buttress
its argument against the validity of the JPA.
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lj
11

II
/
2
I

is 1ntencted

Iconsent

the taxpayers, and require governmental agencies ro carry on their operations on a cash

: Ibasis." In re S. Humboldt
I

Cmty. Healthcare Dist., 254 B.R. 758, 760 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2000).

The Idaho Supreme ·Court declared long ago that a municipality does not violate the

5

6

constitutional prohibition on indebtedness when it pays expenses out of the revenue for that year. Ball

7

v. Bannock County. 5 Idaho 602, 51 P. 454,455 (1897). Here, the District's disbursement to the City

8

pursuant to the JPA are limited to a portion of that year's revenues, as no disbursement will ever require

9

funds beyond what District has already collected. This is in accord \\ith the concept that "'[a] sum

10

payable upon a contingency is not a debt, nor does it become a debt until the contingency happens."' In

11

re Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases, 201 Cal. App. 4th 758, 807, reh'g denied (Jan. 4, 2012),

12
13
14

review denied (Mar. 14, 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 312 (U.S. 2012) (quoting Doland v.
Clark,143 Cal. 176, 181, 76 P. 958 (1904)). In In re Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases, the

15

court determined that "the state's commitment in the Joint Powers Agreement to pay the excess

16

mitigation costs does not violate Section 1, Article XVI of the California Constitution because the state's

17

commitment is contingent on there being excess mitigation costs, and a contingent obligation does not

18
19

qualify as a 'debt' or 'liability' within the meaning of'' California's constitutional limit on debt.
201 Cal.App. 4th at 807.

20
21

22

The District cites to Frazier; Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, 129 P. 643 (1912);
Miller v. City of Buhl, 48 Idaho 668,284 P. 843 (1930); and City ofidaho Falls v. Fuhriman, 149 Idaho

23

574, 237 P.3d 1200 (2010), to demonstrate the constitutional prohibition on indebtedness. However,

24

these examples are inapplicable to this case, as they all deal with municipal purchases of systems or

25
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municipality to
2
3
4
5

6

current

year and for which the municipality would be liable from its general revenues.

Feil, the

Coeur

d'Alene incurred indebtedness by purchasing a water system and issuing bonds payable over 20 years,

I paid for by revenues from the water system.

149 P. at 649-50. Buhl dealt with a contract for the

purchase of an electrical generating system, paid for by the receipts from the sale of power and light.

7

284 P. at 843. Fuhriman involved a power purchase JPA, by which the City of Idaho Falls would

8

purchase power and energy from BPA over a 17-year period and would, upon certain events, require

9

Idaho Falls to post cash or a letter of credit to secure its payment obligations. 149 Idaho at 576. And

10

Frazier dealt with an JPA for the expansion of an airport's parking facilities. 143 Idaho at 2. None of

11

these cases involve a situation analogous to the facts at hand.

12
13

14

In contrast, this case deals only with contingent periodic disbursements from the District to fulfill
its statutory duty to maintain City roads. Construction and maintenance of roads by statute is the only

15

reason the District has the power to levy taxes. By its terms, the JPA simply requires District to

16

"forward to the City all tax revenues received by the District collected from properties within the

17

[c]ity... " (Complaint, Ex. B) A debt is "an 'unconditional promise to pay a fixed sum at some specified

18
19

time, and is quite different from a contract to be performed in the future, depending upon a condition
precedent, which may never be performed, and which cannot ripen into a debt until performed." 15

20
21

McQuillin Mun. Corp. §41:17 (3d ed.). "If an obligation is payable out of a special fund only, and the

22

municipality is not otherwise liable, it is generally held that there is no indebtedness." 15 McQuillin

23

Mun. Corp. §41:30 (3d ed.) (citing U.S. v. City of Charleston, 149 F. Supp. 866 {S.D.W.Va 1957); Law

24

Offices of Cary L. Lapidus v. City of Wasco, 114 Cal.App. 4th 1361, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 680 (1st Dist.), rev.

25
26
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a

2
3

from general

funds, are not considered debt, and not prohibited

not
the Constitution.

at 1368.

See also, Homebuilders Assoc. v. Kansas City, 431 S.W.2d 1 ll(Mo. 1968) (contract for reimbursement

4

from revenues derived from water main extension were not unconstitutional debts); 15 McQuillin Mun.
5

6

Corp. §41:22 (2013) (merely incurring contingent future liability does not create an indebtedness, a

7

contract to pay a fixed price annually, where contingent on the supply furnished, does not create an

8

indebtedness).

9
10

11

In this case, the District's disbursement to the City is akin to a special or contingent fund, as the
District is not otherwise liable to pay City any fixed amount at any point; the District's disbursement
amount is entirely conditioned by its collection of taxes on properties within the city. As shown by the

12

13
14

Affidavit of Ms. Syth, in fact the amount varies each year. As in Lapidus, the District's promise to
disburse tax revenues to the City does not "place a charge upon the general funds of the City, nor create

15

a situation in which future taxpayers might be strapped with obligations incurred by a prior

16

administration without the ability to meet those obligations or the necessary voter approval."

17

(citations omitted). The JPA is no more than an agreed division of funds from tax levies; if no funds are

18

19

Id.

collected, no obligation exists. Taxes levied on property Vvithin a city are generally not part of its
indebtedness. 15 McQuillin Mun. Corp. §41 :17. The JPA is simply what the stipulation states it is; an

20

21
22

agreement on the division of revenue. That is not a debt.

4.3

The JPA provides for an appropriate method of termination- that is, by the Parties'
mutual asset.

23
Idaho's Joint Powers Act ("Act") authorizes the type of JPA entered into between the City and
24

the District. I.C. §67-2326, et seq. The Act authorizes municipal agencies to share responsibilities by
25 I
26
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is
2

Iby enabling them to cooperate to their mutual advantage.

3

4
5

I.C. §67-2326. The JPA is to implement the

"permanent policy" of the State. The District's contention that the JPA is void for want of an effective

Itermination clause is

misguided. I.C. § 67-2328 requires, "Any such agreement shall specify the

!

following: (1) Its duration." The plain meaning of the statute does not require duration of a specific

6
7

make

I number of months or years.

The JPA satisfies the Act's duration requirement by providing express terms

I

8

of the JPA's duration, and an additional vehicle for its termination upon certain dissolving acts. The

9

Parties did not leave any room for ambiguity when they mutually agreed on the JPA term to meet the

10
1

11

12

mutual obligation to maintain City streets:

I

DURATION: The duration of this [A]greement shall be perpetual or until such
time as the District and the City jointly and together agree to amend or terminate the
same.

13

14
15
16

17
18
19

(Complaint, Ex. B) The JPA further provides:
DISSOLUTION: This JPA will automatically terminate if the District is dissolved.
It will also terminate if the City supports any future petition for dissolution of
District.
(Complaint, Ex. B)
The District's cites cases involving agreements lacking any term of duration. This is not the case
here, where the parties specifically provided for the JPA's duration - in perpetuity or by mutual

20
21

22

amendment or termination. In fact, Courts have held that a definite term of duration in perpetuity is not
the same as an "indefinite" duration. Bell v. Leven, 120 Nev. 388, 391, 90 P.3d 1286 (2004); Southern

23

Wine and Spirits of Nevada v. Mountain Valley Spring Company, LLC, 646 F.3d 526, 532 (8th Cir.

24

2011 ). In both Bell and Southern Wine, the courts held that the parties contemplated the duration of

25
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2
3

terms.
The District argues that because I.C. §67-2328(5) requires a method(s) to be employed "in

4

accomplishing the partial or complete termination of the agreement" this language should be read by the
5
6

Court to mean a joint powers agreement cannot continue in perpetuity. The statute does not say that.

7

The District also says there is no method of termination. Again, the District is wrong: the method is

8

mutual agreement. The District builds its argument that "the JPA is an illegal in perpetuity agreement"

9

by citing to Barton v. State, 104 Idaho 338, 659 P.2d 92 (1983), and several other cases for the

10

proposition that "Idaho courts hold perpetuity clauses such as the one in the JPA to be illegal in violation

11

of public policy." (Brief in Supp. of Motion to Dismiss at 13) These cases are not apposite to the facts

12
13
14

of this case, as they deal exclusively with state permits to private parties "to erect or maintain a
! permanent obstruction in a public street, or convey the street or rights to the street to a private person ... "

15

Barto!!, 104 Idaho at 340. Barton is particularly distinguishable, as the court there was asked to infer an

16

intent for the state to be perpetually bound by a purported JPA Id. The court declined to imply such a

17

term. Id. "Absent clear manifestation to be perpetually bound, [the court] will not infer such intent.

18
19

Where a contract is not expressly made perpetual by its terms, construction of such contract as perpetual
is disfavored." Id. Here, the JPA expresses in no uncertain terms that its duration is to be perpetual, or

20

21
22
23

until mutually amended or terminated. Nothing about the term is ambiguous or violative of public
policy. Contra, the JPA advances the permanent public policy of improving highways. LC. §40-201.
The Parties manifested a clear understanding that the JPA would exist permanently absent mutual

24

25
26 I
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I Court must give effect to

Parties' intent

allow the duration clause to stand.

Other states addressing the issue have also ruled contrary to the District's argument.

For

4

example: A contract that "provide[s] for termination or cancellation upon the occurrence of a specified
5

6

event" is not void as a perpetual contract or terminable at will. Payroll Express Corp. v. Aetna Cas. &

7

Sur. Co., 659 F.2d 285,291 (2d Cir.1981) (applying New York law); see Nicholas Labs. Ltd. v. Almay.

8

Inc., 900 F.2d 19, 21 (2d Cir.1990) (applying New York law); First Commodity Traders, Inc. v. Heinold

9

.Commodities, Inc., 766 F.2d 1007, 1012 (7th Cir.1985) (applying Illinois law); Southern Hous.

10

,Partnerships, Inc. v. Stowers Management Co., 494 So.2d 44, 47-48 (Ala.1986); G.M. Abodeely Ins.

11

Agency, Inc. v. Commerce Ins. Co., 41 Mass.App.Ct. 274,669 N.E.2d 787, 789-90 (1996). The specific

12
event which allows termination can include a breach by a party of a term of the contract. See, First
13

14
15

Commodity Traders, 766 F.2d at 1012; Payroll Express, 659 F.2d at 292. Ross-Simons of Warwick,
Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc. 182 F.R.D. 386, 395 (D.R.I.,1998)

16

Arguendo, the District's position were correct, the remedy should be to give effect to the

17

remainder of the JPA. The JPA has a severability clause, which would keep enforceable the distribution

18

19

scheme and the remainder of the JPA even if the duration clause is limited to mutual termination.
(Complaint, Ex. B) This would be consistent with the intentions of the parties stated in the Stipulation

20

21
22
23

that, "[S]aid joint powers agreement is intended to be a permanent resolution subject to termination only

by mutual agreement of both parties". (Complaint, Ex. A, p. 4, 12) Factually, the parties have already
relied upon the custom of using mutual agreement to amend the JPA. For example, see the mutual

24
25
26
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1
2
3
4

I streets.

(Complaint, Ex.
The JPA's duration clause should be found sufficient or limited to termination by mutual

I agreement.

5

4.4

7

The JPA is supported by adequate consideration; the Parties intended for the
original terms of the JP A to provide sufficient mutual consideration for the duration
oftheJPA.

8

As its last "shot gunned" justification for not honoring its obligation, the District contends that

9

the City must provide new consideration "for each budget year" in return for the District's compliance

10

with the JPA. This is, under any other circumstances, a mugging. It is basic common sense that a party

6

11

cannot enter into a settlement, the terms of which call for a statutorily-authorized joint powers

12

13
14

agreement to effect a statutory policy, and then demand ten (10) years after the fact additional
consideration for each subsequent year.

15

The JPA is the result of the Parties' Stipulation for Settlement ("Settlement"), entered into July 3,

16

2003. (Complaint, Ex. A) By its terms, the Settlement grants the City jurisdiction over city streets,

17

requires the formation of a the JPA, compels the City to vacate its petition for a dissolution election,

18

requires dismissal of the civil case with prejudice, requires the City to not oppose future annexation

19
elections sought by the District, and stipulates that the District waives costs awarded on appeal by the

20
21
22

Idaho Supreme Court in Docket No. 27441. (Complaint, Ex. A)
The JPA itself recited mutual consideration. (Complaint, Ex. B) The Stipulation was entered in

23

Sandpoint II, and referred to Sandpoint III as a "companion case"; the Stipulation ended all continued

24

litigation.

The City agreed to cap its maintenance needs from the District to the amount paid by its

25
26
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is significant.

to
the
3

taxpayers

faced with the obligation to

fund roads in a much wider geographical area,, but with a lesser tax base. In other words, the City would

4

get less service for its tax dollar today than it would have received if annexations had been successfully
5

6

resisted .in years past The argument of no consideration is not only misplaced, it is just plain not fair.

7

"[T]he settlement of a bona fide dispute or controversy is the consideration for a compromise or

8

settlement, rather than any question as to the amount actually due or owing from one to another. It is the

9

settlement of the bona fide controversy, differences, or claims of the parties which forms the

10

consideration for the new contract terminating the parties' former transactions." Moran v. Copeman,

11

55 Idaho 785, 47 P.2d 920, 922 (1935). The North Carolina Court of Appeals summarized this point

12
well: "The real consideration is not found in the parties sacrifice of rights, but in the bare fact that they

13
14

15

have settled the dispute." Knight Pub. Co .. Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank. N.A., 131 N.C. App. 257,
262, 506 S.E.2d 728, 731 (1998).

16

This Court approved the Settlement. The Idaho Court of Appeals recently held that a sett1ement,

17

the terms of which are incorporated into a court order, does not need additional consideration to be

18
19

effective. Davidson v. Soelberg, 154 Idaho 227, 296 P.3d 433, 438 (Ct. App. 2013). The same rationale
should apply here, where the Parties provided mutual consideration in the Settlement, a part of which

20

21
22

was the exercise of their rights under LC. §67-2326, et~.
Additionally, mutual benefit and consideration are inherent in the nature of a joint powers

23

agreement. As noted above, the purpose of the Act is "to make the most efficient use of [public

24

agencies'] powers by enabling them to cooperate to their mutual advantage." I.C. §67-2326. The Act

25
26
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I'
11,

to

to

.
or cooperative

aA,u.vu. "

I

2

JPA, by its terms, its incorporation into the Settlement, and the underlying policy of joint powers

3

is supported by adequate consideration.

41

4.5

6

The District is taking a position contrary to which it agreed when it entered into the JPA, and

sl

7

The District is estopped from taking a position inconsistent with its act of entering
into the .Joint Powers Agreement.

consented to this Court's Order. It was the Court's dismissal based on the stipulation that permitted the

8

JPA. As a matter of equity, the District is either judicially estopped from reversing its position taken in
9

10

open court, or is equitably estopped from harming the City by reversing its position. The doctrine of

11

estoppel may be used against a highway district to prevent it from talcing a position inconsistent with

12

previous actions, in order to prevent manifest injustice; the Supreme Court approved this very legal

13

principal in Sandpoint I, 126 Idaho at 15L See also, Murtaugh Highway Dist. v. Twin Falls Highway

14

Dist., 65 Idaho 260, 268, 142 P.2d 579 (1943).

15

4.5.1

16

17

The District is judicially estopped from reversing its position on the
stipulated settlement which the court approved.

Judicial estoppel precludes a party from advantageously taking one position, then subsequently

18

offering a second position that is incompatable with the first. Hoagland v. Ada County, 154 Idaho 900,

19
303 P.3d 587, 599 (2013). Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine which exists to protect the dignity
20
of judicial process, and is invoked by the court at its discretion. Id. Generally, when a litigant obtains a

21

judgment, advantage, or consideration from one party, he will not thereafter be permitted to repudiate

22
23

such by means of inconsistent and contrary allegations or testimony to obtain a recovery or a right

24

against another party arising out of the same transaction or subject matter. Indian Springs, LLC v.

25
26
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1

Indian Springs Land Investment, LLC,

2

intended to prevent parties from playing "fast and loose" \\ith the legal system.

3

In Hoagland, a plaintiff had dismissed state law claims including wrongful death, based on

4

representations to the presiding judge that she was preceding entirely on §1983 claims; on appeal, the
5

6

plaintiff attempted to resurrect wrongful death state claims which she had voluntarily dismissed. The

7

court found that the representation to the court which established the basis for dismissal estopped the

8

plaintiff from pursuing the claim. When a party has taken a position before the court, it may not

9

thereafter pursue an action based on an inconsistent position. Buckskin Properties, Inc. v. Valley

10

County, 154 Idaho 486, 300 P.3d 18-29 (2013). In Buckskin, counsel for Valley County expressed in

11

oral argument that certain resolutions would not be rescinded, and that the County would not enforce the

12

provisions of a capital contribution agreement requiring the payment of compensation for future phases

13

of a project. Based on those representations, the court found the developer's claim for declaratory relief

14

15

moot. Thereafter, the County began to assert a contrary legislative or contractual scheme to enforce the

16

contributions to the detriment of the opposing party.

17

estopped from changing its position on the legislative scheme.

18

The court found the County was judicially

Just as in Hoagland and Buckskin, the District here made specific representations to this Court in

19

the filed stipulated settlement, which included by its nature counsel's representation that the agreements

20
were legal, and a proper basis for the Court's Order of Dismissal. LR.C.P. 1l(a)(l) Toe District now

21

seeks to repudiate all of the terms of the stipulation, including the JPA. The court should exercise its

22
23

discretion to prevent the District from asserting the invalidity of the JPA, which was the basis for this

24

Court to dismiss the City of Sandpoint's action in Sandpoint II, and rendered moot the election to

25
26
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I
1
2
3
4
5

6

Stipulation on
District represented that the interests of the taxpayer and road users would best be served by a
continuation of the arrangement in which the City maintained the streets within its boundary, that the

IDistrict would maintain all streets outside the City but within the District boundaries, and the District
capped its obligation to the City by disbursing 100% of the tax revenues to the City for that pn_rpose; the

7

JPA was to be executed memorializing these agreements. The parties also stipulated that continued

8

litigation on the dissolution action would be costly and not in the best interests of the public, and the

9

court dismissed based on that Stipulation. These are significant representations the District should not

10
11

now be allowed to abandon.
Now, the District has begun to withhold funds, claiming that the JPA is not valid or enforceable.

12
This is clearly an inconsistent position to the one taken before this Court that was enunciated solely to

13

14

halt the dissolution election. To preserve the integrity of the system, the District should be judicially

15

estopped from pursuing a completely contrary position which it took before this Court. Otherwise, this

16

Court is basically been used as a tool for deceptive conduct by the District in agreeing to a contract in

17

order to avoid continued litigation, and representing as much to the court, and now disclaiming any

18

enforceability of such contract when the risk of dissolution or litigation appears to be past.

19

20

4.5.2

The District should also be equitably estopped from claiming that the JPA is
unenforceable.

21

Equitable estoppel requires ''that the offending party must have gained some advantage or caused

22

a disadvantage to the party seeking estoppel; induced the party seeking estoppel to change its position to

23

its detriment; and it must be unconscionable to allow the offending party to maintain a position which is

24
25

inconsistent from a position from which it has already derived a benefit." Sandpoint!, 126 Idaho at 151.
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1
2
3

motion,

statutory 50/50

governmental agencies do not have discretion to violate the express terms

this statute by agreeing to

some other tax distribution ratio ... " Brief in Supp. of Motion to Dismiss at 11. The District also claims

4

specific terms of the JPA render it unenforceable, and claims it is overall unconstitutional. This position
5

6

is entirely inconsistent with District's act of entering into the Stipulation and the JPA. The District

7

obtained the advantage and benefit of avoiding litigation that would have resulted in an election likely to

8

dissolve the District. It agreed to provide a specific apportionment of taxes pursuant to a JPA to avoid

9

that result. It induced the City to forego that dissolution election and agree not to block any additional

10

annexation by the District. The District devised the benefit of the JPA for ten (10) yeas and it is now

11

unconscionable to allow it to repudiate its prior position. See, Sandpoint I, supra.

12
13

14
15

16

5.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, District's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be

denied. The Court is asked to enter an order in a form to be submitted to chambers.
DATED t h i s ~ day ofNovember, 2013.

(;);

17
18

C. MA
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SCOTR. CAMPBELL,/ISB No. 4121
SANDPOINT CITY ATTORNEY
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Attorneys for City of Sandpoint
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via faeSHnne"on November
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David R. Wynkoop
Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP
730 N. Main Street
P.O. Box 31
Meridian, ID 83680
Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
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Reed,
Attorney at

A,JL'7rV

P.O. BoxA
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816
Phone (208) 664-2161
FAX (208) 765-5117
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal
corporation of the State of Idaho,

)
)

Case No. CV-00-0061S

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

)

ORDER APPROVING
STIPULATION FOR SETTLEMENT
A.l'lffi DISMISSING CASE

)

SANDPOINT INDEPENDENT
HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho,

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

The Idaho Supreme Court having entered Remittitur to this Court on
June 26, 2003 and the parties having thereafter filed with this Court a
Stipulation for Settlement, now therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Stipulation for Settlement filed
herein be, and it is hereby, approved.

ORDER APPROVING STIPULATION
FOR SETILEMENT

1

FURTHER ORDERED that this case

and it

hereby,

dismissed with prejudice with each party to bear its own costs and attorney's
fees.
Dated this

J

day of July, 2003.
/SJ

JOHN l MITCHELL

DISTRICT JUDGE
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this / it.- day of July, 2003, I served by mail or
facsimile true copies of the above document upon the following:
BRUCE GREENE
ATTORNEY AT LAW
320 N. 2ND AVENUE
SANDPOINT, IDAHO 83864
SCOTT W. REED
ATTORNEY AT LAW
P. 0. BOXA
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816

~~
~ (!Ltd~

ORDER APPROVING STIPULATION
FOR SETTLEMENT

2

I

1

.III

!I
21I

j Sandpoint, Idaho
Telephone: (208) 263-0534
4 Facsimile: (208) 255-1368
scampbell@ci.sandpoint.id. us
3

5

6
7
8
9

10
11

C. MATTHEW ANDERSEN, ISB No. 3581
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS, a
Professional Service Corporation
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-2103
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121
cma@winstoncashatt.com
Attorneys for City of Sandpoint

12
13
14

15
16

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJJ\i'TY OF BONNER
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal
corporation of the State of Idaho,
Plaintiff,

17
18

19
20

AFFIDAVIT OF SCOT R. CAMPBELL
vs.
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State of Idaho,

21
22

Case No. CV-13-01342

Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO

23

County of Bonner

)
:ss
)

24
I, SCOT R. CAMPBELL, being first duly sworn on oath, say:

25
26

1.

lam

AFFIDAVIT OF SCOT R. CAMPBELL

Sandpoint,
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/l\i,,m- 811/'d., SJ.£ite 206

"I

.)

.

4

Maintained on a regular basis are files related to pending
The City

historical litigation.

Sandpoint litigation files includes those related to

5

Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway District, Bonner County Cause No. CV-00-00615
6
7
8

9

10
11

(Sandpoint II).

5.

Located in the Sandpoint II files are copies of correspondence exchanged at the time the

matter was settled in 2003.
6.

Attached as Ex. 1 is a true and correct copy from the City's files of a letter dated June 24,

2003 from the Highway District's lawyer, Bruce

Greene proposing settlement by entering into a Joint

12
Powers Agreement.

13
14

15

16
17

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _i__ day of November, 2013.

18
19

Notary Public in
Residing at ~==__...:~~:::::z_-,
My appointment expires:--"-=~~-=__...:'-

20

21
22

23
24

25
26
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GREENE,P.A
Attorney At Law
320 North
Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(208) 263-1255
FAX (208) 265-2451

June 24, 2003
City of Sandpoint
Attn: Mayor Ray rv.liller
1123 Lake Street

Sandpoint, ID 83 864

VIA FACSIMlLE ONLY TO 263-3678

Re: Sandpoint lndependmt Highway District
Dear Mayor:
To avoid any further confusion (hopefully) the settlement offer pending is as follows:

1) SIHD would agree to a stipulated court settlement giving Sandpoint jurisdiction over its'
streets, despite the Supreme Court ruling.

2) SIBD would waive t.11.e costs award in the Supreme Court decision.

3) SIHD would agree by Joint Powers Agreement to share its' property taxre--venues Vvith the
City annually. The District would pay over to the City all the property tax funds receive.cl from the
residents of the District who are also inside the City The JPA could also cover a number of other
things, e.g., plovnng, grading, hauling services, etc. which you might need assistance on The tax
revenues would vary annually, but right now would approximate $175,000. I don't have the exact
figure before me- but it is inthe documents earlier furnished.
4) The City would in turn agree - as would Bonner County- that the dissolution election be

vacated.
5) The County would be further agreeing that annexation elections go forward (naturally you

would not be able to dictate to the County; you would sim,ply agree as part of the stipulation with the
County that such election be vacated and annexations be approved.

EXHIBIT

I

City of Sandpoint
Attn: Mayor :Ray M'tller

2003

Those
be
essential terms
settlement proposal.
we discussed
benefits from settling as opposed to ongoing li-iigation 441d politicking,
don't need to be in a settlement agreement.
The District awaits your response this Thursday morning. Hopefully these two entities can stazt

cooperating. If the peacemakers are given a chance for a feiv years vie may "ve!l look back in surprise
as to why we had struggled against each other so long.

The District Vvill meet in executive session after we hear your response.
Yours very tmly,

BRUCE H. GRETh'E
Counsel for SIHD

BHG/bw
cc: SIHD
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David R. Wynkoop
Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP
730 N. Main Street
P.O. Box 31
Meridian, ID 83680
Susan P. Weeks
Jarnes, Vernon & VI/eeks, P.A.

1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
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Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Telephone: (208) 263-0534
Facsimile: (208) 255-1368
scampbell@ci.sandpoint.id. us

s

I C. MATTHEW
. ANDERSEN, ISB No. 3581

6

WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS, a
Professional Service Corporation
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-2103
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121
cma@winstoncashatt.com

7
8
9

10
11

Attorneys for City of Sandpoint
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14

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF B01'i'NER

STATE

15
16

CITY OF SAND PO Th.TT, a municipal
corporation of the State of Idaho,
Case No. CV-13-01342

17
Plaintiff,
18
19
20
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INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State of Idaho,
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my responsibilities I am the custodian

City

Sandpoint.
3.

1
1

7

As part

2.

As part

my r=ponoihiliti= I ,m chargeA with the verification of ,mmmts pai,l

annually by the taxpayers

Sandpoint for assessments related to the operation, maintenance and snow

removal for the City's streets.
4.

The City of Sandpoint lies within the boundaries of the Independent Highway District.

The boundary covers a wider area than the City.
5.

The Independent Highway District is responsible for setting the annual budget for

maintenance, operations and snow removal within its boundaries, which is directly related to tax rates.
6.

The total tax paid in a given year fluctuates due to the changing budgets set by the

Independent Highway District. The City of Sandpoint receives funds for the operation, including snow
removal, and maintenance of its streets principally from two sources. First, like all other cities in the
state, the County is required by law to forward to the City of Sandpoint 50% of the funds collected from
the taxpayers of the City. The balances of the collected funds are paid to the Independent Highway
District. Second, to meet its statutory duty for road maintenance within its boundaries, since the last
quarter of 2003, the District has disbursed to the City the remaining portion of revenue allocated to it
from City taxpayers. By the terms of the negotiated settlement, the sum paid is a cap on the amount the
District contributes to the operation, maintenance and snow removal of the city streets.
7.

I maintain the City of Sandpoint's records of the total amounts disbursed each year to the

City of Sandpoint for the operation, maintenance and snow removal for its streets.
8.

Attached as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct summary of the total amounts disbursed each

year since 2003 property tax collections from the Independent Highway District to the City.

The

I amount disbursed varies each year due to the vagaries affecting the tax collecting from the taxpayers in
the City.

In addition, when there is a delinquent payment made, there is a disbursement for that

AFFIDAVIT OF SHANNON SYTH
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1
2
3

4
5

been collected

taxes

7

8
9

10
11

12
13
14
15

16
17

exhibit reports only maJor items

expenditure from the City Street Department's budget made for that fiscal year in reliance on the funds

I

rPf"'P1UPt1

..1..VVV..L¥VV-~

6

Further,

Ti,p
..L.l..J..V

9.

<;;trPPt nPn<>rfrnp-nt hHAn.-At ;"
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All funds disbursed to the City for operations, maintenance and snow removal go into a

restricted account for the Street Department. The funds are used only for the specific purpose of
operation, maintenance and snow removal.

10.

Over the years, the City has expended the funds for such items specifically listed in

Exhibit 1 directly related to operations, maintenance and snow removal.
11.

In reliance on the disbursement made by the Independent Highway District, the City has

expended funds and incurred obligations for services, equipment, maintenance, personnel, created a
management structure and dedicates oversight at great expenditure of time and money all to operate,
maintain and remove snow in the best interests of the City.
12.

The City of Sandpoint anticipates that the imminent start of snow season will bring with

it dangerous road conditions caused by accumulated ice and snow. Removal could be impeded if the
Independent Highway District continues to withhold tax

18
19
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21
22
23
24

Notary
Residing at ~:...z..::~-~==,My appointment
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I caused a true and
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postage prepaid; 0 hand delivered; ~ sent
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I David R. Wynkoop
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Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP
730 N. Main Street
P.O. Box 31
Meridian, ID 83680
Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
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EXHIBIT 2
City of Sandpoint
Finance Department
S!HD Revenue Receipt History

F

Q t = quarters in which property taxes were collected by the County

FY2013

Property

1STQTR

Tax Year

Oct,Nov, Dec

ZNDQTR

3RDQTR

4THQTR

Jan,Feb,March April, May, Jun July, Aug, Sept

FISCAL YEAR

EXPENDITURES

EXPENDITURE

TOTALS

AMOUNT

PROJECTS

2003

2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Total

BYIHD
714.09
389.38
2,462.07
193,152.99

1~20
865.82
223.44
1,041.70
9,750.82

1.20
1,579.91
612.82
3,503.77
202,903.81

196,718.53

11,882.98

208,601.51

162,943
31,266
13,985
75,462
1,000
4,348
5,794
64,384

Asphalt Overlay
Snow Removal
N Sandpoint pathway
Boyer Infrastructure
Main Street
(:,.jk; .. l, l ""'""'P

i..-.+.

grn+ ...,...,,,+,-h

Schweitzer cutoff
Skidsteer/2013 GMC

359,182

FY2012
Property

lSTQTR

ZNDQTR

Tax Year

Oct,Nov, Dec

Jan,Feb,March

Adjustment
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
1,085.53
2009
387.27
3,358.48
2010
176,897.00
2011
2012
Total

181,728.28

3RDQTR

4THQTR

April, May, Jun July, Aug, Sept

427.90

117.37
481.87
1,401.73
14,204.76

812.18
1,378.05
1,637.26
131,278.77

6.50
88.88
344.62
382.19
4,424.23

16,205.73

135,106.26

5,674.32

FISCAL YEAR

EXPENDITURES

EXPENDITURE

TOTALS

AMOUNT

PROJECTS

427.90
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
6.50
2103.96
2591.81
6779.66
326804.76

338,714.59

202,428
37,917
16,334
46,652
350,564
1,612

Asphalt Overlay
Snow Removal
Boyer to Division
Selkirk loop Int Ctr match
Washington St
Schweitzer cutoff

655,507.00

FY2011
Property
Tax Year

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Total

11/6/2013

lSTQTR

ZNDQTR

Oct,Nov, Dec

Jan,Feb,March

3RDQTR

4TH QTR

April, May, Jun July, Aug, Sept

341.93
397.63
2,372 .24
172,845.57

464.50
573.64
1,397.58
12,542.26

0.35
348.04
1,902.01
992.41
130,442.67

175,957.37

14,977.98

133,685.48

FISCAL YEAR

EXPENDITURES

TOTALS

AMOUNT

264.51
355.34
3,291.21

0.35
1,154.47
3,137.79
5,117.57
319,121.71

3,911.06

328,531.89

134,745
40,305
9,367
26,377
467,119
4,767

EXPENDITURE
PROJECTS
Asphalt Overlay
Snow Removal
Boyer to Division
Seal coat
Washington St
Schweitzer cutoff

682,680

U:\ssyth\My Documents\SIHD\2013 Summary.xlsxSheetl
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F

quarters
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30th

City of Sandpoint

which property taxes were coliected by the County

Finance Department
SIHD Revenue Receipt

FY2010
Property

1STQTR

2NDQTR

3RD QTR

4THQTR

Tax Year

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Total

4.24

FISCAi. YEAR

EXPENDITURES

EXPENDITURE

TOTALS

AMOUNT

PROJECTS

4.24

283.78
998.41
3,759.28
167,602.57

160.19
613-52
1,413.40
15,957.84

31.13
71.57
1,264.28
1,201.41
126,049.58

431.42
812.23
7,435.68

31.13
515.54
3,307.63
7,186.32
317,045.67

172,648.28

18,144.95

128,617.97

8,679.33

328,090.53

137,366
15,863
232,064
4,352

Asphait overlay
Snow Removal
Pine st Rebuild
Schweitzer cutoff

389,645

FY2009
Property

lSTQTR

2NDQTR

Tax Year

Oct,Nov, Dec

Jan,Feb,March

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

55.27
42.74
710.78
481.25
4,606.13
165,351.61

2.09
59.11
142.60
1,029.52
10,331.88

171,247.78

11,565.20

Total

3RDQTR

4THQTR

April, May, Jun July, Aug, Sept

FISCAL YEAR

EXPENDITURES

EXPENDITURE

TOTALS

AMOUNT

PROJECTS

538.57
810.46
835.22
121,636.59

0.57
1.19
214.14
386.62
3,352.66

60.10
45.40
1,309.65
1,648.45
6,857.49
300,672.74

268,552
102,489
8,000

123,825.67

3,955.18

310,593.83

379,041

4.83

Asphalt Overlay
Snow Removal
Schweitzer cutoff

FY2008
Property

lSTQTR

2NDQTR

3RDQTR

4THQTR

FISCAL YEAR

EXPENDITURES

EXPENDITURE

Tax Year

Oct,Nov, Dec

Jan,Feb,March

April, May, Jun

July, Aug, Sept

TOTALS

AMOUNT

PROJECTS

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

0.38
286.36
329.23
599.50
136,182.53

1.40
82.90
472.66
1,163.82
7,149.08

1.22
28.81
538.23
921.50
140,705.66

137,398.00

8,869.86

142,195.42

Total

11/6/2013

11.72
245.65
406.48
5,394.57

3.00
409.79
1,585.77
3,091.30
289,431.84

336,505.00
2,230

6,058.42

294,521.70

338,734.63

Asphalt Overlay
Schweitzer cutoff

U:\ssyth\My Documents\SIHD\2013 Summary.xlsxSheetl
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of Sandpoint
Finance Department
SIHD Revenue

30th

fY2007
Property

1STQTR

2NDQTR

Tax Year

Oct,Nov, Dec

Jan,Feb,March

192.03
256.21
2,885.21

452.43
264.99
1,332.69

2003
2004
2005

2006

1 ,,.,

QC:') (It;

.L"'TL.1...IV"-~VJ

7, ,._,.._.-'-•'-'/1Q1 ")")

3RD QTR

4THQTR

April, May, Jun July, Aug, Sept

1,043.18
782.39
105,336.81

FISCAi.. YEAR

EXPENDffURES

EXPENDITURE

TOTALS

AMOUNT

PROJECTS

1.79
133.32
17,982.25

646.25
1,697.70
22,982.54

'! 17h 1?

?c;2,r:;c;i:;_?n

_ , , , ..... #

.., .... - .

2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Total

146,295.50

9,131.33

107,162.38

21,293.48

283,882.69

202,729
18,030
42,415
71,250
6,178

Asphalt Overlay
Dover bike path
Snow Removal
::lb Rr.y,=,r <:o'.:)clrn.~t

Schweitzer cutoff

340,602

FY2006
Property

lSTQTR

Tax Year

Oct,Nov, Dec

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

221.40
1,911.82
119,707.28

Total

121,840.50

2NDQTR

3RDQTR

Jan,Feb,March April, May, Jun

254.68
894.50
9,779.76

10,928.94

527.07
1,362.18
100,877.23

102,766.48

4THQTR

FISCAi.. YEAR

EXPENDITURES

EXPENDITURE

July, Aug, Sept

TOTALS

AMOUNT

PROJECTS

76.32
1,333.02
4,818.56

6,227.90

1,079.47
5,501.52
235,182.83

241,763.82

109,535
31,337
12,448
8,000
6,198
85,238
19,750
4,085

Asphalt Overlay
Ella Ave - Lake to Superior
Snow Removal
Sandcreek Ped Brdwlk
Division St Bikepath
Rotary snow blower/dump trk
Ford F600
Schweitzer cutoff

276,591

FY2005
Property

lSTQTR

Tax Year

Oct,Nov, Dec

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

(718.49)
114,899.31

2NDQTR

3RDQTR

4THQTR

Jan,Feb,March April, May, Jun July, Aug, Sept

108.45
9,557.74

670.70
81,253.13

2,020.14
3,153.06

FISCAi.. YEAR

EXPENDITURES

EXPENDITURE

TOTALS

AMOUNT

PROJECTS

2,080.80
208,863.24

12,500
36,700
18,584
2,800
12,500
133,293
10,000

Asphalt Overlay
Sandcreek Ped Bdwlk
Snow Removal
Lincoln Ave
CMAQ Flusher/deicer
loader/snowblower
Schweitzer cutoff

2010
2011
2012
Total 114,180.82
11/6/2013

9,666.19

81,923.83

5,173.20
,;'

ill

Jc

-·0
k

J_

210,944.04
226,377
U:\ssyth\My Documents\SIHD\2013 Summary.xlsxSheetl
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City of Sandpoint

30th

iscal Year October 1

Finance Department

Q

S!HD Revenue

FY2004
Property

1STQTR

2NDQTR

Tax Year

Oct,lllov, Dec

Jan,Feb,March

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

107,053.37

8,742.96

Total

107,05337

8,742.96

3RDQTR

4THQTR

April, May, Jun July, Aug, Sept

80,763.22

80,763.22

4,045.51

4,045.51
GRAND TOTAL

11/6/2013

FISCAL YEAR

EXPENDITURES

EXPENDITURE

TOTALS

AMOUNT

PROJECTS

200,605.06

200,605.06

100,730
18,600
31,283
1 Ll
flfl{)
.....
-.,...,..,
.....
35,490
6,000

Cedar St Overlay
Asphalt Overlay
Snow Removal
Qnyo.- porl hiir- p~Th

Sandcreek Bridge
1/2 Lakeview sidewalk

206,103
2,746,249.66

Documents\SIHD\2013

DAVIDE. WYNKOOP
ShJ£R.ER & vn:NKOOP,
MAIN
31

MERIDIAN; IDAHO 83680
208-887-4800
FAX 208-887-4865
I.S.B. 2429

SUSAN P. WEEKS
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, PA
1626 LINCOLN WAY
COEURD-ALENE, IDAHO 83814
208-667-0683
FAX 208-664-1684
I.S.B. 4255
Attorneys for Defendant
Independent Highway District
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND OF THE COUNTY OF BONNER

CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal corporation
of the State ofidaho.

)
)

vs.

)
)
)
)

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State ofidaho,

)
)
)

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

CASE NO. CV 2013-01342

MOTION TO STRIKE
PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S
RESPONSE BRIEF AND
AFFIDAVITS

)
)

COMES NOW Independent Highway
David E. Wynkoop of SHERER & WYNKOOP, LLP and Susan P. Weeks of JAMES, VER.i."'lON
& WEEKS, P.A. and hel·eby moves this Court for an order sttiking the Affidavit of Scot

Campbell. the Affidavit of Shrum.on Syth and those portions of Plaintiffs' Response Brief which

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS

AND AFFIDAVITS- l

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE BRJEF

1'. i1 ·~·1!

Complaint,

A Motion to Dismiss based upon IRCP Rule

not limited

is based upon

aUegations contained

Plaintiffs Complaint See Hellickson v Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 796 P.2d 150 (Ct.App. 1990).
RnlA i?(h) providf'.~·

If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of
the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of
as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable
opportunity to present all material made pe1tinent to such a motion by
Rule 56.

It is premature for this motion to be converted to a summary judgment motion since the
parties have not yet conducted discovery to gather the facts. The parties may save the time and
expense of discovery if the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss in part or in whole.
Accordingly~ any matters outside the allegations contained

Plaintiffs' Complaint

should be stricken and not considered by the Court

Oral argument is requested.
DATED this

y<f'h day ofNovember, 2013.
SHERER & WTh"'KOOP, LLP

MOTION TO STRJKE PORTIONS
AFFIDAVITS- 2

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE BRIEF

6

o.

'2

;)

L

,....;,,-t/
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this " -- day of November, 2013, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S
RESPONSE BRIEF AND AFFIDAVITS upon the following, by the method indicated
X --,v,.

Scot R. Campbell

XX via facsimile to 208-255-1368

Sandpoint City Attorney
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864

Cs Matthew Anderson
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS
250 No1thwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 814

XX via facsimile to 208-765-2121

MOTION TO STR1KEPORTI0NS OF PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE BRIEF
3

DAVIDE. WYNKOOP
SHERER & ~'YNKOOP, LLP

MERIDIAN, IDAHO 83680
208-887-4800
FAX 208-887-4865
I.S.B. 2429
SUSANP. WEEKS
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
208-667-0683
FAX 208-664-1684
I.S.B. 4255

Attorneys for Defendant
Independent Highway District
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND OF THE COUNTY OF BONNER
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal corporation
of the State of Idaho,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
)

vs.

)
)

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State ofidaho,

CASE NO. CV 2013-01342
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS

)
)
)

Defendant.

)

Introduction

In its response to this motion, the City maintains that the Joint Powers Agreement (JP A)
that is the subject of this litigation was a lawful agreement. The City premises this argument on
two concepts. The first is a sweeping statement that joint power agreements generally are a
laV\ful, constitutional and enforceable agreement between public agencies. The City recognizes

-1

analysis is

must

a

motion to dismiss that focus on this key issue.
The second argument is estoppel. The City contends that both judicial estoppel and
equitable estoppel preclude IHD from questioning the legality of the JPA. However, neither of
these doctrines prevents a party from questioning the constitutionality or legality of an
agreement.
Procedural Irregularities

In its response to IHD's motion to dismiss, the City focuses on the correct standards to be
utilized by the Court in considering a motion to dismiss. The City then states under 12(b)( 6), if
matters outside the pleadings are presented, the Court is to treat the motion to dismiss as a
motion for summary judgment. IHD has moved to strike affidavits submitted by the City with its
response. IHD presented no matters outside the pleadings in its motion to dismiss. The City is
unable to convert the Districf s motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment by supplying
rebuttal affidavits. See Nampa Charter School. Inc. v. DeLaPaz, 140 Idaho 23, 89 P.3d 863
(2004). Therefore, the City's affidavits should be stricken and this Court should determine the
matter based solely upon the City's pleadings.
Further, the City's arguments that there are material questions of fact that dictate the
matter proceed forward as a summary judgment are not persuasive. IHD raises issues of whether
the contract is illegal and unconstitutional. These issues do not require additional discovery for
determination. They require only an examination of the pleadings. There is no judicial utility in
extending this case to allow for discovery if the fundamental issues can be determined in a
motion to dismiss.

s

Jurisdiction over Separate Highway Systems
a

defined

I.C. § 40-104, which provides:

means

public highways within the

corporate limits of a city, with a functioning street department, except those highways which are
under federal control, a part of the state highway system, part of a highway district system or an
extension of a rural major collector route as specified in section 40-607, Idaho Code." IHD's
jurisdiction is defined in LC. § 40-109, which provides in relevant part: "'Highway district
system' means all public highways within each highway district, except ... those included within
city highway systems of incorporated cities with a functioning street department. .. " Idaho Code

§ 40-201 provides that "[t]here shall be a system of state highways in the state, a system of
county highways in each county, a system ofhigh"vays in each highway district, and a system of
highways in each city, except as otherwise provided."
The jurisdiction of a highway district is set forth in l.C. § 40-1310 and l.C. § 40-1311,
and is limited to those highways within the highway district system. It does not include the city
system. The jurisdiction of a city is set forth in l.C. § 40-1333, which provides that cities with
city highway systems shall be responsible for the construction, reconstruction and maintenance
of highways in their respective city systems. This same code section allows cities to make
agreements with highway district for their highway work, or a portion of it, but also requires
cities to compensate the highway district fairly for any work performed.
Idaho Code§ 50-1301(2) defines a functioning street department as a city department
that is responsible for the maintenance, construction, repair, snow removal, sanding and traffic
control of a public highway or public street system, and that the existence of such department
qualifies it to receive

-3

§

to

1

recogmzes
a

residents

a

within the boundaries of a highway

~·~·u~

are considered to be

members of the highway district,Idaho Code§ 40-1323 gives the city council the same powers
and duties as highway district commissioners.
After analyzing these exact statutes in City ofSandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent

Highway Dist., 72 P.3d 905, 139 Idaho 65 (Idaho 2003) (Sandpoint I), our Supreme Court
concluded "the above statutes, insofar as is relevant to this case, provide that a city with a
functioning street department has jurisdiction over all public highways within its corporate
limits, except those highways that are part of a highway district system, and a highway district
has jurisdiction over all public highways within the highway district, except those included
within a city highway system of an incorporated city with a functioning street department."
After Sandpoint L the City created a functioning street department. Paragraph 18 of
Complaint. However, in City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist., 139 Idaho
65, 72 P.3d 905 (2003)(Sandpoint II), the Supreme Court noted that the above statutes were
intended to establish jurisdiction for cities with functioning street departments at the time the
highway district was formed. The Supreme Court held for a city that created a functioning street
department after the fact, the highway district did not lose control over the streets until the
highway district's jurisdiction was lm.vfully terminated.
Thereafter, a petition to dissolve IHD was considered by the commissioners of Bonner
County. This lead to litigation between IHD and the Bonner County Commissioners and the
ensuing Supreme Court case of Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist. v. Board of County

1

This jurisdiction is no different than a
county or school district.

or school district where residents of the city are also residents of the

-4

to

an

for

was

the City would not obtain any of the money or assets as a successor entity if the district was
dissolved. FoI1owing these last two decisions by the Supreme Court, the City and IHD entered
into the JP A that is the subject of this suit.
Joint Powers Agreement
Given the holdings of the Idaho Supreme Court in Sandpoint II and the companion case
of Sandpoint III, until the City is deannexed or IHD is dissolved, IHD has jurisdiction over the
streets in Sandpoint. Why the City claims that the jurisdiction is pursuant to I.C. § 40-801 is
unclear. The jurisdiction exists pursuant to
The fundamental precept
power, privilege or authority, they

a

statutes discussed above.

lS

exercise them

two

more) agencies

the same

, but never beyond the limitation of

such powers, privileges or authority, including statutory and constitutional limitations. LC. § 672328. In other words, a joint pmvers agreement is a contract between two or more public
agencies to exercise,jointly, all power(s) common to each of them, for the purpose of
accomplishing specific goals they may have in common. The City maintains that IHD has a
statutory obligation pursuant to I.C. § 40-801 to maintain the City's roads, and therefore the
payment by IHD to

City

IHD's tax revenue to discharge

duty is an appropriate

exercise of a joint power to meet a common goal. In truth, IHD has jurisdiction of the city
streets because they are within their jurisdiction, not because they collect ad valorem taxes on
them. Thus, a JP A for the maintenance of the streets would be appropriate as long as it does not
run afoul of any

statutory or

-5

enter

§

one

lS

agreements as

as

does not violate any statute or the constitution.

does not dispute a JPA for the joint exercise of powers is appropriate. However, the clause of the
JP A that is at issue in this case does not encompass either of these aspects. It does not limit its

terms to joint or cooperative action. The payment provision violates the Idaho Constitution and
Idaho statutes.
Statutory jurisdiction of an agency may not be altered by a JP A. LC. § 67-2328(a).
Wnen the jurisdiction portion of the agreement is examined, it attempts to impermissibly alter
IHD'sjurisdiction. The supervisory authority portion is in accordance with the statute.
The "revenue distribution" clause provides that IHD will levy taxes in accordance with
Chapter 13,

40. This statement is not a

or

but merely a reiteration

ofIHD's statutory powers. The remaining portion of this clause, which is the focus of this
litigation, provides: 'The District will pay over to the City all property tax funds from such
District levies on all property located within the city limits." As discussed later in its brief, this
portion of the JPA violates the Idaho constitution.
In its opening brief, IHD provided the statutory scheme found at LC.§ 40-801 to inform
the Court regarding collection of tax revenue for highway districts. The money that is not
apportioned to

City under

statute is paid to IHD as part of its general fund.

The City presents nvo arguments to the court on why it claims IHD's payment of a
portion of its general tax revenue is constitutionally acceptable. The first is that LC. § 40-801
does not proscribe a highway district from entering into an agreement to pay its general tax

s

6

revenue

to another entity.

second is

it is

to

tax revenues to

streets.

to the first argument,

§ 40-801 is clear.

50% of tax revenues collected

on city properties and apportioned to the highway district are part of the highway district's
general tax revenue fund. The statute does not allocate to the City any percentage greater than
50% of the

collected on city properties. The City argues that the statute does not limit the

District's expenditure of its general tax revenue funds. While that statement is true, once the
funds become general revenue funds of the District, then it must expend them within the
statutory and constitutional limits imposed upon it.
The City is a creditor ofIHD under the payment clause of the JPA. IHD is required to
make an annual payment to the City for street maintenance services the City is going to perform
for IHD. It is no different than ifIHD had contracted in perpetuity with Interstate Concrete and
Asphalt for Interstate to repair the roads

IHD's jurisdiction. Under the city's reasoning, the

contract could extend one hundred, two hundred or even 300 years. An absurd result indeed.
The City next advances the argument that I.C. § 40-801 places IHD under a statutory
duty to maintain the roads lying within its district, and therefore the payment of this money is the
discharge of IHD 's statutory duty. There is no such statutory obligation under this particular
code section. The power and duties of IHD to maintain the City's streets are established in its
general jurisdictional statutes discussed previously. LC. § 40-131
this duty, IHD may not violate the Idaho constitution.
Idaho Code§ 40-801 provides in relevant part that the commissioners of a county
highway system, the commissioners of a county-wide highway district, and the commissioners of
highway districts are

the purpose

construction and

to

ad

statute

tax

coffers

boundaries.2 The

highway district as its tax revenue for road construction and maintenance. Once it is placed in
lHD's general fund, any expenditure must be in accordance with Idaho statutes and the Idaho
Constitution.

IHD cannot alter the statutory apportionment of tax revenue set forth in I.C. § 40-801.
The funds apportioned to IHD by the county from revenues collected from levies against city
properties is part ofIHD's general tax revenue. IHD is unable to change the characterization of
that tax revenue by means of a JP A.
The City argues the JP A is nothing more than an agreement to pay funds to the City to
discharge IHD's statutory obligation to maintain the City's streets.

other words, the City is

providing street maintenance services to IHD. Yet the City seems unable to grasp if that is the
purpose of the payment, then the City stands in the position of a creditor who is owed payment
for services performed for IHD. The fact that the City is a municipal entity that has a common
goal of street maintenance does not change this fundamental fact. 3

Idaho Constitution, Article 8, Section 3
A.

Introduction

It is the Idaho Supreme Court that interprets the Idaho Constitution ... not the courts of
California, Washington, or any other state. In its brief, the City has virtually ignored the Idaho
2

The City points out that in its opening brief, IHD indicated that the money paid to the City was for road
construction and maintenance. The City takes the position this statement was wrong. LC. § 48-801 is clear that the
levy must be limited to this purpose. However, it is not as clear that the city to which a portion of the taxes are paid
must use the money for road construction and maintenance. However, this ambiguity does not change the substance
of the argument presented by IHD.
3
Moreover, it is current and future IHD commissioners who are elected to best prioritize the use ofIHD tax
revenues. The JP A LL'llawfully diminishes or even destroys IHD' s discretion on how to allocate its scarce tax
revenues.

s
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8,

3.
states.

to

Idaho authority to contradict the analysis of Article

Section 3 -~,..~.u·-~

IHD' s initial brief. Based upon Idaho case law, the JP A clearly creates an illegal liability or
indebtedness in violation of Article 8, Section 3.

B.

The requirement that IHD pay the City is a liability or an indebtedness

The provision that JP A requires IHD to make payment to the City annually for services
rendered to benefit streets within IHD's jurisdiction violates the Idaho constitution. The City
doggedly clings to its argument that IHD has a statutory duty to maintain its streets, and
therefore the payment is in lieu of work IHD is required to perform. This argument fails to
address the creditor issue.
In addressing the constitutional challenge, the City abandons the farce that this agreement
is a JPA, and claims it is a ''revenue sharing agreement." However, there is no source of revenue
that the City is sharing with IHD. Instead, there is a multi-year obligation for IHD to pay the
City from its general fund in perpetuity for contract services the City has agreed to perform. The
City advances the untenable argument that the payment IHD is required to make under the JPA
can't be viewed as a debt because LC. §40-801 apportions some of the tax levy revenue collected
pursuant to this statute to the City. However, that fact has no import to whether the JP A payment
is a liability or debt to IHD. The ta.x levy is the source of revenue to IHD, as well as the City.
The mere fact that it sen°es as the source of revenue to two governmental entities is
inconsequential in determining the constitutional issue.
The City tries to claim there is a difference between a "disbursement" and a "debt".
argument that a disbursement is not a debt is

,u-~u,

-9

It

was

question

obligation in the JP A is not a debt. Similarly, the argument that payment
occurs in this debt has no bearing on whether it is an indebtedness or liability. Were IHD to
enter into a 10 vear adiustable rate mort1m2e. the navment would fluctuate. A debt is an amount
.,

..,

.._;

"-'

,,'

.L

.,;

owed, whether it is fixed or fluctuates. That is exactly what the JP A encompasses

an

obligation owed every year, even though the amount might fluctuate.
The City argues that even if the JPA creates a debt, it is only an annual expense and will
never exceed IHD's revenues because it is paid annually from IHD's revenues. This argument
ignores the fact that the indebtedness is a recurring liability which exceeded the revenue in the
year the liability was created .
The initial IHD brief analyzed

definitions of "indebtedness" and "liability" as stated

by the Idaho Supreme Court. In the City's response brief, the City chooses not to address or
even acknowledge these definitions. Rather, the City cites numerous California opinions which
define indebtedness much more narrowly than the Idaho Supreme Court definitions. Surely the
City is aware that the Idaho Supreme Court is the ultimate authority when it comes to
interpreting the Idaho Constitution. The definitions provided by California courts or other state
courts have no binding or even persuasive effect when they contradict the Idaho Supreme Court.
Our Supreme Court has specifically and repeatedly rejected the decisions of other states
interpreting similar provisions to Article 8, Section 3. IHD submits that Idaho case law should
be examined for the definitions of "liability'' and "indebtedness," not case law from other states.

Feil v. City ofCoeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, 129 P. 643 (1912) dealt with the definitions of
and

at some length

the context of Article 8,

s

See

4-6

to

cases

dealt

these

V.

1

Supreme Court held that a commitment by the City of Boise to

91

improve river frontage violated Article 8, Section 3, of the Idaho Constitution. The Supreme
Court thoroughly discussed the breadth of Idaho's prohibitions contained in Article 8, Section 3
and stated:
The courts to whose decisions we have above referred have indulged in
various subtleties and refinements of reasoning to show that no debt or
indebtedness is incurred where a municipality buys certain property and
specifically provides that no liability shall be incurred on the part of the
city, but that the property shall be paid for out of a special fund to be
raised from the income and revenue from such property. The reasoning,
however, of those cases utterly fails when applied to our constitution, for
the reason that none of those cases deals with the word 'liability,' which is
used in our constitution, and which is a much more sweeping and
comprehensive term than the word 'indebtedness'; nor are the words 'in
any manner or for any purpose' given any special attention by the courts
in the foregoing cases. The framers of our constitution were not content
to say that no city shall incur any indebtedness 'in any manner or for any
purpose,' but they rather preferred to say that no city shall incur any
indebtedness or liability in any manner, or for any purpose. It must be
clear to the ordinary mind on reading this language that the framers of the
constitution meant to cover all kinds and character of debts and
obligations for which a city may become bound, and to preclude
circuitous and evasive methods of incurring debts and obligations to be
met by the city or its inhabitants.

Boise Development Company, Ltd. at 361, 143 P. at 535, quoting from the
Feil case.
The Court then rejected arguments based upon the case law from other states that had
more limited definitions of "indebtedness" and "liability", and the Supreme Court concluded:
We are of the opinion, therefore, that under the authority of Feil v. City of
Coeur d'Alene, the contract upon which this action is based by its terms
plainly incurs a liability, if not a debt, upon the city of Boise, that the
obligations of said contract do constitute a new debt upon the city, and we
therefore hold that said contract is void.

at

1

at
case

it

stare

to define the terms

and "indebtedness" as contained

Article

3 of the Idaho Constitution. How other states may define those terms for purposes of their unique
constitutions has no persuasive value

Idaho. The City's reliance on out of state cases to define

the terms "indebtedness" and "liability" for purposes of Article 8, Section 3 is misplaced. This
Court should carefully consider how Idaho judicial decisions have very broadly defined those
terms.
]The City does not argue the JP A meets

ordinary and necessary expense exception. Rather,

the City argues only that the JP A does not create an "indebtedness" or "liability" of IHD. The
City tries to distinguish the long line of precedent cited by IHD that an ongoing multiple year
debt is prohibited by indicating that

cases discussing multiple year debts arose in the context

of purchases. This fact is a distinction without a difference. In City of Boise v. Frazier, 143
Idaho 1, 3, 137 P.3d 388, 390 (2006), the Supreme Court recognized, "[b]roadly speaking, Article
VIII, § 3 imposes two requirements to be met by local governments before incurring
indebtedness. The first requirement is a public election securing two-thirds of the vote ... "
In City ofIdaho Falls v. Fuhriman, 149 Idaho 574. 578-579, 237 P.3d 1200, 1204-1205
(2010), the City of Idaho Falls tried to distinguish the contract debt it incurred in a power
purchase agreement

a period of 17 years from other cases finding a

Idaho Falls

urged the Supreme Court to limit the "necessity-requires-urgency" interpretation of the
constitutional requirement to cases involving large capital projects, such as the expansion of an
airport parking garage, and not to apply the analysis to cases of extraordinary indebtedness or
local

s

etc.

an

the
This rejected exception is exactly the argument the

presents to this Court. It wishes

to characterize the debt as a liability that arises from the ordinary administration of IHD's
statutory obligation to maintain roads. Even if the City were correct about the characterization of
the debt, it would still run afoul of the constitutional prohibition. Under the City's reasoning,
IHD could incur a debt or twenty million over twenty years so long as IHD had revenue of one
million per year. This reasoning is wholly inconsistent with Idaho Supreme Court cases. The
debt is a multiple year obligation.
C.

The Special Fund Doctrine does not save the JPA from its unconstitutional
infirmities.

The City argues that the JPA does not create an illegal "indebtedness" or "liability" since
each year's property tax revenues will be used to pay IHD's obligation to the City. The City
cites several non-Idaho cases in support of its argument. Indeed, it is apparently true that some
states allow the concept of a special fund to enable goverrnnent agencies to fund capital
improvements over time without violating the constitutions of those states.
The Feil and Buhl cases are both good examples of the special fund argument. In both
cases, the cities hoped to finance long-term water and electricity projects and use the proceeds
received from customers to pay for the improvements such that the city's general fund would not
be impacted. The cities argued that because their general funds would not be adversely impacted
there would be no "liability" or "indebtedness" created and thus no violation of Article 8, Section

3. The

Supreme Court

rejected these arguments

s

to recognize
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special

customers

to

received

utility revenues alone. Notwithstanding this special fund argument, the Court held that
agreements violated the plain language of Article 8, Section 3. The Court declined to overrule
Feil and find that the "special fund" arguments removed the taint

constitutional violation.

The Supreme Court flatly rejected the special fund doctrine which is "accepted by a great
majority of cases, and holds that a municipality does not contract indebtedness or incur liability
within the constitutional limitation by undertaking an obligation which is to be paid out

a

special fund consisting entirely of revenue or income from the property purchased or
constructed." Asson v.

of Burley, 105 Idaho 432,439,670 P.2d 839,846 (1983). The

Supreme Court noted
doctrine does not exempt long-term arrangements by governmental agencies from the
prohibitions contained

Article 8, Section 3.

The City's argument that the JPA is immune from the prohibitions of Article 8, Section 3
because the tax revenues involved are special funds is totally without merit.
Estoppel
A.

Estoppel does not save a Constitutionally Invalid Agreement

The City repeatedly argues in its brief that IHD should be estopped from asserting that
the JPA is invalid under the Idaho Constitution and Idaho statutes. The Idaho Supreme Court
definitively rejected the City's argument in Deer Creek Highway District v. Dournecq Highway
District, 37 Idaho 601,218 P. 371 (1923). First, the Court held that a contract between highway

districts for construction of a bridge across the Salmon River was void. Since the contract could
not be performed \vithin the budget year, it violated

s

8, Section 3 of the Idaho

- 4

went on
\Vas
not

used to save an

that "[a]n estoppel can never be invoked in aid of a contract which is expressly prohibited by a
constitutional or statutory provision." 37 Idaho 601, 609, citing School District v.

Falls

County, 30 Idaho 400, 164 P. 1174. The Court went on to add that both of the public agencies
who entered into the contract were chargeable with the knowledge of the limitations imposed
upon the other by Article 8, Section 3 of the Constitution. Accord Village ofHeyburn v.

Security Savings & Trust Co. 55 Idaho 732, 49 P.2d 258 (1935), and 0. T Jones v. Big

River

Irrigation District, 93 Idaho 227, 459 P .2d 1009 ( 1969). Idaho Courts are clear that estoppel
cannot be used to validate an othenvise illegal agreement, whether equitable estoppel or judicial
estoppel.
The City cites three cases in support

estoppel arguments. The City first cites City of

Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway District, 129 Idaho 145,879 P.2d 1078 (1994)
"Sandpoint I". This case is inapposite to the issue before this Court. In Sandpoint L the trial
court applied estoppel and the Supreme Court reversed, holding that estoppel was not applicable.
Further, there was no allegation of a constitutional or statutory violation as there is in the case
now before this court.
The City also cites Jvfurtaugh Highway

Falls

65 Idaho 260,

142 P .2d 579 (1943) for the proposition that estoppel may be applied against a highway district.
However, the Murtaugh case. like Sandpoint I, did not involve an illegal agreement or an
allegation of violation of statutory or constitutional provisions. Also, although the court stated
the case

was

s
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I

to

upon

IS

statutes
The City next cites Hoaglund v.

154 Idaho 900, 303 P.3d 587

1

support of its estoppel argument. Hoaglund involved an attempt to resurrect a wrongful death
claim which Hoaglund had previously voluntarily dismissed. Hoaglund told the Court one thing,
and then contradicted herself in order to revive her wrongful death action. The Court refused to
allow this misrepresentation. There was no allegation of an unlawful action based upon a statute
or the constitution.
Hoaglund has no application to these facts.

the present case the City and IHD entered

into the JP A in the apparent belief that it was lawful. It has now come to the attention of IHD
(and probably the City) that the JPA violates the apportionment statute and the Idaho
constitution. The Idaho Supreme Court decisions cited in this brief clearly do not allow the
doctrine of estoppel to validate othefV\iise unlawful actions. Estoppel has no application to the
present case.
The City also argues that judicial estoppels should apply and cites Buckskin Properties v.
Valley County, 154 Idaho 486,300 P.3d 18 (2013) to support its position. This case involved a

developer who agreed to contribute road impact mitigation fees to Valley County as a condition
of development. A Development Agreement was entered into pursuant to which the developer
paid fees and received development approval.

the fees were paid and the lots \Vere

approved by the County, the developer sued for return of the fees he had voluntarily paid.
The Court held that the developer voluntarily paid the fees, received the benefit of the
development agreement he entered into, and so could not now contend that he entered into the
agreement involuntarily.

Buckskin, the County adopted a

s

made moot some
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to

court's

that

rendered moot several

developer's claims. The Court held that the developer's claims were moot because the County
no longer engaged in the conduct the developer was seeking to restrain.
It was in response to the developer's hypothetical that the County might change its

position and come back after the developer for illegal impact fees that the Supreme Court
discussed judicial estoppel. In dicta, the Supreme Court responded to the developer's
hypothetical concern that judicial estoppel would protect the developer from future "'sharp
dealing or revision of Resolution 11-6 by the County", Buckskin Properties at 500.

Buckskin has no applicability to the case at bar. In Buckskin, the County's attorney made
a very specific factual representation to the trial court that the County would not rescind the
resolution. The Supreme Court responded with dicta to the developer's concern of future county
action contrary to the attorney's representation that the County would be precluded from acting
contradictory to the County's factual representations to the trial court. There was no argument
that the County's Resolution was entered into

violation of the Idaho Constitution or in

violation ofldaho statutes.
The situation now before this Court is very different from facts in Buckskin. Here there
was no specific factual representation made to the trial court. The only representation was that
the parties resolved a former suit by entering into a JP A, which was trne. More significantly in
the present case, the JP A clearly violates the Idaho Constitution and Idaho statutes.
The Buckskin case was cited and discussed at length by the City in its response.

·s discussion of judicial estoppel cites to and is

IN
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upon
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It is

does not

case.

not
argument.

is apparently the first Idaho case to

it is important to examine Loomis to determine when judicial estoppel may be applied versus
when the application of judicial estoppel is not warranted.
Loomis was a passenger in a car driven by Church. Loomis was injured when the vehicle
she was riding in collided with a Garret Freightlines truck. Loomis first sued Garret Freightlines
and in that case she made sworn statements that Garrett Freightlines was solely responsible for
the accident and that Church was free from fault. Loomis obtained a settlement from Garret
Freightlines.
Loomis then sued Church and alleged directly opposite facts. In her lawsuit against
Church, Loomis asserted that Church was not

at fault, but acted with reckless disregard by

not stopping at a stop sign before crossing State Highway 26, even though Loomis had asked
Church to stop and Church verbally refused.
In other words, Loomis' specific factual allegations in her second lawsuit against Church
were directly contrary to the specific factual allegations Loomis previously swore to in her
lawsuit against Garret Freightlines. The Supreme Court was concerned that these directly
contradictory factual allegations resulted in a fraud on the courts. The Supreme Court first stated
the parameters of judicial estoppel as:
It is quite generally held that where a litigant, by means of such sworn
statements, obtains a judgment, advantage or consideration from one
party, he will not thereafter, by repudiating such allegations and by means
of inconsistent and contrary allegations or testimony, be permitted to
obtain a recovery or a right against another party, arising out of the same
transaction or subject matter.
76 Idaho 87, 93,277 P.2d 5621, 565 (citations [all from other states] omitted).

SUPPORT
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to a
as

present case.

UH,HCUA.i

case before

H.Ho.n<U.n.'-

at

court contains no allegations

sworn factual allegations arising to the level of a fraud upon this Court.
Finally, the City cites Indian Springs, LLC v. Indian Springs Land Investment, LLC, 147
Idaho 737,215 P.3d 457 (2009) in support of its judicial estoppel argument. Indian Springs also
involves inconsistent sworn factual statements presented to the Court. In a mortgage foreclosure
proceeding, the holder of the mortgage alleged a principal balance of the note of$188,000 at one
point, but then alleged

subsequent bankruptcy proceedings that the principal balance was

$270,637.50. It is these contradictory factual allegations that trigger the discussion and
application of judicial estoppeL
Moreover, the Court stated that "Because judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine
existing to protect the dignity of the judicial process, it is invoked by the court at its discretion.'·
147 Idaho 737,748,215 P.3d 457,469. The Court went on to note that "' ... the party asserting
judicial estoppel must show that the sworn statement at issue was used to obtain a judgment,
advantage or consideration from another party." Indian Springs at 749,215 P.3d at 469.
(Emphasis added.) Because the party claiming judicial estoppel failed to show that the other
party made factual mis-statements to the court with the intent to gain an advantage, the Supreme
Court dismissed the judicial estoppel argument.

Based upon controlling Idaho

judicial

estoppel has no application to this case. First, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that no
type of estoppel cannot be used to enforce an agreement which violates Article 8, Section 3.
Second, judicial estoppel applies only to inconsistent sworn factual statements. Here, there is no
allegation of inconsistent sworn

OF

statements. Rather,

s

is a mutual mistake
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enter

as

case

a

on

estoppel is invoked only at the discretion of the court to prevent an attack on the integrity of the
judicial system where a litigant is playing fast and loose with the truth of the factual
representations made to the court. In the case at bar, there are no inconsistent sworn factual
statements that put the integrity of the Court at risk. Rather, the City and IHD, in 2003, entered
into a settlement agreement that turns out not to be authorized by statute and violates the Idaho
Constitution.
Even if the Court believed it has the discretion to invoke judicial estoppel, it should not do
so in this case. Any equitable remedies should be invoked only to support and uphold the
Constitution and statutes; not to allow an agreement to stand which violates the Constitution and
statutes and the policies behind those provisions.
Conclusion

The JPA that is the subject of this litigation was the product of negotiations between the
parties and a fair attempt to resolve those issues. However, the terms agreed to amounted to an
agreement to pay the city in perpetuity for services the City rendered for IHD. As such, this
clause violated Article 8, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution and the payment clause may not be
upheld. Additionally, as noted in IHD's initial brief, the JPA violates several statutes and public
policies of the State of Idaho.
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City wishes to correct

reference at page 3 of its Response Memorandum when it refers to

the District as a "political subdivision".

That is not correct. The District is a taxing district without

23
governing authority and as such is
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23
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24
25

7,
,1f
,.__,./b.Vl4.ff
PAGE 1

A "'=iO=ESS 1)Nt,;_ ss=v ·SE: COF"ORA.,.
250 "i:mr:ti631 !31•.a .. =.--1,; :we
,::; :ieur d Alene ::kihc 8381-"
Pne,!",~: !2:i6t 65"."~2iC3
1

or,

3 of

8:46AM

s
3

agreed

4

The District brought a Motion to

s Complaint for failure to state a claim.

5
6

motion to dismiss is based upon several false predicates about the legality of the agreement, the intent of

7

the agreement and

8

the scope of the District's continuing obligation to provide for rhe maintenance

9

Sandpoint; all of which was capped by the parties' JPA.

impact of the agreement. Further,

motion to dismiss misstates
the

context. It is the

Streets of

The false predicates of the District's briefing

require a supplementation of the record so the Court has the opportunity to review
11

fact of and

motion

proper

to do such.

12
In opposition to the motion, the City filed two affidavits: one from Scot R. Campbell, City
13
14

Attorney

Sandpoint, and one

Shannon

Treasurer

15

Sandpoint. The District now seeks to strike these affidavits on the sole basis that it is "premature to

16

convert" the Motion to Dismiss to a Motion for Summary Judgment It is not certain what relief the

17

District requests. The District does not attack either the admissibility or the veracity of the contents of

18

19

the affidavits. By quoting to

12(b)'s obligation to permit a party a reasonable opportunity to

present matters made pertinent, coupled with the statement that

has not yet COITh'11enced,

20

21

22

appears to be that th.e District is making an I.RC.P. 56(f) request

additional time to conduct

discovery. If that is the request, then the City asks what additional discovery it wishes to conduct before

23

the motion is submitted. If the request is just that the Court should not consider the affidavits, then the

24

request is not well founded as it would negate the cited provision of LRC.P. 12(b) wbich clearly permits

25

the City to offer ar1y pertinent material.
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To: 2082651447

are
3

excluded

the

be treated as one

a

stL.11unary

4

as provided in Rule 56."

the

5
6
7

pleadings on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, it errs

for summary judgment. Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho

8

Although

9

no principled reason

consider the truth

to one

App. 1990).

150

matters outside the pleadings, there is

the Court should not consider the affidavits offered in this case.
District's suggestion that it is "premature" for the Court to

A trial is a search for the tn1th.
11

276, 796

discretion to consider or

court

it fails to convert

ruling on the motion is not a reasonable interpretation uf the rules First, :he

12
negate the very obligation

premature argument

the Court to consider information made

13

and

pertinent

15

arc highly pertinent to the

response.

taken in

Second. there is no law for the proposition that

16

supporting affidavits are "premature" in considering a motion to dismiss.

17

contemplates that a responding party can put forth supporting affidavits and the court should consider

18
19

is one on summary judgmenL

them; then the standard

The

Indeed, the very rule

as

as attachments tc the Complaint, are evidence

the Parties' intent to be

20
21
22

bound by the JPA,

the reliance that the City has invested

the JPA was mutually agreed to as being

23

District; that there was

24

than ample mutual advantage to
paying into

the best interests

the JP A. The documents establish that
the taxpayers

JPA;
the

and the

the

there is more

and the District by utilizing the JP A to serve the taxpayers

District.
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and cannot dispute

7

by

8

The prospect

9

4.

Response, the facts as pied, as supplemented and as applied
a sufficient basis to support

having

clains as a matter

deriied is the

CO:SCLUSIO~
For the foregoing reasons, District's Motion to Strike should be denied.
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JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO
FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
215 S. FIRST AVENUE
SANDPOINT, IDAHO 83864

CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal corporation of
the State ofldaho,

)
)

) Case No: CV-2013-0001342
Plaintiff,

)

) SCHEDULING ORDER, NOTICE
} OF TRIAL SETTING AND INITIAL
) PRETRIAL ORDER

vs.
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho,
Defendant,

}
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16} IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
I. A Jury Trial Scheduled for a 5 day trial will commence at the B0m1er Courthouse at 9:00 a.m. on
Tuesday, Mnrch 25, 2014. If possible, cases set for the same day will be tried on a "to follow 0 basis.

2. The Court, at its discretion, wiU set the priority for each of the civil matters set for trial 011 the above
date. Any party may request a priority setting by filing a Request for Priority Setting. copy to the Court in

chambers. The Court will attempt to give ptiority to cases where such Request for Priority Setting is filed, in
the order in which they are filed. P1for participation in mediation is a factor in granting priority. Notice is
hereby given that an civll trial settings a:re subject to being preempted by the court's criminal calendar.

In 01'der to assist with the lriai of this matter IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED:
1. a. PRETRIAL EVENTS: Before 11oticing a deposition, hearing or other pi·etrial event, a lawyer shall
consult and work with opposing counsel to accommodate the needs and reasonable requests of an witnesses and
pa1ticipating Jawyers.
h. MOTION PRACTICE: Before setiing a .,.,,.,,,.,v.. for a headng, a lawyer shall

PRETRIAL ORDER

a reasonable

r,I

L

"•

.i

r r

)

jJ

no
to opposing counsej
draft it
the

a hearing) a
to

and aoouraterv articulate

ruling. Before submitting the proposed order to the Court; the lawyer shall provide a copy to opposing

counsel who shall promptly voice any objections. If the lawyers cannot resolve all objections. the drafting lawyer
shall promptly submit the proposed order to the Court, stating any unresolved objections,
c. PRETRIAL MOTIONS (other than Summary Judgment): The last day for fiiing pretrial motions

(other than Summary Judgment1 except for motions in limine concerning witnesses an.d exhibits designated under
paragraphs 6 and 7 respectively of this Pretrial Order) shall be twenty-one (21) days priol' to Trial Motions in
llmfne conceming designated witnesses and exhibits shall be submitted in writing at least seven (7) days prior to

Trial. Motions in limine concerning any designated exhibit shall attach copies of the exhibit in issue. Motions in
limine regarding designated witnesses shall attach copies of the discovery requests claimed to require the earlier
disclosure and a representation by counsel regarding the absence of a prior response from the party to whom the
discove1y was directed. The fact that a party has submitted discovery to another party and has not filed motions to
compel in advance of trial does not, in and of itselt waive an objection by that party as to the timeliness of
disclosure of witnesses and exhibits by the other party as requil'ed by this otder.
d. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT:

Motions for summary judgment shall be timely

filed so as to be heard not later than ninety~one (91) days (thirteen weeks) before Trhtl. (NOTICE: DUE TO

COURT CALENDAR CONGESTION YOU SHOULD CONTACT THE COURT CLERK AT LEAST

!BREE MONTHS BEFORE THE DATE YOU ARE REQUESTING, FOR A HEARING DATE/fIME
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS). There shall be served and filed with each motion for summary
judgment a separate condse statement, together with references to the record, of each of the material facts as to
which the moving pal'ty contends there are no genuine issues of dispute, Any party opposing the motion shall. not
later than fourteen (14) days prior to the date of the hearing, serve and file a separate concise statement)

together with references to the record, setting forth all material facts as to which it is contended the1'e exist genuine
issues necessitating litigation. In determining any motion for summary judgment, the Comt may assume that the
facts as claimed by the moving party a1·e admitted to exist without controversy, except and to the extent that such

facts are asserted to be actually in good faith controve11ed by a statement filed in opposition to the motion.
e. SCHEDULING HEARINGS ON MOTIONS: All hearing dates and times must be arranged by

contacting the Court's Clerk. When making that request, an estimate of the amount of time needed must be given.
A Notice of Hearing shall be filed and served in compliance with LRC,P. 7(b)(3)(A). Once a hearing date and

time has been obtained from the Comfs Clerk, no party may add additional hearings to that time set for hearing
without obtaining the prior approval of the Coures Clerk.
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in those circumstances where the obstacles to proceeding with the case cannot be resolved by any means
other than granting a continuance. Continuances wiH not be granted solely because all parties agree to a

continuance, ln exercising its clisc1·etion to grant or deny a continuance, the Court may consider the foHowing
factors:
~

Availability of alternative court dates.
Age of the case and the nature ofany previous continuances or delays attributable to either party.

>
>
>

The avaiJabiJi ty of an earlier date fol' the event.

~

Whether the continuance may be avoided by substitution of other counsel.

The proximity of the scheduled event.

>" The prejudice or inconvenience caused to the party not requesting the continuance.

>

The diligence of counsel in attempting to avoid the continuance and in bringing it to the attention of the
court and opposing counsel promptly.

The request for a continuance shall be ii1 a motion signed by counsel and filed immediately upon discovering the
need for a continuance. The motion should be supported by an affidavit stating: l) when the need for a
continuance arose, 2) the grounds for requesting the continuance, 3) the request for a continuance has been
discussed with the client and the client does not object, 4) measures taken to avoid the necessity of a

continuance, and 5) when, at the eal'Iiest) the parties can be ready to proceed. The affidavit should be

accompanied by all documentation supporting the request

2. BRIEFS AND MEMORANDA: In addition to any 01iginal brief or memorandum filed with the Clerk
of the Court, a chambers' copy shaH be provided to the Court. To the extent counsel rely on legal authorities not

contained h1 the Idaho Reports, a copy of each case or authority cited shall be attached to the Comt's copy of the
brief or memorandum.

3. DISCOVERY DISPUTES: Unless otherwise ordered, the Com't will not ente1tain any discove1y

motion, except tl1ose brought by a person appearingpro se and those brought pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(c) by a person
who is not a party, unless counsel for the moving party files with the Court, at the time of filing the motion, a
certification that the lawyer makin_g the motion has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the

opposing lawyer to reach agreement without court action, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 37(a)(2). The motion shall not refer

the Court to other documents in the file. For example. if the sufficiency of an answer to an inte1rogatory is in issue,
the motion shall contain; verbatim, both the interrogatory and the allegedly insufficient
party's contentions, separately stated.
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4. EXPERT WITNESSES:

called at
before trial1

to

at

consist of at least the information required to be disclosed pursuant to

Notice

Compliance of all disclosul'es shall be filed with the Clerk of Court. Absent good cause, an expert may not
testify to matters not included in the disclosure. A pa11y may comply with the disclosure by referencing expe1t
iviL'1ess depositions) \\'ltliout restating the deposition testimony in the disclosute t'eport
5. DISCLOSURE OF WITNESSES: No later than foul'teen (14) days (two weeks) before trialj each
party shall prepare and exchange between the parties and file with the Clerk a list of witnesses with current
addresses at1d telephone numbers) setting forth a brief statement identifying the general subject matter about which
the witness may be asked to testify (exclusive of impeachment witnesses). Each party shall provide opposing
parties with a list of the pal'ty's witnesses and shall pl'ovide the Court with two copies of each list of witnesses.
6. EXHIBITS AND EXHIBIT LISTS: No later than fourteen (14) days (two weeks) before trial,

exhibit lists and copies of exhibits shall be exchanged between parties and the exhibit list filed with the Clerk.
Using the form available at the following website: http://www.kcgov.us./depru:tments/districtcourt/forms.asp (or
avai]able by calling the Comf s clerk), each party shall prepare a list of exhibits it expects to offe1:. Exhibits should

be listed in the order that the party anticipates they will be offered. Each party shall affix labels to their exhibits
before trial. After the labels ate marked and attached to the original exhibit, copies should be made. Plaintiffs
exhibits shall be marked in numerical sequence. Defendant's exhibits shall be marked in alphabetical sequence.
The civil action number of the case and the dare of the trial shall also be placed on each exhibit label. The original
exhibits and a Judge1s copy of the exhibits should be filed with the Clerk at the time of trial. Two copies of the
exhibit list are to be filed with the Clerk. It is expected that each party will have a copy of all exhibits to be used at
trial.
7. JURY INSTRUCTIONS (if JURY trla)): No later than seven (7) days before trial. jury instructions
shall be prepared and exchanged between the pru.1ies and filed with the Clerk (wlth copies delivered to chambers).
Each Judge may have prepared stock ju1y Instructions from the Idaho Jmy Instructions. Copies of the Court's
stock instmctions may be obtajned from the Com1, and are avaiiable on the Kootenai County website:
ht1p;//www.kcgov ,tJs/departments/djstrictcourVforms.asp. The pa11ies shall meet in good faith to agree on a

statement of claims instruction which shall be submitted to the Comt with the other proposed jnstructions. Absent
agreement, each party shall submit their ovm statement of claims instruction. All instructions shall be prepared in
accordance with LR.C,P. 5I(a).
8. TRIAL BRIEFS: No later than seven (7) days before trial, trial briefs shall be prepared and

exchanged between the pmties and filed with the Clerk (with copies to chambers)
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9. PROPOSED FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

proposed findings and conclusions should

seven

COURT

provided to the Court's

accomplished by e-mail.
10. TRIAL PRACTICE: At least a week before trial the lawyers shall meet and confer to discuss any
stipulations Lliat can be made at the beginning of trial and to identify exhibits w'hich can be admitted by stipu!atio:n.

Following this meeting, the parties shall immediately alert the Court to any matters that need to be taken up before
the time scheduled for trial to begin.
11. ·TRIAL DAY: Call the Judge's Comt Clerk or Law Clerk for the start and finish times of u·ial dates
Uuit folJow the first day of trial.
12. MODIFICATION. This Pretrial Order may be modified by stipulation of the parties upon entry of an
order by the Court approving such stipulation. Any pai1y may, upon motion and for good cause shown, seek leave

of the Cm.ut modifying the terms of this order, upon such terms and conditions tis the Coul't deems fit. Any party

may request a pretrial conference pursuant to LR.C.P. 16(d) or mediation pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(k).
1:3. REQUEST TO VACATE TRJAL SEITING: Paragraph Lf above applies in its entirety. Any

vacation or continuance of the trial day shall not change or alter the time frames for the deadlines set fo1·th
herein, but the dates for such deadlines wHI change to fhe new dates as are established by the date of the new
tl'ial setti11g. Any paity may, upon motion and for good cause shown, request diffe1·ent discovery and disclosm·e
dates upon vacation or continuance of the trial date.
14. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: It is expected that all lawyers will educate their

clients early in the legal process about the various methods of resolving their dispute without trial (alternative
dispute resolution/ADR), including mediation, arbitration, settlement conference and neutral case evaluation. The
parties are expected to engage in ADR as soon as possible. The Comt will facilitate ADR ifrequested. The parties
are ordered to report jointly to the Court in writing at least sixt:y~three (63) days (9 weeks) prior to trial, setting
forth when ADR occurred and the results of ADR. If no ADR has taken place, the joint repmt must state the

reason the patties failed to use ADR.
15. SANCTIONS FOR NONCOMPLIANCE:

Failure to timely comply In all respects with the

provisions of this order shall subject non-complying parties to sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(i), which may
include:

(A)

An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support OJ' oppose designated claims or defenses,

or prohibiting such party from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(B)

scmmuuNG

order striking pleadings or parts thereof: or staying fm1her proceedings

AND
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the order is obeyed,

ay
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ar
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or proceeding or any part thereof, or 1·ende1ing a

or dismissing the

Heu
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default against

or

court

failul'e to comply;
(D)

In Heu of or in addition to any other sanction. the judge shall require the party or the attorney

representing such party

01·

both to pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of any noncompliance with this

rule, incJuding attoiney's fees. unless the judge finds that the noncompliance was substantially justified or that
othe1' ci1·cumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no party may rely upon any deadline set forth in this pretrial order as a
reason for failing to timely respond to discovery or to timely supplement discovery l'esponses pursuant to I.R.C,P.
26(f),

Notice is hereby given> pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40(d)(l)(G), that an alternate judge may
be assigned to preside in this case. The following is a list of potential altem.ate judges: Hon. John P. Luster; Hon.

Fred Gibler, Hon. John T. Mitchen, Hon. Steve Verby1 Hon. Lansing L Haynes, Hon. Benjamin R. Simpson, Hon.
Charles W. Hosack or Hon. George R. Reinlun'dt; IIL
Unless a party has previously exercised their right to disqualification without cause under Rule 40(d)(i ).
each party shall have the right to file one (1) motion for disqualification without cause as to any alternate judge not
later than ten (I 0) days after service of this notice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any party who brings in an additional party shall serve a copy of this
''Scheduling Order, Notice of T1iaI Setting" upon that added party at the time the pleading adding the party is
served on the added party. and proof of such service shall then be filed with the Court by the party adding an
additional party

DATED this (~

~ day of December. 2013,
BY ORDER OF

SCHEDULING OlmEn, NOTICfi.Oi''TRIALSirtru\JG AND INITIAL PRETRIAL ORDER
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

were

true

served as foHows on
Plaintiffls Counsel:

Scot R. CampbeH
Sandpoint City Attorney
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, lD 83864

Mailed~

Faxed_ _

C. Matthew Andersen
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Mailed_s_

Faxed_ _

Defendant's Counsel:
David E. Wynkoop
SHERER & WYNKOOP, LLP
P.O. Box31
Boise, ID 83680
Mailed~

Faxed_ _

SCUEDUUNG mmrn, NOH CE OF TIHAI, SE'rl'ING AND INITIAL PRETRIAL ORDER

b,ATE OF IDAHO
County of BONNER

Deputy

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a Municipal
Corporation of the State of Idaho,

)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
vs.
)
)
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
)
political subdivision of the State of Idaho, )
)
)
Defendant.
)

case No.

BON CV 2013 1342

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

_______________

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND.
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant
Independent Highway District (IHD) on September 9, 2013.
On August 15, 2013, plaintiff City of Sandpoint (City) filed this lawsuit alleging a
breach of contract claim against IHD for an alleged failure to perform an obligation
under a 2003 contractual agreement between the two entities. The 2003 contractual
agreement was a "Joint Powers Agreement," which had settled about a decade of
litigation between the two parties.
The original dispute that eventually led to the settlement agreement began in the
1990s. when City and IHD in a different lawsuit brought to the district court the question
of which entity was responsible for street maintenance within common boundaries.
Aithough the district court declared the parties' respective responsibiiities, the district
court's decision was appealed and the district court's holding was vacated on appeal

Page

because the Idaho Supreme Court held the district court erred in exceeding the
scope

a

of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent
1

Supreme

Court found that Highway District had general authority to maintain the streets absent a
showing by the City that it has a functioning street department. 126 Idaho 145, 150-51,
879 P.2d 1078, 1083-84.
In 2000 the City established a street department of its own and brought suit
again, which resulted in two decisions from the Idaho Supreme Court in 2003. The City
sought a declaratory judgment that, because of its functioning street department, the
City had exclusive general supervisory authority over street maintenance, construction,
snow removal, etc. within the City. City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent
Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 66-67, 72 P.3d 905, 905-07 (June 19, 2003). The City
also sought to enjoin the IHD from exercising supervisory authority over the City's
streets, and from levying any real property within the City. 139 Idaho 65, 67, 72 P.3d
905, 907. On summary judgment, the district court held the City had a functioning
street department and therefore had control over the public streets within the City. Id.
This decision was certified as a partial summary judgment and appealed Id.
Interpreting the relevant statutes, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed, holding: "There is
no indication that the legislature intended that a city included within an existing highway
district could exclude its streets from the highway district simply by creating a city street
department capable of assuming the maintenance, construction, repair, snow removal,
sanding and traffic control of city streets." 139 Idaho 65, 70, 72 P.3d 905, 910. The
Idaho Supreme Court held the City was required to follow statutes that provided

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
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procedures for lawful termination of a Highway District's authority within a city's

Idaho
held that the City could not be the succeeding operational unit to a dissolved highway
district. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist. v. Board of County Commissioners, 138
Idaho 887, 892, 71 P.3d 1034, 1039 (June 4, 2003). The Idaho Supreme Court
reached this conclusion by a plain reading of the statutes that address the dissolution
funds and property of a highway district. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court held that,
because the statute prohibited surplus funds of a dissolved district to go to a city and no
statute prescribed where the money would go if not to the successor, the City,
therefore, could not be the successor to a dissolved highway district. /d.

1

The contract at issue was the result of a settlement entered into July 3, 2003,
after these last two Idaho Supreme Court decisions but before the Board of County
Commissioners set a date for a dissolution election. Complaint, Exhibit A, p. 3. The
Stipulation for Settlement is attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint. The parties
entered into it upon general agreement that further litigation was not in the best interest
of the public. Id., p. 4. This contract entitled, "Joint Powers Agreement between the
City of Sandpoint and the Sandpoint Independent Highway District", was dated July 8,
2003, and is attached to the verified complaint. Complaint, Exhibit B, p. 1
The Joint Powers Agreement was intended to be a permanent resolution as it
stated, under the heading "Duration": "The duration of this agreement shall be

1

The Court was also asked to interpret Idaho Code§ 40-1805 to determine what "district"
meant for the commissioners' determination that disso!v!ng the high\AJay district "would be to the
best interest of the district." See Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist. v. Board of County
Commissioners, 138 idaho 887, 890 (2003). The Court held that the "best interests of the
district" meant "consideration of geographical area and the interests of the people living in the
district." Id. at 891.
Page

perpetual or

such time as the District and the City

and together agree to
all

or
promised
tax funds from levies of properties within the City limits. Id., p. 3.

return, the City,

which had jointly petitioned for the IHD's dissolution election, would request the Bonner
County Board of Commissioners to vacate the dissolution election and dismiss the
action with prejudice. Id., p 5. The parties stipulated that the Joint Powers Agreement
could only be terminated by mutual agreement of both parties. Id., pp. 1, 4.
In this case, the City has brought an action alleging IHD has breached the
agreement by unilaterally terminating it and withholding funds that the City alleges it
needs to operate its street department. Complaint, p. 8. The City alleges that on
July 11, 2013, the IHD notified the City that they were withholding funds and were not
going to perform a material term of the agreement. Id.,

,r 40.

On September 9, 2013, IHD filed its Motion to Dismiss, and on October 11,
2013, IHD filed its "Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss." On November 7, 2013, City
filed its "Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss." On November 12,
2013, IHD filed its "Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss." Oral
argument was held on November 13, 2013. IHD' Motion to Strike was granted.
IHD's Motion to Dismiss was taken under advisement at the end of that hearing.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW.
An I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted" must be considered against the I.R.C.P. 8(a) requirement that a
complaint contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief." I R.C.P. 12(b)(6); 8(a){1

Harperv. Harper, 122 Idaho 535,536,835
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Page4

1346, 1347

1992).

motions

dismiss, the

look only at the

is

the

1

1

1

11

1

Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n. 6 (8th Cir. 1990) (regarding 12(b)(1)
motions raising facial challenges to jurisdiction); Serv. Emp. Intern. V. Idaho
Department of Health and Welfare, 106 Idaho 756,758,683 P.2d 404,406 (1984
(regarding 12(b) challenges generally). 'The nonmoving party is entitled to have all
inferences from the record viewed in his favor and only then may the question be asked
whether a claim for relief has been stated." Idaho Branch Inc. of Associated General
Contractors of America, Inc. v. Nampa Highway Dist. No. 1, 123 Idaho 237, 240, 846
P.2d 239, 242 (Ct. App. 1993); see a/so Independent School Dist. of Boise City v.
Harris Family Ltd. Partnership, 150 Idaho 583, 587, 249 P.3d 382, 386 (2011).
Complaints should not be dismissed under I.RC.P. 12(b) unless the non-moving party
can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief. Dumas v. Ropp, 98 Idaho
61, 62, 558 P.2d 632, 633 (1977). And any doubts must be resolved in favor of the
survival of the complaint. Gardnerv. Hollifield, 96 ldaho 609, 610-11, 533 P.2d 730,
731-32 (1975). An I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss may be granted "when it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which
would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Harper, 122 Idaho at 536, 835 P.2d at 1347 (Ct. App.
1992) (internal quotations omitted).

Ill. ANALYSIS.
A. Introduction.
!HD makes five arguments as to why the agreement entered into was unlawful
First, IHD argues the Joint Powers Agreement constitutes an indebtedness that IHD

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
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has incurred

violation of Article VIII, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution. Second, I

1 requires an equal division

ad

property taxes oe1rweien
ad

valorem property tax funds from levies of properties within the City limits; therefore,
since the agreement does not provide an equal division it is in violation of that statute
and an unlawful agreement. Third, IHD argues the agreement is unlawful under the
Joint Powers Act because there is no termination provision. Fourth, IHD argues the
agreement is unlawful because it was intended to last in perpetuity and Idaho courts
disfavor such contract provisions. Finally, IHD argues the contract is void because
there was no consideration.
Based on these arguments, IHD asks the Court to dismiss this case on the
grounds that the contract was illegal and therefore the City has asserted no claim upon
which relief can be granted.
Of concern to the Court is the fact that the parties have obviously considered this
to be a binding agreement for the past ten years. Apparently, IHD recently received
legal advice indicating there are legal arguments to be made as to the legitimacy of that
agreement. Obviously, the City relies on these revenues being paid from IHD to the
City each year. Rather than IHD bringing a declaratory action against the City where
the IHD would continue to pay the City under the contract until those legal arguments
are decided by a court, IHD instead chose to simply not pay the under the agreement,
leaving the City in the lurch financially and forcing the City to sue IHD.

8. Positions of the Parties and Analysis by the Court.
1. Indebtedness in Violation of the Idaho Constitution.
IHD argues this agreement constitutes an indebtedness and violates Article VIII,
Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, p. 4. That
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
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section prohibits a political subdivision

incurring any indebtedness or liability that

exceeds what the

a year

qualified

can

assent

argues

an

, or

on the part of IHO, where if the levy amount were $350,000 and the agreement lasted
twenty years, it would create a $7 million dollar liability. Id., p. 9.
The City argues, "This case does not involve a debt." Plaintiff's Response to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 12. The City claims, "This case is about how the
District has agreed to 'divide' the funds it statutorily has available annually to meet its
statutory duty to maintain the streets in its boundaries." Id. The City notes LC. § 40801 (a) gives the IHO the power to levy a tax, and if that levy is made upon property
within an incorporated city, then 50% of the funds are apportioned to that incorporated
city. Id. The City argues that it obviously is not unconstitutional up to that point, as that
is what the statute requires and the statute has never been held to be unconstitutional.
Id., pp. 12-13. Simply because !HO contractually agreed in the Joint Powers

Agreement to go over the 50% and give all funds taxed to the City does not make the
agreement unconstitutional. The City argues the disbursement from IHO to the City
each year is not a debt, the IHO receives revenues from the taxpayers and has
contractually agreed to pay all those revenues to the City. ld. p. 13. The City notes the
1

Idaho Supreme Court held a municipality does not violate the constitutional prohibition
on indebtedness when it pays expenses out of revenue for that year, citing Ball v.
Bannock County, 5 Idaho 602, 51 P. 454,455 (1897). Id., p. 14. The City argues,

"Here, the District's disbursements to the City pursuant to the JPA are limited to a
portion of that year's revenues, as no disbursement will ever require funds beyond what
the District has already collected." Id. The City correctly notes the cases cited by !HD
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of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 137 P.3d 388 (2006); Feil v.

Idaho

1

1

643
all deal

and

of Coeur

of Idaho Falls
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municipal purchases of systems or

private parties that necessarily require the municipality to incur liabilities beyond the
current year and for which the municipality would be liable from its general revenues,
where "In contrast, this case deals only with contingent periodic disbursements from the
District to fulfill its statutory duty to maintain City roads." Id., pp. 14-15.
IHD's reply argument, in its entirety is as follows:
It is the Idaho Supreme Court that interprets the Idaho
Constitution .. not the courts of California, V\/ashington, or any other state.
In its brief, the City has virtually ignored the Idaho Supreme Court
decisions interpreting Article 8, Section 3. Instead, the city has cited to
and quoted from court decisions from California and other states.
Apparently, the City has been unable to find Idaho authority to contradict
the analysis of Article 8, Section 3 contained in IHO's initial brief. Based
upon Idaho case law, the JPA clearly creates an illegal liability or
indebtedness in violation of Article 8, Section 3.
Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 9. The Court finds this
argument by IHD to the points made by the City, to be disingenuous, and unpersuasive.
The IHD completely ignores the fact that Frazier, Feil, and Fuhriman are all cases
involving municipal purchases of systems or goods from private parties that required
the municipality to incur liabilities beyond the current year and for which the municipality
would be liable from its general revenues, and those are simply not the facts in this
case. The present case concerns contingent periodic disbursements from the District,
half of which are to fulfill its statutory duty to maintain City roads, the other half are to
fulfill its contractual duty to pay the City under the Joint Powers Agreement.
The Court must deny IHO's motion to dismiss on this basis because the case law
cited by IHD simply does not apply to this case. The Idaho Constitution limits the
manner in which a county or municipality may incur indebtedness:
Pages

No ... subdivision .. shall incur any ... liability .. exceeding that year, the
income and revenue provided for it for such year, without the assent
two-thirds
qualified electors thereof voting at an election
be held

Constitution of the State of Idaho, Article 8, Section 3. "[A] city may anticipate both the
income and revenue provided for it for such year, and incur debts or liabilities against
the city which can be met and discharged out of the aggregate income and revenue for
that year." Charles Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, _, 129 P.643, 650
(1912); see also City of Idaho Falls v. Fuhriman, 149 Idaho 574, 580, 237 P.3d 1200,
1206 (2010) (holding that the liability incurred by a power sales agreement exceeded
the income in the year that it was incurred, and that it was the type of expenditure that
needed the assent of two-thirds of the voting electorate); City of Boise v. Frazier, 143
Idaho 1, 7, 137 P .3d 388, 394 (2005) (holding that this constitutional provision
prohibited the city from entering into a lease agreement for the expansion of airport
parking facilities absent a public vote that authorized the expense); Miller v. City of
Buhl, 48 Idaho 668, 284 P. 843, 845 (1930) (prohibiting a city from incurring a debt to

purchase an electric-generating system); Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, _,
129 P.643, 652 (1912) {holding that a bond funding $180,000 to fund a waterworks
system would create a liability against the city and was therefore invalid under this
constitutional provision without a vote). Feil and Miller were cases where expenses
were invalidated because neither fell into a special fund exception (i.e., bonds paid by
revenue from the services of the plant that was financed by the bond), but this later
became an exception that was amended into Article 8, § 3. See Asson v. City of
Burley, 105 Idaho 432,439, 670 P.2d 839, 846 (1983). A contract that violates this

section is void and cannot be enforced. See Deer Creek Highway Dist. v. Doumecq
Highway Dist., 37 Idaho 601, _, 218 P. 371, 372 (1923). IHD argues the Joint Powers
MEMORANDUM DECISION ANO ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
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Agreement is illegal because it falls under a "liability" and that, because a twenty-year
this agreement would demonstrate that the Highway District has indebted itself
it has taken on more indebtedness than it can

is

simply not true when looking at the plain meaning of the statute.
"[T]he statutory rules of construction apply to the interpretation of constitutional
provisions." Sweeney v. Otter, 119 Idaho 135, 138, 804 P.2d 308, 311 (1990) (citing
Lewis v. Woodall, 72 Idaho 16, 18, 236 P.2d 91, 93 (1951)). "Liability" means "the state

of being bound or obligated in law or justice to do, pay, or make good something." Feil
v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, _ 129 P. 643,649 (1912) (relying on this

definition and other comparable definitions of "liability"). Because IHD has obligated
itself to pay a percentage of the annual revenue it collected on ad valorem taxes, it did
incur a liability. However, the liability does not exceed the income received a year. The
IHD has apportioned a portion, or a percentage of the revenue collected; the portion
that the City receives only reflects the percentage of the revenue that is generated from
the property located within the city. So long as the IHD's boundaries equal or exceed
the City's boundaries, the IHD will always receive more revenue than what it has
apportioned the City each year because it will receive levies from property in the City
limits as well as levies from property outside the City limits. Because the IHD has not
incurred a liability that exceeds its revenue, the Court must deny IHD's motion to
dismiss upon this basis.
2. Legality of Contract Under Idaho Code § 40-801.

IHD argues I.C. §40-801 governs distribution of ad valorem taxes levied within
city limits. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss. pp. 10-11. Under that statute, half of
funds for property within the limits of an incorporated city are apportioned to the city.
IHD argues that by entering into an agreement which provides for anything other than
Page

an even split of levies between I

and the City, violates the division of the levy as

299
P.3d 232,252 (2013); Millerv. Haller, 129 Idaho 345,351,924 P.2d 607,613 (1996)
("The general rule is that a contract prohibited by law is illegal and hence
unenforceable."). Id. p. 11 IHD argues, "The statutory 50/50 tax distribution ratio is
mandatory", because the statute uses the word "shall" not "may". Id. IHD argues, ''The
statue does not authorize a 75/25 split or a 100/0 split." Id. For this proposition, IHD
cites Rexburg v. Madison County, 115 Idaho 88, 764 P.2d 838 (1988). Id.
The City correctly points out City of Rexburg does not support IHD's argument
that I.C. §40-801 does not permit anything other than a 50/50 tax distribution ratio as
that case dealt with an inadvertent decimal point error, where the City of Rexburg
received only 5% rather than the statutory 50% revenue. Plaintiff's Response to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, pp. 10-11. This Court finds the Idaho Supreme Court in
City of Rexburg did not address whether a disbursement greater than 50% would have
violated the statute; it simply held the county in that case had duty to allocate at least
the 50% under that statute. 115 Idaho 88, 89-90, 764 P .2d 838, 839-90.
Idaho Code §40-801(1)(a) reads:

40-801. Authority and procedure for levies. (1) The commissioners of a
county highway system, the commissioners of a county-wide highway
district, and the commissioners of highway districts are empowered, for
the purpose of construction and maintenance of highways and bridges
under their respective jurisdictions, to make the following highway ad
valorem tax levies as applied to the market value for assessment
purposes within their districts:
(a) Two-tenths per cent (0.2%) of market value for assessment purposes
for construction and maintenance of highways and bridges; provided that
if the levy is made upon property within the limits of any incorporated city,

Page

fifty per cent (50%) of the funds shall be apportioned to that incorporated

made it clear

Madison

a

"statutory duty" (and specifically not a duty "based in common law, contact, or any other
theory of law") to pay the City of Rexburg the amounts due under I. C. §40-801. 115
Idaho 88, 89-90, 764 P.2d 838, 839-90. City of Rexburg makes it ciear that the county
has a statutory duty to pay the city the amount due under I.C. §40-801. Id. The word
"shall" in I.C. §40-801 applies to IHD's statutory duty to pay City 50% of revenues
raised by taxes on property owners within the City of Sandpoint. City of Rexburg
makes it clear this statutory duty of paying revenues is mandatory under the statute,
and must be in the statutory amount of 50% of revenues, and in that case the
mispayment of .5% was a breach of that statutory duty. This Court can find nothing in

City of Rexburg or in I.C. §40-801 that prohibits a county from contractually agreeing to
pay more than the statutory amount. This Court finds IHD's argument "IHD cannot alter
the statutory apportionment of tax revenue set forth in I.C. §40-801" to be completely
without merit. Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 8. There is
nothing in LC. §40-801 which prohibits the highway district from allocating the
remaining revenues (those above the statutorily mandated 50%) to a city by agreement.
IHD's argument that the statutory language "fifty per cent (50%) of the funds shall
be apportioned" means that the defendant cannot legally apportion more than fifty
percent to the City, is a strained interpretation which this Court simply cannot make.
"Judicial interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of the statute's literal
words." State, Dept. of Transp. v. HJ Grathol, 153 Idaho 87, 91,278 P.3d 957,961
(2012); State v. Bumight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999). Statutes are
interpreted by their plain and express meaning. HJ Grathol, 153 Idaho at 91, 278 P.3d
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
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at 961 . A rational

meaning of a statute is always preferred to any curious,

1

11
if

is

incomplete, absurd, or arguably in conflict with other laws." Arel v. T & L Enterprises,

Inc., 146 Idaho 29, 32, 189 P.3d 1149, 1152 (2008).
A plain reading of Idaho Code § 40-801 is that a highway district owes a city 50%

of ad valorem statutes within city limits. The statute does not designate what is to be
done with the other fifty percent. Thus, interpreting the 50% amount as a minimum
amount is much more logical than to interpret such as a limit
IHD's argument that this 50% amount is a limit ignores the powers given to
highway commissioners. "[S]tatutes that are in pari materia (of the same matter or
subject), are to be construed together as one system to effect legislative intent.

City of

Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway District, 126 Idaho 145. 150 (1994).
Idaho Code § 40-1310 outlines the powers of the highway district commissioners,
among which includes the following:
The commissioners of a highway district have exclusive general
supervision and jurisdiction over all highways and public rights-of-way
within their highway system, with full power to construct, maintain, repair,
acquire, purchase and improve all highways within their highway system,
whether directly or by their own agents and employees or by contract. ..
The highway district shall have power to manage and conduct the
business and affairs of the district; establish and post speed and other
regulatory signs; make and execute all necessary contracts; have an
office and employ and appoint agents, attorneys, officers and employees
as may be required, and prescribe their duties and fix their compensation.
Highway district commissioners and their agents and employees have the
right to enter upon any lands to make a survey, and may locate the
necessary works on the line of any highways on any land which may be
deemed best for the location.
LC. §40-1310(1). A plain reading of this statute illustrates that the commissioners have
the power to contract for services and to conduct its own business. Therefore, the
Page

commissioners have discretion of what to do with its funds,
a

the

the discretion
maintain

fifty percent above what it is required so
fifty-percent

to be a

commissioners may not exceed would put ITO's reading of I.C. §40-801 in conflict with
the powers set forth in I.C. §40-1310(1). To hold otherwise would limit the
Commissioners' discretion of how to spend the other 50 percent of the taxes collected.
Interpreting the fifty-percent apportionment as a minimum creates no such conflict.
Thus, this Court's interpretation is LC. §40-1310(1) mandates IHO to pay a minimum
fifty percent of ad valorem city taxes to the city and IHO has the discretion on how to
use the other half of its funds. !HO chose ten years ago, with the advice of counsel, to
contractually agree the remaining fifty percent goes to the City as well, and that is not
prohibited under§ 40-801, and thus, the agreement is not illegal.

IHO's motion to

dismiss on this ground must be denied.

3. Legality under the Joint Powers Act.
IHO argues that the agreement is unlawful under the Joint Powers Act (JPA), I.C.
§67-2326 et seq. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, pp. 11-13. IHO argues JPA
mandates an agency cannot delegate away or exceed its statutory or constitutional
authority when entering into a joint agreement. LC. § 67-2328. Id., p. 12. Additionally,
IHO argues there must be a termination clause and there is no termination because the
contract states that it will be "perpetual." Id. !HO also argues that the provision stating
that the agreement may terminate by "mutuai agreement" is not a termination provision;
rather, the IHO argues that it functions as a prohibition of termination unless there can
be a mutual agreement. Id. The defendant argues that because the City receives

Page

benefits

excess of what the statute authorizes, the

never have an incentive

1
argues:
The District's contention that the JPA is void for want of an effective
termination clause is misguided. I.C. § 67-2328 requires, "Any such
agreement shall specify the following: (1) Its duration." The plain meaning
of the statue does not require duration of a specific number of months or
years. The JPA satisfies the Act's duration requirement by providing
express terms of the JPA's duration, and an additional vehicle for its
termination upon certain dissolving acts. The Parties did not leave any
room for ambiguity when they mutually agreed on the JPA term to meet
the mutual obligation to maintain City streets:
DURATION: The duration of this [A]greement shall be perpetual or
until such time as the District and the City jointly and together agree
to amend or terminate the same.
(Complaint, Ex. B) The JPA further provides:
DISSOLUTION: This JPA will automatically terminate if the District
is dissolved. It will also terminate if the City supports any future
petition for dissolution of District.
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 1
A joint powers agreement must specify the following:
(1) Its duration.
(2) The precise organization, composition and nature of any separate
legal or administrative entity created thereby together with the powers
delegated thereto, provided such entity may be legally created.
(3) Its purpose or purposes.
(4) The manner of financing the joint or cooperative undertaking and of
establishing and maintaining a budget therefore.
(5) The permissible method or methods to be employed in accomplishing
the partial or complete termination of the agreement and for disposing of
property upon such partial or complete termination.
(6) Any other necessary and proper matters.

I.C. § 67-2328(c). This Court agrees with the City that the statutory mandate of
LC. § 67-2738 has been satisfied, the agreement's "duration" is "perpetual." The
duration is not unknown, it is perpetual. The fact that !HD ten years later regrets
entering into that agreement is of no import. This Court also agrees that there is a
method of termination, and that is "mutual agreement." There is no Idaho appellate
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"method

court precedent on Idaho Code § 67-2328 which interprets "duration"
The language must be given its plain meaning. Given
and "method

, those requirements

been

The Joint Powers Act allows for state or public agencies to exercise their powers
jointly provided each has power over the common subject matter. LC.§ 67-2328(a).
!HD is correct that neither entity may exceed its authority and that a joint power
agreement must address some specific provisions. Id. The Court's decision above that
IHD has not violated the Idaho Constitution in entering into this agreement thus effects
this Joint Powers argument raised by !HD. Had the Court bought IHD's argument that
IHD had indebted itself in violation of the Idaho Constitution, then the agreement would
also be unlawful under the Joint Powers Act. However, as this Court holds there is no
violation of the Idaho Constitution and IHD acted in a constitutionally permissible way,
then this secondary argument by IHD must be rejected as well.
Additionally, for the same reasons discussed in the next section, the argument
that perpetual contracts are in violation of public policy are, best case for IHD at this
juncture, not a basis for granting a motion to dismiss because a court must consider
factual circumstances, which would require an examination of evidence outside the
pleading. In any event, IHD's motion to dismiss on this ground must be denied.
4. Invalidity Because of Perpetuity.
!HD argues Idaho courts disfavor perpetual agreements. Brief

Support of

Motion to Dismiss, pp. 13-14. IHD cites Barton v. State, 104 Idaho 338, 659 P.2d 92
(1983). Id., p. 13. IHD notes in that case the Idaho Supreme Court declined to read a
contract as containing a perpetuity clause which would have bound the State of Idaho
Transportation Department. 104 Idaho 338, 340, 659 P.2d 92, 94.
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was asked

an intent for

Response

particularly distinguishable, as the court there
be perpetually

Defendant's

Dismiss,

a purported

18.

the Idaho Supreme Court actually wrote is, "Where a contract is not expressly made
perpetual by its terms, construction of such contract as perpetual is disfavored." 104
Idaho 338, 340, 659 P.2d 92, 94, citations omitted. In the present case, IHD and City
specifically agreed the duration was "perpetual." There is nothing about that term which
is ambiguous. Thus, the implication under Barton is where the parties expressly agree
the duration of the agreement is "perpetual", the Court should not look upon that
agreement with disfavor. In Barton, the Idaho Department of Transportation entered
into an agreement with a landowner where the State would provide access to the
owner's business properties and purchase her land at $1,000.104 Idaho 338,339,659
P.2d 92, 93. In return, the landowner agreed to forebear from legal action and to
encourage other landowners who were dealing with the Department of Transportation
to be reasonable in their dealings. Id. The contract did not address how long this
arrangement would continue, and in 1977, the Department of Transportation closed the
access points. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court refused to imply that the contract was
perpetual absent clear indication that the parties intended to be perpetually bound:
"Where a contract is not expressly made perpetual by its terms, construction of such
contract as perpetual is disfavored." 104 Idaho 338, 340, 659 P.2d 92, 94. Again, the
Idaho Supreme Court's statement only disfavors interpreting a contract to be perpetual
when the contract is silent as to duration. When there is express language that a
contract is intended to be perpetual, this holding suggests that the Idaho Supreme
Court would uphold such an express provision.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
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In any event, the Court must deny the motion to dismiss on this basis because
even if

contract is against public policy (which the

does

the

determine a reasonable time for performance, and this determination requires
factual findings that are outside of the pleadings. Barton, 104 Idaho 338,341,659 P.2d
92, 95. A court determines "reasonable time" by examining "the subject matter of the
contract, the relationship of the parties and the circumstances surrounding the
transaction." Id. In addition to a reasonable time of performance, a party must also
give reasonable notice of its intent to terminate the contract. Id. In Barton, the Court
held that twenty-two years of performance under the contract between the Idaho
Department of Transportation and the landowner was reasonable. Id.

5. Idaho Code §40-1333.
!HD argues LC.§ 40-1333 requires cities which have city highway systems, shall
be responsible for the maintenance of highways in their system, except as provided in
LC.§ 40-607; and cities may make agreements with a highway district to do the city
work, but the city shall compensate the district for any work performed. Brief in Support
of Motion to Dismiss, p. 14. IHD argues: "The Idaho legislature has established a clear
policy that a city must use its own revenues to maintain city streets and may not use
highway district revenues to do so, except as provided in I.C. §40-801." Id. The IHD
then claims "If a highway district constructs or maintains a city street, the city must
repay the highway district for all expenditures made within the city by the highway
district." Id. While that is an accurate summary of LC. $40-1333, it has nothing to do
with the facts of this case, because IHD has not counterclaimed against the City to
recompense IHD for maintenance work IHD has performed for the City
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!HD's argument under LC.§ 40-1333. The Court finds IHD's
333

have no merit

6. Sufficient Consideration.
Finally, IHD argues that there was no consideration for IHD providing 100% of its
ad valorem property taxes. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, pp. 14-15. This Court

finds this argument by IHD is especially inapt. As pointed out by the City, the Joint
Powers Agreement itself recited mutual consideration, as it ended all the protracted
litigation. Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, pp. 20-21; citing
Complaint, Exhibit A. The City correctly notes:
The JPA is the result of the Parties' Stipulation for Settlement
("Settlement"), entered into July 3, 2003. (Complaint, Ex. A) By its terms,
the Settlement grants the City jurisdiction over city streets, requires the
formation of a the JPA, compels the City to vacate its petition for a
dissolution election, requires dismissal of the civil case with prejudice,
requires the City to not oppose future annexation elections sought be the
District, and stipulates that the District waives its costs awarded on appeal
by the Idaho Supreme Court in Docket No. 27441. (Complaint, Ex. A)
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 20. The City also correctly
notes:
This Court approved the Settlement. The Idaho Court of Appeals recently
held that a settlement, the terms of which are incorporated into a court
order, does not need additional consideration to be effective. Davidson v.
Sae/berg, 154 Idaho 227, 296 P.3d 433,438 (Ct.App. 2013). The same
rationale should apply here, where the Parties provided mutual
consideration in the settlement, a part of which was the exercise of their
rights under I.C. §67-2326, et seq.
Id., p. 21. IHD did not respond to the City's arguments in its Reply Brief in Support of

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
A contract that contains no consideration is illusory and therefore unenforceable.
There is consideration in the present case because the IHD has agreed to pay money
and the City has agreed to forbear its legal efforts to dissolve the IHD. An agreement
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
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must have consideration, a benefit of the bargain,
Springs Owners Ass'n,

consideration

an issue.

order to be enforceable. Weisel v.

152 Idaho 519,526,272 P.3d 491,498 (2012).
agreement,

benefited

because it received the responsibility to maintain its own streets in addition to funds to
do so. The Highway District benefitted because the City ceased its pursuit to legally
dissolve the Highway District within Bonner County. There was consideration and
therefore the motion to dismiss must be denied under this argument.
7. Estoppel.
The City correctly notes:
The District is taking a position contrary to which it agreed when it entered
into the JPA, and consented to this Court's Order. It was the Court's
dismissal based on the stipulation that permitted the JPA.
Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 22. The City then argues, "As
a matter of equity, the District is either judicially estopped from reversing its position
taken in open court, or is equitably estopped from harming the City by reversing its
position. Id. IHD argues "Estoppel does not save a Constitutionally Invalid Agreement."
Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, pp.14-20. Because this Court
does not find the Joint Powers Agreement to be Constitutionally invalid, there is no
need to discuss the judicial estoppel or equitable estoppel arguments.
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER.
The complaint here has been sufficiently pleaded. For that reason alone, IHD's
motion to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for "failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted" must be denied. Claims grounded in a breach of contract are
sufficiently pleaded if they allege the formation of a contract, the obligations under the
contract, the right of the plaintiff pursuant to the contract, and the breach by the
defendant. See State ex rel. Robins v. Clinger, 72 Idaho 222

951). In this case, City

has alleged an agreement between it and !HD, has alleged City's agreed-upon right to
and has alleged
alleged

breach
a

contract claim, IHD's motion to dismiss must be denied.
Additionally, when an illegal contract is alleged, the Court might have an
affirmative duty to examine the legality of the contract when it appears in the pleading
through a verified complaint. It is generally not appropriate for a court to consider
affirmative defenses in considering a motion to dismiss at the pleading stage of
litigation. See Gardner v. Hollifield, 96 Idaho 609, 611 (1975). There are exceptions,
however. One exception is when an affirmative defense appears on the face of the
complaint itself. Gardner v. Hollifield, 96 Idaho 609, 611 (1975). Another exception,
raised in contract-related defenses, is whether the alleged agreement is illegal. "The
illegality of a contract can be raised at any stage in litigation. In fact, the court has the
duty to raise the issue of illegality sua sponte." Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604,
608 (2009)(citing Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6 (2002). Illegal contracts constitute
questions of law for the court. Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6 (2002). Here, the
verified complaint has attached a copy of the contract, so the contract itself is part of
the proceedings and the illegality would be evident from the face of the contract.
Additionally, the defendant has questioned the contract's legality. Based on the
affirmative duty of a court to evaluate the illegality of the contract, based on the contract
that is part of the verified complaint, and based on the defendant's challenge of the
contract's legality, this Court may proceed to make a determination of the legality of the
contract in the record in deciding whether to dismiss the complaint
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can

make determinations regarding the legality of the contract, and has done so. Based on
the above reasons, the Court must deny the motion to dismiss on all the arguments
presented by IHD.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the defendant IHD's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED in all
aspects.
Entered this 9th day of December, 2013.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

14

15

CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal
corporation of the State ofidaho,

Case No. CV-13-01342

16

17

Plaintiff,

STIPULATION FOR RECIPROCAL
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

vs.

18

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT. a

19

political subdivision of the State of Idaho,

20

21

Defendant.
Plaintiff. City of Sandpoint ("Sandpoint"), filed its Complaint For Breach of Contract and for

22
Pennanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief on August 16, 2013.

The Independent Highway

23

24

25

District ("Distrid') filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 9, 2013 . On December 9, 2013, the Court
issued its Memorandum Decision and Order denying the District's Motion to Dismiss ("DecisionH)

26
STIPULATION FOR RECIPROCAL
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
PAGE l

?~~A9't/tZJJfatt
176

A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPOFIATION
250 NorltY,1!131 Blvd, Suite 200
Coaur d'Alene. ldnho 83814

PhM!I: (208) OOJ.2103

2 3 2· 9

d1

N. 5

r

./

further stipulate as follows:
4
l.

This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this case and jurisdiction of all parties

7

2.

Venue lies properly with this Court.

8

3.

Entry of a reciprocal preliminary injunction pending final resolution of the case is in the

5
6

9

10

11

hereto.

best :interests of citizens represented by the parties pending final resolution of this action.

4.

No security is required. Rule 65(c), LR.C.P.

5.

The parties agree that the reciprocal preliminary injunction is binding in form and scope

12
pursuant to Rule 6S(d), I.R.C.P.

13

14

6.

The parties by agreeing and stipulating to entry of a preliminary injunction make no

!5

admissions as to the truth of Plaintiff's allegations or to Defendant's defenses. Each party reserves its

16

rights to, and defenses to, any claim made in this matter.

17

18
19

7.

The parties stipulate to entry of an injunction that requires conduct in accordance with the

terms of the Joint Powers Agreement dated July 8, 2003 until further order of the Court. IHD shall
disburse any sums withheld from Sandpoint and continue the contractual disbursements unless absolved

20

21
22

23

from such by the Comt. Any distribution made during the pendency of this case shall not be deemed
"voluntary" by !HD to Sandpoint. Sandpoint's right to asse1i entitlement to all distributions made to it is
reserved for fu1ther action of the Court,

24

25
26

STIPULATION FOR RECIPROCAL
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
2
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r

Mit chel l, Hay nes, Fr i edlan der, Pete

P. 6

Counsel for both patties stipulated that they accept service for their respective party

2

clients and such service is effective on each party.

3

. ,.).''-

4

No. 5131

_.;:,

DATED this ~day of December, 2013 .

5

6
7

TTHEW ANDERSEN, ISB No. 3581
TON & CASHATT, LAWYERS,
a Professional Service Corporation

8

9

10

SCOTR. CAMPBELL, ISB No. 4121
SANDPOINT CITY ATTORNEY

SUS~P. WEEKS, ISB No, 4255
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, PA
DAVID W. WYNKOOP
SHERER & WYNKOOP, LLP
Attorneys for Independent Highway District

Attorneys for City of Sandpoint
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15
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18
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND OF THE COUNTY OF BONNER
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal corporation
of the State of Idaho,

Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
)

)

VS.

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT; a
political subdivision of the State ofldaho,

Defendant.

CASE NO. CV 2013-01342
RECIPROCAL PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION ORDER

)
)
)
)
)

The Comt having considered the stipulation of City of Sandpoint ("Cityu) and
Independent Highway District ("IHD") for entry of a preliminary injunction, and being advised
in the premises, finds that:

1,

This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this case and jurisdiction of all

patties hereto.
2.

Venue lies properly with this Court.

3.

Entry of a reciprocal preliminary injunction is in the best interests of all citizens

represented by the parties pending final resolution of this action.

4.

Security is not required. Rule 65(c), I.R.C.P.

5.

The parties stipulate that the preliminary injunction is binding in form and scope

to Rule 65(d), I.R.C.P.

PRELIMINARY

d ,

D

<

N, 5

f:

3

a

made

reserves

7.

matter.

The parties are enjoined to conduct themselves in accordance with the terms of

the Joint Powers Agreement dated July 8, 2003 until further order of the Court. IHD shall
disburse

sums withheld from Sandpoint and continue the contractual disbursements unless

absolved from such by the Court. Any distribution made during the pendency of this case shall
not be deemed "voluntary" by IHD to Sandpoint Sandpoint's right to assert entitlement to all
distributions made to it is reserved for further action of the Comt.
8.

Counsel for both parties stipulated that they accept service for their respective

party clients and such service is effective on each party.

~-fl--

Dated this _U_ day ofDecember, 2013.

'

6HN T. MITCHELL
APPROVED:

'
C. M tthew Andersen
Scot ampbell
Attorneys for Plaintiff

b-20~

avidynkoop'
Susan P. Weeks
Attorneys for Defendants

RECIPROCAL PRELIMINARY

"'-··

)

r,

L

2 3 2 9

I HEREBY
correct

of the 1"n'l',Qrrnn1

Scot R. Campbell
Sandpoint City Attorney
1123 Lake Street

Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Facsimile: (208) 255-1368

C. Matthew Ander.sen
Winston & Cashatt; Lawyers
a Professional Service Corporation
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121 Neu-v::l- Der \l!?rd__
David R. Wynkoop
Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP
730 N. Main Street
P.O. Box 31

Meridian, ID 83680
(208) 887-4865
Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
(208) 664-1684 \---\ b--Aol Pe I~ v l vet(_,

CLERK OF THE COURT

N,

~.
j

03/2014

3
4

5
6

7
8

9

3.57
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JAMES VERN

20855457'11

01 02

.,_,...,,_,,._,,. lSB

SA.~TIPOINT CITY ATTORJ.'\JEY
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, Idaho 83 864
Telephone: (208) 263-0534
Facsimile: (208) 255-1368
scai.J1t2bell@,ci.sand12oint.id. us

C. MATTHEW A1'.TIERSEN, ISB No. 3581
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS 1
a Professional Service Corporation
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814

10

Telephone: (208) 667-2103

11

Facsimile: (208) 765-2121
cma:@vvinstoncashatt.com

12
13

Attorneys for City of Sandpoint

14
THE DISTRICT COlJRT OF TI-IE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

15

16
17

CITY OF SA.:"\i-UPOfNT, a municipal
corporation of the State ofidaho,
Case No. CV-13-01342

18

Plaintiff;

vs.

19
20

21

STIPULATED MOTION TO VACATE
TRIAL DATE

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State ofidaho,
Defendant

22
23

Plaintiff, City of Sandpoint and Defendant, Independent Highway District, by and through their

24
undersigned com1Sel hereby stipulate to entry of an order vacating the t."ial date presently set on

25
March

The request is made

STIPULATED MOTION TO
TRIAL DATE
1

reason that the parties originally contemplated an

~~~~

A~OW.Sa:!Va~
2l5'0 ~ 811,d,. ~20&
Ocltllr d'Alane. ldlho :&aml4

~~eti-2103

[

03/201

3:57

20855457'11

matter

research
3
4

s
6

PAGE

JAMES

02/02

consent

the parties

proper procedure for an inter]ocutory appeal. The parties

54(b) certificate was not
continue to confer to determine the proper

Jsteps to take to effectuate an appeal of the Court's order.

II

,.~rc1

DATED this-;;:,L-daY of March, 2014.

7

11

12
13

14

. MATTHEW A:Nl)ERSEN, ISB No. 3581
IWINSTON & CASHATI. LAWYERS,
.a Professional Service Corporation
!SCOT R. CA,.\1PBELL, ISB No. 21
SANDPOINT CITY ATTORNEY
I

I Attorneys for City of Sandpoint

15
16

17
18

19

20
21

22

I
24 l
23

25

I

I

26 11
MOTION TO

TRIAL DATE
PAGE2

SUSA..'N" P. \VEEKS, ISB No. 4255
JAMES. VERNON & \\iEEKS, PA

DAVIDW. WYNKOOP
SHERER & VlYNKOOP, LLP
Attorneys for Independent Highway District

N 85L3

a

20

02/04

'I

I

1

l

I

2
3
4
5

6

7
8

JN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOJ\1NER

9

10

CITY OF SA1'H)P01NT~ a muofoipal
corporation of the St.ate ofldahoi

CaseNo. CV-13-01342

11

12
13
14

Plaintiff,

ORDER VACATJNG TRIAL DATE

vs.

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRJCT, a
political subdivision of the State ofidaho,
Defendant.

15

16
17

THIS MATTER crune before the Court on the parties! Stipulated Motion to Vacate Trial Date.

18

The court having considered the stipulated motio» and the pleadings fifod in this matter and being fully

19
20

advised, finds good cause to grant the motion.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the trial date presently set on March 25, 2014 in the above

21
action is vacated~
22

Z3

,?-G.SJ 't, &QJt~

DONElliOPENCOURTthis

t?c_fo her .2.
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6rt{dayof Mo..vL
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ii014,

24
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26
ORDER ON MOTION TOVACATE TRIA
DATE-PAGE J
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C. MATIHEW ANDERSEN,
WINSTON & CASHATT
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Fr

r

ISB No, 3581

6
7
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8

SUSAN P. \\'EEKS, ISB No. 4255

9

JAMES. VERNON & WEEKS, PA
Attorneys for Independent Highway District
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VACATE TRIAL

1an

\ . 851.1
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2

03/0'1

84

:, 20

II

I

. III - -

J.

hereby

that

a true and

complete copy of the foregoing to
2

3

postage prepaid;

delivered;

sent

via facsLrpJle on March~ 2014, to:

4

C. Matthew Andersen
Winston & Cashatt

5

601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1900

6

509-838-141.6 (fax)

Spokane, WA 99201
7
8

9

10

R Scot Campbell
Sandpoint City Attorney

1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, ID &3864
(208) 255-1368 (fax)

ll

David E. Wynkoop

12

P.O. Box 31

Sherer & Wynkoop~ LLP
Boise, ID 83680
13

(208) 887-4865 (fax)

14

Susan P. Week~

15

James, Vernon & Weeks

1626 Lincoln Way

16

17
19

Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
(208) 664-1684 (fax)

CLERK OF THE cotrRT

20
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25
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Cashatt LFax: !509\ 202-4304

To: 2082B51447@rcfax.crm Fax: +12082651447
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SCOT R. CAMPBELL, ISB No. 4121
SANDPOINT CITY AITORNEY
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Telephone: (208) 263-0534
Facsimile: (208) 255-1368
scru:npbell@ci.sandpoint.id.us

3
4
5
6

7

C. MATTHEW A.'IDERSEN, ISB No. 3581

8

WINSTON & CASHAIT, LAWYERS,
a Professional Service Corporation
9 250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
10 Telephone: (208) 667-2103
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121
cma@winstoncashatt.com
12
Attorneys for Plaintiff
13

I

14
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN A.ND FOR THE COlJr-.'TY OF BONNER

15
16

CITY OF SAfmPOINT' a municipal
corporation of the State of Idaho,

17
18

Plaintiff,

CaseNo. CV-13-01342

vs.

19

20 . INDEPENDE:r-..'T HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State of Idaho,
21 II
Defendant.

CITY OF SANDPOINT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Oral Argument Requested

22
23

The City of Sandpoint (the "City") requests pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56, 57, 65 and LC. §10-1201 et
24

seq. that the Court enter declaratory judgment establishing that the Joint Powers Agreement and the

25
26

CITY OF SM"DPOINT'S MOTION FOR

I
11

StJMMARY JUDGMENT
PAGE 1

~n1Jk,n,.#~
A?f!Oi'ESS!ONAL SEiMCE COR.l>OMOON
250No~Blvd~ &lil&200
Coeur If Ak!ne, idaho83!ii4
Phml&: (2091657-2100

1/'<Jlnston

Cashatt

2082651447@rcfa;:.con Fax: +12082651447

Dage

of 4 06/04/2014

I :35

!
11

II
1
/ Memorandum

2

I

Order «;:,c;'uu.u,i; th,,

3

were
to
·- f"nmnhr
--- r·. with
.. ...

!ndle!J!'mllent

form of a permanent injunction. Further, the City of Sandpoint requests an award of costs and attorney

4

fees incurred in this action as allowed

law, I.C. §12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54.

5

This Motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support filed herewith, the Affidavits of Scot

6

7

Campbell and Shannon Syth filed on November 7, 2013 and the Court's Memorandum Decision and

8

Order entered December 9, 2013.

l

9

DATED this

day of June,

10
11

W ANDERSEN, ISB No. 3581

12

& CASHATT, LAWYERS

13
14

SCOT R. CAMPBELL, ISB No. 4121
SANDPOINT CITY ATTORL'IBY

15

Attorneys for City of Sandpoint

16
17
18 ,

19
20
21
22
23

24
25

26

'
I
I

CITY OF SA.1\IDPOINT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PAGE2

?P'~~~

A~ESS!ONALSER\l!CE~O!i
250 Nor'lllwd Blvd_ S!!II& 200
Coew d' !\Ian&. i-dllho !:lm14

Phcne: /2001 ffi-2100

202-4304

To: 2082651447@n::fax.con Fax: +12082651447

Page 4 of 4 0!3iD4i20i4

:36

coino,lere copy of
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l.....l

via facsimile on June --i---'

3

to:

4

David R Wynkoop
Sherer & Wynkoop. LLP
5 730 N. Main Street
P.O.Box31
6 , Meridian, ID 83680

I

7

8

!Susan P. Weeks

Vernon & Weeks, P.A.
I James,
1626 Lincoln Way
1

1

Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

9

10
11

12
13
14

15
16
17
18

19
20

21
22

231
l

24

25
26

OF SA.'IDPOINT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGME:!•rr
3
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To 208265144 7@rcfax .cor Fax: +i 208265144 7

Cashatt, L,Fax: (509) 202-4304

Fmm: Winston

SCOT R. CA,.\1PBELL,

3

5 06/04/2014

No.

SANDPOINT CITY ATTORNEY
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864

4
5

Telephone: (208) 263-0534

Facsimile: (208) 255-1368

7

Ij

8

IWINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS,

6

scampbell@ci.sandpoint.id.us

IC. MATTHEW ANDERSEN, ISB No. 3581

1

a Professional Service Corporation
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene. Idaho 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-2103
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121

1

9
10
11

cma@winstoncashattcom

12
Attorneys for Plaintiff

13
14

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

15
I

16

I CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal
corporation of the State of Idaho,

17

Plaintiff,

18

vs.

19

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision oft.he State of Idaho,

20

21

22

23

Case No. CV-13-01342
CITY OF SANDPOINT'S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant.

I1·
I

Relief Requested.
The City of Sandpoint (the

11

City") requests that the Court enter declaratory judgment

24

establishing that the Joint Powers Agreement and the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by

25
26

I

CITY OF SA...~l)POINT'S MEMORANDIJM IN

.. SUPPORT OF SlJMM..J\.RY JUDGMENT -· l

I
11

~~ell~
A!"RO!'ESSIONAI. SERVICE COR.r'OflAT',ON
250 Narlflweet Bllld.. S,Jila 208
Coeur d' Al-. idaho83814
~ : (21)8} 667-21(1'3

From: Winston & Cashatt LFax: (509) 202-4304

2082651447@rcfax.con Fax: -1-12082651447

06/04/2014 11 :44

II

3

the

Sandpoint requests an award

costs

attorney fees incurred

action.

4

2.

Undisputed Facts.

5
The undisputed facts are established in the body of the verified Complaint filed on August 16,

6

7

2013, and as outlined in the

8

2013, along with the previously filed affidavits of Scot R. Campbell and Shannon Syth and exhibits

Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss filed on November

9 . thereto. As those pleadings provide, the City and Il-ID entered into a Joint Powers Agreement ("JPA'')
10

and Memorandum of Understanding (which settled litigation between the parties, all of which is public

11

record), requiring the IHD to disburse ad volorem tax funds raised within the City to the City for the

12
operation, maintenance and snow removal of the streets within the City limits. The JPA was entered

13
into in compromise

14

pending litigation and to terminate a petition to abolish the llID.

15

IHD inexplicably ceased disbursing the funds and challenged the validity of the ten year old

16

agreement it had executed. The City was forced to sue to obtain the withheld amounts. Without

17

disputing the underlying facts, IHD moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to IC 12{b)(6). IHD's

18

1

argument is based on its view of the controlling law. This Court entered a detailed Memorandum

'

19 I

Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on December 9. 2013.

That order

20
affirmatively established the law of this case and by its ruling; the court has determined the Joint Powers
21

22
23
24

Agreement was legally enforceable.

The parties have stipulated to entry
December 18, 2013.

a Preliminary Injunction which was entered on

(Without the Preliminary Injunction Il-ID would have continued to withhold

25
26

CITY OF SANDPOINTS MEMOR.i\NDlJM IN
SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT -

2

~~AWddAa#

A ?ROrESSIONALSS:WlCE COR."'ORAnON
250 Nal'tlrHeat 131vd.. Sult9 2118
Coeur d' Alane. !doho 113814
~ : (208! &l7-2100

LFax: (509) 202-4304

3

2082651447@rcfax.con Fax: +12082651447

P~qe

of 5 06/04/2014

its motion to dismiss, which has been granted. However, the matter has not been stayed and IBD will

4
5
6

1

not consent to such a

Given the posture

the case and pending scheduling deadlines, it is

appropriate for the City to request summary judgment because there is no genuine issue of material fact

7

which would necessitate a trial

8

3.

Points of Authority and Argument.

9

To expedite argument on this matter, the City incorporates the authority and argument made in

10

its Response to IHD s Motion to Dismiss, as well as the Court's reasoning set out in its Memorandum

11

1

Decision and Order. IHD's challenges to the agreement were based on the legal claims that Idaho's

12
statutory scheme prohibited the parties from having the authority to enter into the JPA, that the JPA

13

14

created an illegal future "debt" prohibited by statute and constitution, that the JPA's express terms
statute, and that the JPA lacked consideration, all of

15

improperly lacked termination terms as required

16

which rendered it illegal and unenforceable. Each of these claims rests solely on the legal interpretation

17

of the statutes, the Constitution, and the express unambiguous terms of the agreement. As a result, there

18

19
20

21

are no issues of fact which are disputed to create any genuine issue for trial; if the JPA was legal, it is
enforceable, and the City is entitled to all of its declaratory relief and fees and costs.

IRCP 56;

!I!' I.C. §12-121; IRCP 54.

22
23
24

CITY OF SANDPOINT'S MEMORANDUM IN
SCPPORT OF SUMM.ARY Ji.JDGMENT -- 3

~~AW~

A PROfESSIONAl. SERVICE OORi"ORsmON
250 l\lor!hweat Blvd.,. Suil9 206
Coeur If A!SM. kfaho83814

l"hcln9: l20BI 687-2103

To: 2082651447@rcfruccoc Fax: +12082651447

(509) 202-4304

3

JPA and ordering

declaring the

DATED this

enforcement

the

Page 5

06/04/2014

:44

a permanent

I!:!

day of June,

C. MA

W ANDERSEN, ISB No. 3581

WINSTO. 1 & CASHATT, LAWYERS
SCOT R. CAMPBELL, ISB No. 4121

SANDPOINT CITY ATTORNEY
Attorneys for City of Sandpoint

11

12
I hereby certify that I caused a true and
complete copy of the foregoing to be
mailed,
postage prepaid;
ha.'ld delivered; 18'.l sent

13

D

D

14

via facsimile on June

15

16

David R. Wynkoop

18

1 Meridian, ID 83680

2014, to:

Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP
17 1730 N. Main Street
1

P.O. Box 31

19

Susan P. Weeks
20 James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A.
1
1626 Lincoln Way
21 Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

22

CITY OF SANDPOTh'T'S MEMORA..l'IDUM IN
SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT -- 4

~~AP~

A i'ROR:SSIONAL SErMCE OOA.:>Ol'lA.TION
250 ~ Blvd. Suite 21]8
Coeul' d' Afeoo. lrl:lho83814
f'ham: (208) 661-2103

a,

a ae r

Main
P.O.Box31
Meridian, ID 83 680
Telephone: (208) 887-4800

Facsimile (208) 887-4865
ISB No. 2429

SusanP, Weaks
James, Vernon& Weeks, P.A
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d1 Alene, ID 83 814
Telephone: (208) 667-0683
Facsimile; (208) 664-1684

ISB No, 4255
Attorneys for Defendant Independent Highway District

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STA TE OF
IDAHDO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal
corporation of the State of Idaho,
Plaintiff,
vs,

ORDER GRANTING RULE 12
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
CERTIFICATION

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State of Idaho~

Defendant
For the reasons enunciated on the record

this matter at the hearing held May

4,

Defendant's motion for Leave to File an Interlocutory Appeal pursuant to lAR. 12 oft.he
Coun's December 9, 2013, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss is hereby granted.
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STATE
IDAHO
County of BONNER

AT ,,:t.: IO
O'C!ock_e._M
CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

Deputy

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

CITY OF SANDPOINT, a Municipal

Corporation of the State of Idaho,

)
}

)
vs.

)
)

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a

}
)

case No. BON CV 2013 1342
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

political subdivision of the State of Idaho, )
)

______________
Defendant

)
,)

i. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND.
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant
Independent Highway District (IHD) on September 9, 2013.

On August 151 2013, plaintiff City of Sandpoint {City) filed this lawsuit alleging a
breach of contract claim against IHD for an alleged failure to perform an obligation
under a 2003 contractual agreement between the two entities. The 2003 contractual
agreement was a "Joint Powers Agreement," which had settled about a decade of

litigation between the two parties.
The original dispute that eventually led to the settlement agreement began in the
1990s, when City and IHO in a different lawsuit brought to the district court the question
of which entity was responsible for street maintenance within common boundaries.

Although the district court deciared ti-te parties' respective responsibilities, the district
court's decision was appealed and the district court's holding was vacated on appeal
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of Sandpoint v. Sanc!po!.11t Independent
Highway Dist., 126 Idaho 145, 148, 879 P.2d 1078, 1081 (1994). The Idaho Supreme
Court found that Highway District had general authority to maintain the streets absent a
showing by the City that it has a functioning street department 126 Idaho 145, 150-51,

879 P.2d 1078, 1083-84.
In 2000 the City established a street department of its own and brought suit
again, which resulted in two decisions from the Idaho Supreme Court in 2003. The City
sought a declaratory judgment that, because of its functioning street department, the
City had exclusive general supervisory authority over street maintenance, construction,

snow removal, etc. within the City. City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent
Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 66-67, 72 P.3d 905, 905-07 (June 19, 2003}. The City
also sought to enjoin the 1HD from exercising supervisory authority over the City's
streets, and from levying any real properfl;within the City. 139 Idaho 65, 67, 72 P.3d
905, 907. On summary judgment, the district court held the City had a functioning
street department and therefore had control over the public streets within the City. Id.
This decision was certified as a partial summary jtJdgment and appealed. Id.
Interpreting the relevant statutes, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed, holding: "There is
no indication that the legisfature intended that a city included within an existing highway
district could exclude its streets from the highway district simply by creating a city street
department capable of assuming the maintenance, construction, repair, snow removal,

sanding and traffic control of city streets." 139 Idaho 65, 70, 72 P.3d 905, 910. The
Idaho Supreme Court held the City was required to follow statutes that provided
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procedures for lawful

a city's

boundaries. Id
In the counterpart decision issued earlier that month, the Idaho Supreme Court

held that the City could not be the succeeding operational unit to a dissolved highway
district. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist. v. Board of County Commissioners, 138

Idaho 887, 892, 71 P.3d 1034, 1039 (June 4, 2003). The Idaho Supreme Court
reached this conclusion by a plain reading of the statutes that address the dissolution
funds and property of a highway district.· Id. The Idaho Supreme Court held that,
because the statute prohibited surplus funds of a dissolved district to go to a city and no
statute prescribed where the money would go if not to the successor, the City,
therefore, could not be the successor to a dissolved highway district Id.

1

The contract at issue was the result of a settlement entered into July 3, 2003,
after these last two Idaho Supreme Court decisions but before the Board of County
Commissioners set a date for a dissolution election. Complaint, Exhibit A, p. 3. The
Stipulation for Settlement is attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint The parties

entered into it upon general agreement that further litigation was not in the best interest
of the public. Id., p. 4. This contract entitled, UJoint Powers Agreement between the
City of Sandpoint and the Sandpoint Independent Highway District", was dated July a,
2003, and is attached to the verified complaint Complaint, Exhibit B, p. 1.

The Joint Powers Agreement was intended to be a permanent resolution as it
stated, under the heading "Duration": "The duration of this agreement shaH be

1

The Court was afso asked to interpret Idaho Code§ 40-1805 to determine what adistrlct"
meant for the commissioners' determination that dissolving the highway district "would be to the
best interest of the district." See Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist. v. Board of County
Commissioners, 138 Idaho 887,890 (2003). The Court held that the "best interest,!;! of the
district" meant «consideration of geographical area and the interests of the people living in the

district." Id. at 891.
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together agree

amend or terminate the same11 • Id. The City would assume responsibility for all

the

streets within its limits. Id. The IHD promised to pay the City aH ad valorem property
tax funds from levies of properties within the City limits. Id., p. 3. In return, the City,
which had jointly petitioned for the IHD's dissolution election, would request the Bonner
County Board of Commissioners to vacate the dissolution election and dismiss the

action with prejudice. Id., p. 5. The parties stipulated that the Joint Powers Agreement
could only be terminated by mutual agreement of both parties. Id., pp. 1, 4.
In this case, the City has brought an action alleging IHD has breached the

agreement by unilaterally terminating it and withholding funds that the City alleges it
needs to operate its street department. Complaint, p. 8. The City alleges that on

July 11, 2013, the IHD notified the City that they were withholding funds and were not
going to perform a material term of the agreement. Id.,

1I 40.

On September 9, 2013, IHD filed its Motion to Dismiss, and on October 11,
2013, IHD filed its "Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss." On November 7, 2013, City
flied its "Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss." On November 12,
2013, IHD filed its "Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss." Oral
argument was held on November 13, 2013. !HD' Motion to Strike was granted.
IHD's Motion to Dismiss was taken under advisement at the end of that hearing.

11. STANDARD OF REVIEW.
An I.R.C.P. 12{b)(6) motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted" must be considered against the I.R.C.P. 8(a) requirement that a
complaint contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief." l.R.C.P. 12(b)(6); 8(a)(1): Harperv. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 536, 835
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dismiss, the

Is

look

pleadings and view all inferences in favor of the non-moving part<;. Young v. City of

Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002) (regarding 12{b)(6) motions);
Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n. 6 (8t11 Cir. 1990) (regarding 12(b)(1)
motions raising faciaf chaffenges to jurisdiction); Sent. Emp. lntem. V. Idaho
Department of Health and Welfar.e, 106 Idaho 756i 758,683 P.2d 404,406 (1984

(regarding 12(b) challenges generally). "The nonmoving party is entitled to have all
inferences from the record viewed in his favor and only then may the question be asked
whether a claim for relief has been stated." Idaho Branch Inc. of Associated General
Contractors of America, Inc. v. Nampa Highway Dist. No. 1, 123 (daho 237, 240, 846

P.2d 239, 242 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Independent School Dist. of Bolse City v.

Harris Family Ltd. Partnership, 150 Idaho 583,587,249 P.3d 382, 386 (2011).
Complaints should not be dismissed under I.R.C.P. 12(b) unless the non-moving party
can prove no set of facts whieh would entitle him to relief. Dumas v. Ropp, 98 Idaho
61, 62, 558 P.2d 632, 633 (1977). And ar.y doubts must be resolved in favor of the
survival of the complaint. Garclnerv. Hollifield, 96 Idaho 609, 610-11, 533 P.2d 730,
731-32 (1975}. An I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss may be granted 'when it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which
would entitle the pfaintiff to relief." Harper, 122 Idaho at 536,835 P.2d at 1347 (Ct. App.
1992) (internal quotations omitted).

Hr. ANALYSIS.
A Introduction.

IHD makes five arguments as to why the agreement entered into was unlawful.
First, IHD argues the Joint Powers Agreement constitutes an Indebtedness that IHD
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the

§40-801 requires an equal division ofad valorem property taxes between

the City and !HD, and in the Joint Power Agreement !HD promised to pay the City all ad
valorem property tax funds from levies of properties within the City limits; therefore,
since the agreement does not provide an equal division it is in violation of that statute
and an unlawful agreement. Third, IHD argues the agreement is unlawful under the
Joint Powers Act because there is no termination provision. Fourth, IHD argues the
agreement is unlawful because it was intended to last in perpetuity and Jdaho courts
disfavor such contract provisions. Finally, IHD argues the contract is void because
there was no consideration.
Based on these arguments, (HD asks the Court to dismiss this case on the
grounds that the contract was illegal and therefore the City has asserted no claim upon
which relief can be granted,

Of concern to the Court is the fact that the parties have obviously considered this
to be a binding agreement for the past ten years. Apparently, IHD recently received
regal advice indicating there are legaf arguments.to be made as to the legitimacy of that
agreement. Obviously, the City relies on these revenues being paid from IHD to the
City each year. Rather than IHD bringing a declaratory action against the City where
the IHD would continue to pay the City under the contract until those legal arguments
are decided by a court, IHO instead chose to simply not pay the under the agreement,
leaving the City in the lurch financially and forcing the City to sue IHO.

B. Positions of the Parties and Analysis by the Court

1. Indebtedness in Violation of the Idaho Constitution.
[HD argues this agreement constitutes an indebtedness and violates Article vm,
Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, p. 4. That
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indebtedness or liabiiity

exceeds what the subdivision can satisfy in a year without the assent of two-thirds of
the qualified electors. fHD argues the agreement constitutes an obligation, or liability,
on the part of !HD, where if the levy amount were $350,000 and the agreement lasted
twenty years, it would create a $7 miilion dollar liability. Id., p. 9.
The City argues, "This case does not invoive a debt" Plaintiff's Response to

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 12. The City claims, "This case is about how the
District has agreed to 'divide' the funds it statutorily has available annually to meet its
statutory duty to maintain the streets in its boundaries." Jd. The City notes I.C. § 40801 (a) gives the IHD the power to levy a tax, and if that levy is made upon property
within an incorporated city, then 50% of the funds are apportioned to that incorporated
city. Id. The City argues that it obviously is not unconstitutional up to that point, as that
is what the statute requires and the statute has never been held to be unconstitutional.

Id., pp. 12-13. Simply because IHD contractualfy agreed in the Joint Powers
Agreement to go over the 50% and give all funds taxed to the City does not make the
agreement unconstitutional. The City argues the disbursement from !HD to the City
each year is not a debt, the IHD receives revenues from the taxpayers and has
contractually agreed to pay all those revenues to the Cit'f. Jd., p. 13. The City notes the
Idaho Supreme Court held a municipality does not violate the constitutional prohibition
on indebtedness when tt pays expenses out of revenue for that year, citing Ball v.

Bannock County, 5 Idaho 602, 51 P. 454, 455 (1897). Id., p. 14. The City argues,
"Here, the District's disbursements to the City pursuant to the JPA are limited to a

portion of that year's revenues, as no disbursement wm ever require funds beyond what
the District has already collected." Id. The City correctly notes the cases cited by IHD
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of Boise
d'Alene, 23 Idaho

Idaho 1, 1

(2006); Feil V.

129 P. 643 (1912); and City of Idaho Falls v. Fuhriman, 149 Idaho

574, 237 P. 3d 1200 (2010)) afl deal with municrpal purchases of systems or goods from
private parties that necessarily require the municipality to incur liabilities beyond the
current year and for which the municipality would be liabie from its general revenues,
where uin contrast, this case deals only with contingent periodic disbursements from the
District to fulfill its statutory duty to maintain City roads." Id., pp. 14-15.
JHD's reply argument, in its entirety ls as follows:
It is the Idaho Supreme Court that interprets the Idaho
Constitution ... not the courts of California, Washington, or any other state.
In its brief, the City has virtually ignored the Idaho Supreme Court
decisions interpreting Article 8, Section 3. Instead, the city has cited to

and quoted from court decisions from California and other states.
Apparently, the City has been unable to find Idaho authority to contradict
the analysis of Article 8, Section 3 contained in IHD's initial brief. Based
upon Idaho case law1 the JPA clearly creates an illegal liability or
indebtedness in violation of Article 8, Section 3.
Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 9. The Court finds this
argument by IHD to the points made by the City, to be disingenuous, and unpersuasive.
The fHD completely ignores the fact that Frazier, Feil, and Fuhriman are all cases
involving municipal purchases of systems or goods from private parties that required
the municipality to incur liabilities beyond the current year and for which the municipality
would be fiable from its general revenues, and those are simply not the facts in this

case. The present case concerns contingent periodic disbursements from the District,
half of which are to fulfill its statutory duty to maintain City roads, the other half are to

fulfill its contractual duty to pay the City under the Joint Powers Agreement.
The Court must deny IHD's motion to dismiss on this basis because the case !aw
cited by IHD simply does not apply to this case. The Idaho Constitution limits the
manner in which a county or municipality may incur indebtedness:
MEl!ORANDUM DECISION AND OF<OER DENYING DV!iNDANT'S MOTION ro DISMISS
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'"shall incur any.. .iiabillty."'exceeding in that year,
income and revenue provided for it for such year, without the assent of
two-thirds of the qualified electors thereof voting at an election tc be held
for that purpose ....
Constitution of the State of Idaho, Article 8, Section 3. "[A] city may anticipate both the

income and revenue provided for it for such year, and incur debts or liabilities against
the city which· can be met and discharged out of the aggregate income and revenue for
that year_~ Charles Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, _, 129 P .643, 650
(1912); see also City of Idaho Falls v. Fuhriman, 149 Idaho 574, 580, 237 P.3d 1200,

1206 (2010) (holding that the liability incurred by a power sales agreement exceeded
the income in the year that It was incurred, and that it was the type of expenditure that
needed the assent of two-thirds of the voting electorate); City of Boise v. Frazier, 143

idaho 1, 7, 137 P.3d 388, 394 (2005) {holding that this constitutional provision
prohibited the city from entering into a lease agreement for the expansion of airport
parking facilities absent a public vote that authorized the expense); Milter 11. City of
Buhl, 48 Idaho 668, 284 P. 843, 845 (1930) (prohibiting a city from incurring a debt to

purchase an electric-generating system); Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, _,
129 P.643, 652 (1912) (holding that a bond funding $180,000 to fund a waterworks
system would create a liability against the city and was therefore invalid under this

constitutional provision without a vote). Feil and Miller were cases where expenses
were invalidated because neither fell into a special fund exception (i.e., bonds paid by

revenue from the services of the plant that was financed by the bond), but this later
became an exception that was amended into Article 8, § 3, See Asson v. City of

Burley, 105 Idaho 432, 439, 670 P.2d 839, 846 {1983). A contract that violates this
section is void and cannot be enforced. See Deer Creek Highway Dist. v. Doumecq
Highway Dist., 37 fdaho 601, _, 218 P. 371,372 (1923). 1HD argues the Joint Powers
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Agreement is illegal because it falls under a
view of this agreement would demonstrate that the Highway District has indebted itseif

upwards of $7 million, It has taken on more indebtedness than it can pay. This is
simply not true when looking at the

plain meaning of the statute_

"[T]he statutory rules of construction appfy to the interpretation of constitutional
provisions." Sweeney v. Otter, 119 Idaho 135, 138, 804 P.2d 308, 311 {1990) (citing

Lewis v. Woodall, 72 Idaho 16, 18,236 P.2d 91, 93 (1951)). "Uabi!ity" means ''the state
of being bound or obligated in Jaw or justice to do, pay, or make good something." Feil

v. City of Coeurd'Alene 1 23 Idaho 32, ~ 129 P. 643,649 (1912) (relying on this
definition and other comparable definitions of "liabUity'l Because IHD has obligated
itself to pay a percentage of the annual revenue it collected on ad valorem taxes, It did
incur a fiability. However, the liability does not exceed the income received a year, The
IHD has apportioned a portion, or a percentage of the !'evenue collected; the portion
that the City receives only reflects the percentage of the revenue that is generated from

the property located within the city. So long as the IHD's boundaries equal or exceed
the City's boundaries, the JHD will always receive more revenue than what it has
apportioned the City each year because it will receive levies from property in the City
limits as well as levies from property outside the City limits. Because the IHD has not

incurred a liability that exceeds its revenue, the Court must deny IHD's motion to
dismiss upon this basis.

2. Legality of Contract Under Idaho Code § 40--801.
IHD argues I.C. §40-801 governs distribution of ad valorem taxes levied within

city limits. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, pp. 10-11. Under that statute, half of
the funds for property within the limits of an incorporated city are apportioned to the city.
IHO argues that by entering into an agreement which provides for anything other than
MEMOAANDUM DECISION AND OROER DENYING Ds:&NoANT'S MOTION TO DISE/11$$
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violates the division

the levy as

Powers Agreement is illegal and thus

void and unenforceable, citing City of Meridian v. Petra, lnc. 1 154 idaho 425, _ 299
P.3d 232,252 (2013); Miflerv. Haller, 129 Idaho 345,351,924 P.2d 607,613 (1996)

("The general rule is that a contract prohibited by law is illegal and hence
unenforceable.

Id. p. 11. IHD argues, "The statutory 50/50 tax distribution ratio is

mandatory", because the statute uses the word "shall" not "may". Id. IHD argues 1 "The

statue does not authorize a 75/25 split or a 100/0 split" Id. For this proposition, IHD
cites Rexburg v. Madison County, 115 Idaho 88, 764 P.2d 838 (1988). Id.

The City correctly points out City of Rexburg does not support IHD's argument
that I.C. §40--801 does not permit anything other than a 50/50 tax distribution ratio as

that case dealt with an inadvertent decimal point error, where the City of Rexburg
received only 5% rather than the statutory 50% revenue. Plaintiff's Response to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, pp. 10-11. This Court finds the Idaho Supreme Court in

City of Rexburg did

not address whether a disbursement greater than

50% would have

violated the statute; it simply held the counfy in that case had duty to allocate at least

the 50% under that statute. 115 Idaho 88, 89-90, 764 P.2d 838, 839-90.
Idaho Code §40-801(1)(a) reads:

40-801. Authority and procedure for levies. (1) The commissioners of a
county highway system, the commissioners of a county-wide highway
district, and the commissioners of highway districts are empowered, for

the purpose of constrnction and maintenance of highways and bridges
under their respective jurisdictions, to make the following highway ad
valorem tax revies as applied to the market value for assessment
purposes within their districts:
(a} Two-tenths per cent (0.2%) of market vafue for assessment purposes
for construction and maintenance of highways and bridges; provided that
if the levy is made upon property within the limits of any incorporated city,

11/2
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that incorporated

The Idaho Supreme Court in City of Rexburg made It clear that Madison County had a
"statutory duty" (and specifically not a duty "based in common law, contact, or any other
theory of law") to pay the City of Rexburg the amounts due under I. C. §40-801. 115

Idaho 88, 89-90. 764 P.2d 838, 839-90. City of Rexburg makes it clear that the county
has a statutory duty to pay the city the amount due under f.C. §40-801. Id. The word
"shalll)' in I.C. §40-801 applies to IHD's ~tatutory duty to pay City 50% of revenues
raised by taxes on property owners within the City of Sandpoint. City of Rexburg
makes it clear this statutory duty of paying revenues is mandatory under the statute,

and must be in the statutory amount of 50% of revenues, and in that case the
mispayment of .5% was a breach of that statutory duty. This Court can find nothing in
City of Rexburg or in I.C. §40-801 that prohibits a county from contractually agreeing to
pay more than

the statutory amount. This Court finds IHO's argument "iHO cannot alter

the statutory apportionment of tax revenue set forth in LC. §40-801" to be completely

without merit. Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 8. There is
nothing in I.C. §40-801 which prohibits the highway district from allocating the
remaining revenues (those above the statutorify mandated 50%) to a city by agreement

rHD's argument that the statutory language "fifty per cent (50%) of the funds shall
be apportioned" means that the defendant cannot legally apportion more than fifty
percent to the City, is a strained interpretation which this Court simply cannot make.
"Judicial interpretation of a statute begins with an examlnation of the statute's literal

words." State, Dept. of Transp. v. HJ Grathol, 153 Idaho 87, 91,278 P.3d 957,961
(2012); State v. Bumight, 132 Idaho 654,659, 978 P.2d 214,219 (1999). Statutes are
interpreted by their plafn and express meaning. HJ Grathol, 153 Idaho at 91, 278 P.3d
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a statute is always preferred

obvious

Hensley Trucking, 1

any

Idaho 572 1 691 P.2d 11

(1984). A court will resort to judicial construction "only if the statute is ambiguous,

incomplete, absurd, or arguably in conflict with other laws." Arel v. T & L Enterprises,
Inc., 146 Idaho 29, 32, 189 P.3d 1149, 1152 (2008).
A plain reading of Idaho Code § 40-801 is that a highway district owes a city 50%
of ad valorem statutes within city limits. The statute does not designate what is to be
done with the other fifty percent Thus 1 interpreting the 50% amount as a minimum
amount is much more logical than to interpret such as a limit.
IHD's argument that this 50% amount is a limit ignores the powers given to

highway commissioners. "[SJtatutes that are in pari materia {of the same matter or
subject), are to be construed together as one system to effect legislative intent." City of
Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway District, 126 Idaho 145, 150 (1994).
Idaho Code § 40-131 O outlines the powers of the highway district commissioners,

among which includes the followrng:
The commissioners of a highway district have exclusive general
supervision and jurisdiction over all highways and public rights-of-way
within their highway system, with full power to construct, maintain, repair,
acquire, purchase and improve all highways within their highway system,
whether directly or by their own agents and employees or by contract ..
The highway district shall have power to manage and conduct the
business and affairs of the district; establish and post speed and other
regulatory signs; make and execute all necessary contracts; have an
office and employ and appoint agents, attorneys, officers and employees
as may be required, and prescribe tlieir duties and fix their compensation.

Highway district commissioners and their agents and employees have the
right to enter upon any lands to make a survey, and may locate the
necessary works on the line of any highways on any rand which may be
deemed best for the location.
l.C. §40-1310(1). A plain reading of this statute mustrates that the commissioners have
the power to contract for services and to conduct its own business. Therefore, the
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discretion

fifty percent above what it is required so that the city may maintain

the roads. To read the fifty-percent apportionment to be a Hmlt upon which the
commissioners may not exceed would put !TD's reading of tC. §40-801 in conflict with
the powers setforth in LC. §40-1310(1). To hold otherwise would limit the
Commissioners' discretion of how to spend the other 50 percent of the taxes collected.

Interpreting the frfty-percent apportionment as a minimum creates no such conflict.
Thus, this Court's interpretation is LC. §40-1310{1) mandates IHD to pay a minimum

fifty percent of ad valorem city taxes to the city and IHO has the discretion on how to
use the other half of its funds. !HD chose ten years ago, with the advice of counsel, to
contractually agree the remaining fifty percent goes to the City as well, and that is not
prohibited under§ 40-801, and thus, the agreement is not illegal. IHO's motion to
dismiss on this ground must be denied.
3, Legality under the Joint Powers Act.
IHD argues that the agreement is unlawful under the Joint Powers Act (JPA), !. C.

§67-2326 et seq. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, pp. 11-13. IHD argues JPA

mandates an agency cannot delegate away or exceed its statutory or constitutional
authority when entering into a joint agreement. I.C. § 67-2328. id., p. 12. Additionally,
iHD argues there must be a termination clause and there is no termination because the

contract states that it wm be "perpetual." Id. IHO also argues that the provision stating
that the agreement may terminate by "mutual agreement" is not a termination provision;
rather, the lHD argues that it functions as a prohibition of tennination unless there can

be a mutual agreement. Id. The defendant argues that because the City receives
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City argues:
The District's contention that the JPA is void for want of an effective
termination dause is misguided. I.C. § 67-2328 requires, ~Any such
agreement shall specify the following: (1) Its duration." The plain meaning
of the statue does not require duration of a specific number of months or
years. The JPA satisfies the Act's duration requirement by providing
express terms of the JPA's duration, and an additional vehicle for its
termination upon certain dissolving acts. The Parties did not leave any
room for ambiguity when they mutually agreed on the JPA term to meet
the mutual obrigation to maintain City streets:
DURATION: The duration of this [A]greement shall be perpetual or
until such time as the District and the City jointly and together agree

to amend or terminate the same.
(Complaint, Ex. B) The JPA further provides:
DISSOLUTION: This JPA will automatica!ry terminate if the District
is dissofved. ft will also terminate if the City supports any future
petition for dissolution of District.
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 17.

A joint powers agreement must specify the following:
(1) Its duration.
(2) The precise organization, composition and nature of any separate
legal or administrative entity created thereby together with the powers
delegated thereto, provided such entity may be legaHy created.
(3) Its purpose or purposes.
(4) The manner of financing the joint or cooperative undertaking and of
establishing and maintaining a budget therefore.
(5} The permissible method or methods to be employed in accomplishing
the partial or complete termination of the agreement and for disposing of
property upon such partiaf or complete termination.

(6) Any other necessary and proper matters.
I.C. § 67~2328(c). This Court agrees with the City that the statutory mandate of

I.C. § 67-2738 has been satisfied, the agreement's "duration" is "perpetuaL" The
duration is not unknown, it is perpetual. The fact that IHO ten years later regrets

entering into that agreement is of no import This Court also agrees that there is a
method of termination, and that is «mutual agreement." There is no Idaho appellate
MEMORANDUM D=CISION ANO OROiR DENYING D!f'eNDANT'S MO'TION TO DISMISS
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court precedent on

§
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interprets

termination." The language must be given its plain meaning. Given the plain meaning
of "duration" and ''method of termination", those requirements have been met
The Joint Powers Act allows for state or public agencies to exercise their powers

jointly provided each has power over the common subject matter. LC.§ 67-2328(a).
IHD is correct that neither entity may exceed its authority and that a joint power

agreement must address some specific provisions. Id. The Court's decision above that
IHD has not violated the Idaho Constitution

entering into this agreement thus effects

this Joint Powers argument raised by IHD. Had the Court bought IHD's argument that
IHD had indebted itself in violation of the Idaho Constitution, then the agreement would
also be unlawful under the Joint Powers Act. However, as this Court holds there is no
violation of the Idaho Constitution and !HD acted ln a constitutionaf!y permissible way,
then this secondary argument by IHD must be rejected as welL
Additionally, for the

same reasons discussed in the next section, the argument

that perpetual contracts are in violation of pubfic policy are, best case for IHD at this
juncture, not a basis for granting a motion to dismiss because a court must consider
factual circumstances, which would require an examination of evidence outside the

pleading. In any event, IHD's motion to dismiss on this ground must be denied.

4. Invalidity Because of Perpetuity.
IHD argues Idaho courts disfavor perpetual agreements. Brief in Support of
Motion to Dismiss, pp. 13-14. IHD cites Barton v. state, 104 Idaho 338, 659 P.2d 92
(1983). Id., p. 13. IHD notes in that case the fdaho Supreme Court declined to read a
contract as containing a perpetuity clause which would have bound the State of Jdaho
Transportation Department. 104 fdaho 338. 340,659 P.2d 92, 94.
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Is correct that Barton is .

PAGE

particularly distinguishable, as

was asked to infer an Intent for the state

be perpetually bound by a purported JPA"

Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 18. (bold in original). What
the Idaho Supreme Court actually wrote is, 'Where a contract is not expressly made

perpetual by its terms, construction of such contract as perpetual is disfavored." 104

fdaho 338, 340) 659 P.2d 92, 94, citations omitted. In the present case, IHD and City
specifically agreed the duration was "perpetual." There is nothing about that term which
is ambiguous. Thus, the implication under Barton is where the parties expressly agree

the duration of the agreement is "perpetual", the Court should not look. upon that
agreement with disfavor, In Berton, the Idaho Department of Transportation entered
into an agreement with a landowner where the State would provide access to the

owner's business properties and purchase her land at $1,000. 104 Idaho 338, 339, 659

P.2d 92, 93. In return, the landowner agreed to forebear from legal action and to
encourage other landowners who were dealing with the Department of Transportation
to be reasonable in their dealings. Id. The contract did not address how long this
arrangement wouid continue, and in 1977, the Department of Transportation closed the

access points. Id, The Idaho Supreme Court refused to imply that the contract was

perpetual absent clear indication that the parties intended to be perpetually bound:
"Where a contract is not expressly made perpetual by its tenns, construction of such

contract as perpetuat is disfavored." 104 Idaho 338,340,659 P.2d 92, 94. Again, the
Idaho Supreme Court's statement only disfavors interpreting a contract to be perpetual
when the contract Is s;Jent as to duration. When there is express language that a
contract is intended to be perpetual, this holding suggests that the Idaho Supreme
Court would uphold such an express provision.
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dismiss on

any

even if the contract is against public policy (which the Court does

basis because
the

must determine a reasonable time for performance, and this determination requires
factual findings that are outside of the pleadings. Barton, 104 Idaho 338, 341, 659 P.2d
92, 95. A court determines "reasonable time"

by examining "the subject matter of the

contract, the relationship of the parties and the circumstances surrounding the
transaction." Id. In addition to a reasonable time of performance, a party must also
give reasonable notice of its intent to terminate the contract Id. Jn Barton, the Court
held that twenty-two years of performance under the contract between the Idaho
Department of Transportation and the landowner was reasonable. Id.
5. Idaho Code §40•1333.
!HD argues LC.§ 40-1333 requires cities which have city highway systems, shall
be responsible for the maintenance of highways in their system, except as provided in
i.C. § 40-607; and cities may make agreements with a highway district to do the city

work, but the city shall compensate the district for any work performed. Brief in Support
of Motion to Dismiss, p. 14. fHD argues: "The Idaho legislature has established a clear

policy that a city must use its own revenues to maintain city streets and may not use
highway district revenues to do so, except as provided in I.C. §40-801."

The !HD

then claims "If a highway district constructs or maintains a city street, the city must

repay the highway district for all expenditures made within the city by the highway
district." Id. While that is an accurate summary of I.C. $40-1333, it has nothing to do
with the facts of this case, because IHD has not oounterdaimed against the City to

recompense IHD for maintenance work IHD has performed for the City In its briefing,

M5UORANOUM DECISION ANO ORDeR DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
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§ 40-1333. The

finds

§ 40-1333 to have no merit

6. Sufficient Consideration.

Finally, IHD argues that there was no consideration for fHD providing 100% of its

ad valorem property taxes. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, pp. 14-15. This Court
finds this argument by IHD is especially inapt /ls pointed out by the City, the Joint
Powers Agreement itself recr.:ed mutual consideration, as it ended all the protracted
litigation. Plaintiff's Response to Defendanfs Motion to Dismiss, pp. 20-21; citing
Complaint, Exhibit A. The City correctly notes:

The JPA is the result of the Parties' Stipulation for Settlement
f'Settlement"}, entered into July 3, 2003. (Complaint, Ex. A) By its terms,
the Settlement grants the City jurisdiction over city streets, requires the
formation of a the JPA, compels the City to vacate its petition for a
dissorution election, requires dismissal of the cMI case with prejudice,
requires the City to not oppose future annexation elections sought be the
District, and stipulates that the District waives its costs awarded on appeal
by the ldaho Supreme Court in Docket No. 27441. (Complaint, Ex. A)
Plaintiff's Response to Defendanfs Motion to Dismiss. p. 20. The City also correctly
notes:
This Court approved the Settlement The Idaho Court of Appeals recently
held that a settlement, the terms of which are incorporated into a court

order, does not need additional consideration to be effective. Davidson v.
Soelberg, 154 Idaho 227,296 P.3d 433,438 (Ct.App. 2013). The same
rationale should apply here, where the ·Parties provided mutual

consideration in the settlement, a part of which was the exercise of their
rights under J.C. §67-2326, ~ Id., p. 21. IHD did not respond to the City's arguments in its Rep!y Brief in Support of

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
A contract that contains no consideration is illusory and therefore unenforceable.

There is consideration in the present case because the IHD has agreed to pay money
and the City has agreed to forbear its legs! efforts to dissohte the IHD. An agreement
MEMORANDUM DECISIOfol AND ORD!!~ Dl:IMNG ~FENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
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52 Idaho

order
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be

9, 526, 272

, 498 (2012).

Here, consideration is not an issue. According to the agreement1 the City benefited
because it received the responsibility to maintain its own streets in addition to funds to
do so. The Highway District benefitted because the City ceased its pursuit to legally
dissolve the Highway District within Bonner County. There was consideration and

therefore the motion to dismiss must be denied under this argument

7. Estoppel.
The City correctly notes:

The District is taking a position contrary to which it agreed when it entered
into the JPA, and consented to this Court's Order. It was the Court's
dismissal based on the stipulation that permitted the JPA
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss,

p. 22. The City then argues, "As

a matter of equity, the District is erther judicially estopped from reversing its position
taken in open court, or is equitably estopped from harming the City by reversing its

position. Id. IHD argues "Estoppel does not save a Constitutionally Invalid Agreement."
Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, pp. 14-20. Because this Court
does not find the Joint Powers Agreement to be Constitutionally invalid, there is no
need to discuss the judicial estoppel or equitable estoppei arguments.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER.
The complaint here has been sufficiently pleaded. For that reason alone, IHD's
motion to dismiss under LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) for "failure to state a cfarm upon which relief
can be granted" must be denfed. Claims grounded in a breach of contract are
sufficiently pleaded if they allege the formation of a contract; the obligations under the
contract, the right of the plaintiff pursuant to thti! contract, and the breach by the

defendant. See State ex rel. Robins v. Clinger, 72 ldaho 222 (1951).

this case, City
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alleged an agreement between it
share in the ad valorem taxes collected

has alleged City's agreed·upon
and has alleged

breach

withholding those funds. Because City has alleged all of the elements of a breach of
contract claim, IHD 1s motion to dismiss must be denied.
Additionally, when an megal contract is alleged, the Court might have an

affirmative duty to examine the legality of the contract when it appears in the pleading
through a verified complaint.

rt is generally not appropriate for a court to consider

affirmative defenses in considering a motion to dismiss at the pleading stage of
litigation. See Gardnerv. Hollifield,

96 Idaho 609, 611 (1975). There are exceptions,

however. One exception is when an affirmative defense appears on the face of the

complaint itseff. Gardner v. Hollifield, 96 Idaho 609, 811 (1975). Another exception,
raised in contract-related defenses, fs whether the alleged agreement is illegal. "The
illegality of a contract can be raised at any stage in litigation. In fact, the court has the
duty to raise the issue of illegality sua sponte." Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604,
608 (2009){citing Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6 (2002}. lffegal contracts constitute
questions of faw for the court. Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6 (2002). Here, the
verified complaint has attached a copy of the contract, so the contract itself is part of
the proceedings and the illegality would be evident from the face of the

contract

Additionally, the defendant has questioned the contract's legality. Based on the
affinnatrve duty of a court to evaluate the illegality of the contract, based on the contract

that is part of the verified complaint, and based on the defendant's challenge of the
contract's regality, this Court may proceed to make a determination of the legality of the
contract in the record in deciding whether to dismiss the complaint
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shows, this Court has analyzed the merits

whether the contract is illegal as made in the arguments by IHD. Because the
agreement Is attached to the Complaint and is part of these prooeedlngsJ the Court can

make determinations regarding the legality of the contract, a.nd has done so. Based on
the above reasons, the Court must deny fhe motion to dismiss on all the arguments
presented by iHD.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the defendant IHD's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED in aff
aspects.

Entered this 91.>i day of December, 2013.
itohell, District Judge
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MOTION FOR APPEAL
PERivHSSION

political
Defendant.

I.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Plaintiff
13 against Independent Highway District (''District")

taxes

FOR

a failure

the District to

contract,

1

Under

as
arid together agree to w.uend or terminate t}1e saine . "
On September 9, 2013, the District filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted, wbich was heard on November 13, 2013. The District
advanced five different arguments for why the contract was unconstitutional and unlavvful. Toe
district court entered

Order Re: Motion to Dismiss, a copy of which is attached to the Motion

for Appeal by Permission. The district court rejected each of the District's argum.ents as a matter
oflaw and denied the District's Motion to Dismiss.
Trial was scheduled to commence on March 25, 2014. On March 3, 2014, a stipulation
prepared by the City, after discussion and input from the District, was filed with the district
court. The stipulation requested the district court vacate the trial date because there were no
remaining disputed material facts for trial, and the issues remaining were of law. On May 7,
2014, the District made timely application to the district court to appeal by permission by :filing
its Motion for Leave to File Interlocutory Appeal. On June 13, 2014, the district court granted
the District's motion. The Order from which the District seeks permission to appeal is the order
denying its Motion to Dismiss.

II.

THE STANDARD FOR APPEAL UNDER I.A.R. 12

In Aardema v. US. Dairy Systems, Inc., 147 Idaho 785,215 P.3d 505 (2009) the Idaho
Supreme Court recited t.h.e rules for consideration of an application for appeal by permission.
Permission may be granted by the Supreme Court to appeal from
an interlocutory order or decree of a district court in a civil or
criminal action, or from an interlocutory order of an administrative
agency, which is not otherwise appealable under t.hese rules, but
which involves a controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial grounds for difference
opinion and
which an
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR APPEAL BY PERMISSION: 2

!.Illlme,mat~ appeal from the order or decree may

litigation.
llU.Jlllv<~Lasvappeal
an
substantial legal issues
great public interest or legal

questions

first impression are involved." Budell v. Todd, 105

Idaho 2, 4, 665 P.2d 701, 703 (1983) (per curiam ). A permissive
appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 12 is "a.'1 unusual posture." Winn v.
Frasher, 116 Idaho 500, 501, 777 P.2d 722, 723 (1989). Due to
"the unusual posture cf the case, we are constrained to rnle
narrowly and address only the precise question that was framed by
the motion and answered by the trial cou.rt." Id. "Such appeal,
[after acceptance by this Court,] shall proceed in the same manner
as an appeal as a matter of right, unless otherwise ordered by [this
Court]." I.A.R. 12(d).

***
Rule 12 appeals are only accepted in the most exceptional cases
with the intent to resolve "substantial legal issues of great public
interest or legal questions of first impression[.]" Budell, 105 Idaho
at 4, 665 P.2d at 703.

This Court, citing the "confusion" about the application of the economic loss rule to
plaintiffs tort action, accepted the appeal by permission. Aardema v.

Dairy Systems, Inc.,

147 Idaho 785, 789-790, 215 P.3d 505, 509-510 (2009).

The Idaho Supreme Court has also granted motions for permission to appeal in cases
involving the retroactive application of a statute of limitations to claims of sexual abuse of
minors, Doe v. Boy Scouts ofAmerica, 148 Idaho 427,224 P.3d 494 (2009); liability of a
corporation for the tort of injury to a child under Idaho Code§ 6-1701(4), Steed v. Grand Teton

Council ofthe Boy Scouts ofAmerica, Inc.,

Idaho 848, 172 P .3d 1123 (2007); whether a

beneficiary of a trust may sue a lawyer for malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty, Taylor v.

Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005); enforcement of a forum selection clause in a
contract for the transportation

Royal Caribbean Cruises,

a passenger on the high seas, a aw;;:m,on of federal law, Fisk v.
, 14 I Idaho 290, 108 P .3d 990 (2005);

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
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a

statutes, Moon v.

!dah..o Farmers Association,

Idaho 536,

P.3d

defendants' motions to suppress in criminal cases, State v. Becknell, 140 Idaho 201,203, 91 P.3d
1105, 1107 (2004) (the issues were significant and of practical importa.11ce

the ad..uinistration

of the criminal justice system); whether comparative fault was available as a defense in a dram
shop case, Idaho Department ofLabor v. Sunset Mart, Inc., 140 Idaho 207, 91 P .3d 1111 (2004 );
the application of general provisions of SRBA orders to test basins, A & B Irr. Dist. v. Idaho
Conservation League, 131 Idaho 411, 958 P.2d 568 (1997); questions ofinsurance coverage,
North Pacific Insurance Co. v. Mai, 130 Idaho 251,939 P.2d 570 (1997); denial ofthe State's
motion in Iimine as to evidence establishing the defense of necessity, State v. Howley, 128 Idaho
874, 920 P.2d 391 (1996); denial of motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in
case involving the Industrial Commission, Walters v. Industrial Commission, 127 Idaho 933, 908
P .2d 1240 (1996); whether the administrative suspension of a driver's license and prosecution of
a DUI charge put the defendant in double jeopardy, State v. Talavera, 127 Idaho 700, 905 P .2d
633 (1995); the constitutionality of the 1994 amendments to the SRBA, In re SRBA Case No.
39576, 128 Idaho 246,912 P.2d 614 (1994); apportionment of benefits under a prior version of

Idaho Code § 72-332, Doh/ v. PSF Ind, Inc., 127 Idaho 232, 899 P.2d 3445 (1995); whether a
commercial tenant who is required to return the property in good condition at the end of the lease
and who obtains fire insurance is an additional insured under the landlord's fire insurance policy,
Bannock Building Co. v. Sahlberg, 126 Idaho 545, 887 P .2d 1052 (1984 ); a denial by the
Industrial Commission of a motion for clarification of an award, Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar
Co., 118 Idaho 147, 795 P.2d 309 (1990); the application of the "fireman's rule," Winn v.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR APPEAL BY PERMISSION: 4
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Idaho

&

P2d 722
Idaho

subrogation

u...r1der the third pa.rty provisions of the worker's compensation act, Barringer v. State, 111 Idaho
794, 727 P.2d 1122 (1986); denial of a motion in limine on the use of a blood alcohol test of the
deceased in a wrongful death action against the city, Stattner v. City ofCalcfwell, 111Idar10714,
727 P .2d 1142 (1986); venue of an action against a public official, Priest Lake Coalition, Inc. v.

State ex rel. Evans, 111 Idaho 354, 723 P.2d 898 (1986); whether the legislature's declaration of
an emergency is subject to judicial review, Idaho State AFL-CJO v. Leroy, 110 Idaho 691, 718
P.2d 1129 (1986); order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, Evans v.

Galloway, 108 Idaho 711, 701 P.2d 659 (1985); application of the statute oflimitations to a
claim against a surety for the defalcations of a former treasurer and tax collector, Lincoln County

v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 102 Idaho 489, 632 P.2d 567 (1980); denial of an
insurer's motion for summary judgment on a coverage question under a blanket endorsement,

Wright v. Johnson, 101 Idaho 208, 610 P .2d 567 (1980); and a review of a summary judgment to
the State in a highway sign case, Gavica v. Hansen, 101 Idaho 58,608 P.2d 861 (1980).
With respect to a motion to dismiss specifically, in In re Text .Messaging Antitrust

Litigation, 630 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2010), t.he 7th Circuit held that a denial of a Rule I2(b)(6)
motion to dismiss was an order suitable for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
In Budell v. Todd, 105 Idaho 2,665 P.2d 701, (1983), this Court indicated L.1-iat I.AR. 12 was the
equivalent rule to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), stating:
I.A.R. 12 was adopted by the Court in 1977 and implemented a
procedure similar to an appeal from an interlocutory order from a
federal district court to a court of appeals under 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b) and Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
for the United States Courts of Appeals. Under the Idaho rule a
party to an action in a district court or a proceeding in an
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR APPEAL BY PERMISSION: 5

administrative agency may seek permission to appeal from an
interlocutory order which is not otherwise appealable as a matter of
right under LA.R. 1 .
consideration
an appeal by certification
an interlocutory order under Rule
12 is that the order "involves a controlling question of law as to
which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion," and
that an lllliilediate appeal from the order "may materially advance
the orderly resolution of the litigation . . . ." The rule requires a
party to first make application to t.iie district court or administrative
agency for its advisory ruling, and thereafter the party files a
motion with the Supreme Court requesting it to accept the appeal
from the interlocutory order. The defendant in this case properly
followed the procedures set forth in the rule and did obtain an
order of the district court recom..rnending the appeal by
certification.
In Rudell, this Court denied a Rule 12 motion for appeal of the district court's order
denying a motion for summary judgment seeking an order that a prior judgment in favor of the
defendant in a small claims case barred a subsequent personal injury action. The Supreme Court,
per curiam, noted that just because a reversal would obviate a trial did not by itself justify a Rule
12 appeal where there was no argument by the defendant that an appeal would materially

advance the orderly resolution of the litigation. The Court stated:
It was the intent of I.A.R. 12 to provide an immediate appeal from
an interiocutory order if substantial legal issues of great public
interest or legal questions of first in1pression are involved. The
Court also considers such factors as the impact of an immediate
appeal upon the parties, the effect of the delay of the proceedings
in the district court pending the appeal, the likelihood or possibility
of a second appeal after judgment is finally entered by the district
court, and the case workload of the appellate courts. No single
factor is controlling in the Court's decision of acceptance or
rejection of an appeal by certification, but the court intends by
Rule 12 to create an appeal in the exceptional case and does not
intend by the rule to broaden the appeals which may be taken as a
matter of right under I.AR. 11.
105 Idaho at 4, 665 P .2d at 703.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR APPEAL

PERMISSION: 6

No clear thread emerges

cases

cases

appeals.

groups for difference of

ai~d orderly advruicement

litigation; such as the

constitutionality of statutes, subject matter and personal jurisdiction, or the application of the
Double Jeopardy clause. Other cases have high profiles, such as those involving salacious
allegations against the Boy Scouts. Other cases less apparently pass muster under the Buddell
test; such as, cases involving venue, insurance coverage, motions to suppress, availability of
affinnative defenses or evidentiary issues. Most of the time this Court simply recites that a
motion for appeal by permission was granted.
So, in the absence of a bright line rule and with a multi-factor test that this Court
exercises on a case-by-case basis, the job of the applicant is to marshal arguments to satisfy each
of the requirements of the rule to persuade this Court to accept the appeal.

IIL

THE ISSUES RAISED BY the MOTION TO DISMISS

Under I.A.R. l 2(b), the first criterion to grant a motion for permission to appeal from an
interlocutory order is that the interlocutory order must involve a controlling question of law as to
which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion. The second criterion in order to grant a
motion to appeal is that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the orderly
resolution of the litigation. Both criteria must be present before this Court will grant permission to
appeal from the interlocutory order denying the District's motion to dismiss. Further, "the intent of
I.A.R. 12 [is] to provide an immediate appeal from

lh~

interlocutory order if substa.11.tial legal

issues of great public interest or legal questions of first impression are involved. Aardema v.

US. Dairy Systems, Inc, supra.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR APPEAL BY PERMISSION: 7

Controlling
opinion.

of law as to
court re,:og;m~~

t..lie agreement entered

was u.'Jlavvf..ll.

Memorru1dfuu Decision a11d Order Denying

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, page 5. The district court decided as a matter of !aw that all of the
District's arguments failed. The decision was not based upon any disputed issues of fact. It was
based upon an interpretation of a provision of the Idaho Constitution (Article VIII, Section 3), the
application of Idaho statutes, as well as an application as a matter of law of contract principals.
Therefore, the District submits that the court's decision was based upon controlling questions of
law. The City seemingly agreed to this view when it sought a stipulated continuance of the trial.
The next issue for this Court to examine is whether there exists substantial grounds for
differences of opinion regarding the law as applied by this Court. The briefing submitted in support
of the motion to dismiss presented substantial grou.11ds under the law for which there was a
difference of opirilon based upon existing law.

The district court disagreed with District's

constitutional and statutory analysis and agreed with t.he City's position. However, the District's
position was supported by existing constitutional interpretations by this Court. The district court
recognized the same when it granted leave to file the interlocutory appeal.
Fu.rther, as previously noted, it is appropriate to grant permissive appeal where substantial
legal issues of great public interest are involved. The present case involves such an issue. The
duration of the contract requiring a tum over of ad valorem goes in perpetuity. This Court has
held that contracts requiring performance of a series of acts in perpetuity may be against public
policy. Barton v. State, 104 Idaho 338, 340, 659 P.2d 92, 94; Shultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770, 775,
554 P.2d 948,953 (1976).

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR APPEAL BY PER.MISSION: 8

case

involves a matter

great
,,......,,,..,,..,.,.,..,..,,=

streets
as pointed out by· the District below, th.e use

to

valorem funds in perpetuity is of great

public interest to its taxpayers, not all of whom reside within the City. Thus, this case specific
concern is also met by the present case.
The final arbiter of the differences of opinion regarding the application of the law will
necessarily be this Court. A permissive appeal

the district court's interlocutory order on the

motion to disJT1iss is appropriate in this case.

Orderly advancement of the litigation. If the District is right about the application of
law in this matter, the case ends upon appeal. Whatever decision this Court makes will shape the
outcome of the case on remand. The appeal of the interlocutory order will reduce the cost of
litigation between the parties, both of which are fonded by taxpayer revenues.

Further, the

parties have stipulated to a joint preliminary injunction that continues the operations of the
entities as was occurring under the disputed contract, so the public is not disadvantaged in any
manner by the appeal. An appeal, especially of the constitutional issue, may materially advance
the orderly resolution of the litigation.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Defendants' Motion for Appeal by Permission under I.A.R. 12(c) meets each prong
of the test set for under the rule, and the holding of Aardema v. US. Dairy Systems, Inc., supra.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY
on this
foregoing upon
following, by the

21

C. Matthew

Winston & Cashatt
Coeur

Scot
Sandpoint City Attorney
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864

MEMORAl'fDUM

correct

OF

07/08/2014

MERIDIAN,
208-887~4800
FAX 208~887-4865
2429

PAGE

JAMES VERN

2085545741

14:25

83680

SUSAN P. WEEKS

.TAMEST VERl~ON & WEEKS, PA
1626 LINCOLN WAY
COEL;R D-ALENE,
208-667-0683
FAX 208~664-1684

83814

r.s.B. 4255
Attorneys for Defendant
fodependent Highway District
INTHE

COURT OF

DISTRJCT OF

COUNTY OF BOl'·r!,rnR

IDAHO,IN

STATE

a

CITY OF
the State of Idaho,

)

CASE

Plai.ntiff,

)
)

vs.

201

AFFIDA VlT OF
MARJ TILLEY

INDEPENDENT HfGHWA Y DISTRICT, a
subdivision of the State ofldaho.

)
)

Dcfoodant,

IDAI-fO )
ss.
)

County of Ada

being first duly sworn deposes and states:

M/\RJ
L

statem1.;nts

I make

AFFIDAVIT OF MARJ TILLEY -

1

own persona! knowledge;

01 03

2085545 7 ,, 1_

25

07/08/

3.

PAGE

JAMES VERN

serve as

of the hldcpcndent

of

an.d have served in that capacity for approximately eight years:

r have 1,cver understood
obligation

perpeti..!ity

a prior Board

all future Boards

Cornmlssioners to pay to the City of Sandpoint

Sandpoint

5.

The

Board

Commissioners could create an

properties;

or Commissioiters has made numerous

to contact

of

Sandpoint officials lo renegotiate the Joint Powers Agreement which purported to crnate an
obligation to pay over all such property taxes into perpeinity;

6.

The

Board of Commissioners instructed its former artomey on numerous

occasions to approach

Sandpoint officials to negotiate a temrination or amendment to the
in perpetuity to disburse ail such IHD

Joint Powers Agreement so as to modify
property tax revenues to the

('if Sandpoint;

i,.

or modification to the Joint Powers

Agreement were unsuccessful.
4.

DATED

Marj

SUBSCRJBED

SWORN

before me this ·- _2JiJ)_ day of

Notary Publlc
Idaho
Residing at:
\,J-·0 ~(" /
My Commission Expi;;s:

APFIDA VIT OF MARJ

LLEY - 2
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l HERE.BY CERTIFY that on this _b_'+_A-_ day of July, 2014, 1. served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing

OF MARJ TILLEY upon the following, by the

mfi,thod indicated below:

Scot R, Campbell

~

via facsimile to 208-255-1368

Sandpoint City Attorney
1 I23 Lake Street
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864

C. Matthew Anderson
WINSTON & CASHATT, LA WYERS
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Jdaho 83814

AFFrDAVrT OF MARJ TILLEY - 3

facsimile to 208-765-212!
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DAVIDE. w').'NKOOP
SHERER & WYI\1KOOP, LLP
1\1AIN
B0X31
M.bKlUJAN, lJJA.tlU €5.:HJ~U

208-887-4800
FAX 208-887-4865
LS.B. 2429
SUSANP. WEEKS
JAl'1ES, VER.t~ON & WEEKS, PA
1626 LINCOLN WAY
COEUR D-ALENE, IDAHO 83814

208-667-0683
FAX 208-664-1684
LS.B. 4255
Attorneys for Defendant
Independent Highway District

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN fo.J\1) OF

COLNTY OF BUNNER

CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal corporation
the State of Idaho,

)

Plaintiff,
vs.
l};DEPENDENT IDGHWA Y DISTRJCT~ a
political subdivision of the State of Idaho,
Defendant.

)

CASE NO, CV 2013-01342

)
)
)
)

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF
M..1...R.J TILLEY

)

)
)
)

STATEOFIDAHO )
) ss.
of Ada
)
MARJ TILLEY being first duly sworn deposes ~nd states:

1.

I make the following statements of my QW1J personal knowledge:

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF MARJ TILLEY -

PAGE

01 03

4

4:27

2-
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am an elected Commissioner oftbe Independent Highway

have served in that capacity for approxi."tlately ten years;
3.

I presently serve as Chairman of the Independent Highway District Board of

Commissioners and have served in that capacity for approximately eight years~
4_

f am farrriliar with the ad valorem ta:x:es paid to the Citv of Sandpoint pursuant to

the Joint Powers Agreement that is the subject of this lawsuit. IHD has never paid any penalties
or interest collected on late payment of ad valorem taxes to the City of Sandpoint.

DATED this

day of July, 20i4.

~:/,?olrf

SlJBSCRIBED AND SWOR,~

before me

~a-n

7 r_k day of July. 2014.
-tr'!.

Nota.ry PubHc for Idaho
Residing at:

B-, fl n..v... LP

My Commission Expires:

v~
. Idaho

/t){t / I (.a

02/03

07/08/201

·27
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1.:urre:ct

method 1.:no1catea

Scot R. Campbell
Sandpoint City Attorney

XX via facsimile to 208-255-1368

1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
C. Matthew Anderson
WINSTON & CASHATT. LAWYERS
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Ida..110 83814

XX via facsimile to 208-765-2121

XX via facsimile to 208-446-1132

SEC01'rD AFFIDAVIT OF MARJ TILLEY - 3
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P.O. BOX 31
MERIDIAN, IDAHO
208-887-4800
FAX 208-887-4865
LS.R 2429

SUSAN P. WEEKS
.JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, PA
1626 LINCOLN WAY
COEUR D-ALENE, IDAHO 838.14
208-667-068}
F1-\X 208-664-1684
LS.B. 4255
Dcfendani
Attorneys
Independent Highway District

DrSTRTCT COURT OF TI IE FlRST

IN

OFTHE

ER
CITY OF SA1'..TDP0fNT,
the State

a

municipal corporation

)

Idaho,

J
Plaintiff,

CASENO.

201

)
}

)

l\FFIDAVTT OF
BISHOP

)

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DtSTRICT, a
political subdivision of tlic State ofldaho,

)

Defe11dant.
STATE OF IDAHO )
) SS,

County of Ada

)

BISHOP being fitst duly sworn deposes and states:

I make the following statements

rny own personal knowledge~

2.

I am the Clerk of the Tndepcndent Highway Dii;trict

3.

As part

the

my

I?

,H;u t.·
AfFlDAVff OF MI\RJ TrLl.&V'

f'

l

342
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attached

20 4.

[e Bishop

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN

before me

2014.
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07/08/2014
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Scot R. Campbell
Sandpoint
Attorn<-.:y
i 123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864

to

C. Matthew Anderson
WINSTON &
250 Kortbwest Boulevard,
Coeur
Idaho 83 8

ti)

i....tt>~IC
FFlOr'\ VIT OF ~H'ft:t:;f'-Y - 3

I368

208~ 765-2 i 2

03/05

201

15:12
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S<.nl (;imf>lmil
Tmisduy,

)um~ 12,

7.0l:?. 11,114 PM

hmcchgmi:me@Trmiti!lr.<:c,1 n
Mar!;ha Ofjilvic; Kody V,,,, fJyk
Indt~p,~ndent Ht1-;hwny t:>i~h'kJ fHiyrncnts

V)

1:in:c,,.
Tl!!'. em11il l$ i!: rns1Hm51! H, ll\H ,n,:i::tinf! you h:.d wHh tin: City wl,f:H: y,1u ::1mvcyml !mfotlnmJi•m
Di!:trlcls
cl,H,i, ,.: w 1·t.'linnut,h Ci,11 uf Snndp(>im'.
!:fFN!!.<. {to r1,,11nnr
llnO ,li:;r.onUnvr·! pny1twn(s ,.id vnlorm11 !l1i•.!S
,h;~ (:ity. IH rnc!lli m,: 'lllrl position, yc,u fei!I that th1: r>bflmit!on for fHl, to r.oliUnmi r,aymrrnts 1nro tho fotur!: i~ iit1i11al
bt:cause It!!; a dclH of !l!D mid bind:, ruwr<: 111D llmmls, If thi:i ii. net yo11r posilhm, fllm1sc let 1m1 know,
will
m1drc.~.; t!1is ismm.
On .tuly l, ;,mil:? Ii-If) m11f ttw C!tv cntar~6 into a 5tipu!!Jtlon !o-t 5~1tlemrmi which ,1:u;h pll!'i.\f dmNrnkH!d it w,rn In !liclr
i:Jest lnternst m i:mnp1·omrsu wh,1tn111~r daltns !lir:y mny lmvr, hi1d ai,:i:tlMt imr.h otl'.<n and :,et!/o a l,1wsi!it trial l\,l(l b!i,m

goi11r, nn fot;; tmul 3 vears.
111 the ,;eHlcnumt, llw rmrtics ngmmJ to rmter into u mint Jiowcm; 1'\gmc1110n1 (/\13ni.:1mmlt}
t!m following:
1. samlp,<iilH rntalns }urlsdl<:tion :w,i i:ontrol ovHr Ws stmt<!~;
7.., IND woo Id p;iy over to the City ail
va!orem r;ro1lcrly tux f1mrfa rnoiived from lo vies by 1!11) (Hl r>mpe rtier.
wlthin City limits;
:l. City v.muld rr.q11i'l.~l l:h.it !lom1cr County viH:11t11 ~he dlssolwion election [with
,1. City wo\Jfd not uµpo!;c lliD ,mnEx<l'.tion e!m::tioni; il!H.l
::i. !HD woalt! wnivc co.sis pmvlot,sly aw,mled.

i,a

Pw·;;wmt to the ~ti1mlritl<in far .SeHlemm1l, whlrh was 11ctr!ptud ;.rnd i:onfirmml by th<? Crn1rt,

ri.:

July B, :W03 tho p;:inii;!,;

m,rnr-ed Into .r Joint Powers 1'\l{1'e1m11mt

J.,
2.

the <lur.,tron of th<: ,1gnnmwnt ls 1rnrp,Gtm1l ur until i;oth pnith,rn <1/l'rm~

u~ formim1fo it;

!l·lD 111:rnflci !(1 i,,vv ,1mi ,ipvly mr ;,d valornm prnpc;rty imic~; 1111d
3. '"nm Distr!cl wi!I pny ovnr w tile City all rwopll1 ty t(l)( f11mli. frum ,,11d1 Dlsuict !cvhi.t tlll :r!I pmp<:rtv foc.:ni.id
wi!hh1 tile cHy limit:.."

m

fli!'ia19·rw wlt:h t!H,
,,f ll th,1t tlm floym,~nts to the Cily arc .a ,fd)t of the fJist!'i1;t Hml thm the D!~trl<:t cnn
d!sr.cmtinue p;iymnntr. lo the City,
l\tt!r.!c Viii Section;! of the h.luh!J Com,titutlon places a rcstrlcHm1 ml Cifa;,,; tliat th~y :im i::s:mm1lly barred frum lncurrinri
di}bt~ or i!ahilitir;.,, in 1:x,.l!S~ of the !nt:nnHc nml rmmmit, prmridcd for (lehts. arid linl,Jllltl,::; in sur:h vm1t, unlrH,s tlwy flrst ·
c1mduc\ ami clci:tilm irnd Si!Wf~ vtih~r nm:irov;:,! oi the prnpu!,IJd c!ipcnditmH (unless t!rn exp11t1<litllm k: :w "otdlnary nod
n~c,:ss.1ry r.x1um!tt>",
'
!tntilN tli,iri hmtc IHD 01mrntf! nm/ m1J!nt;ii11 City :i;trcets, till: City's Public Works i)t!p,.rtrncnt mnm;"w.s that frnu:tlnn, 1,1
thmueh to tHc CiW that portion of the «ti v.'lionm, tnxr,•s that nrc coilccwct within the !J:1Jmitli1ri~::;

c;1ch,Hlf.!l!, IHD pm:.,l'S
of the City.
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111 ,i(llii!ii,•1, ;;s f)r;)ded
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<l'ltN or k1'rn!m1tn U111 i.li!nll~ment IJoth 1,anii::; 1;,;1vc, ,ip
:.on\111 hinf: 10 r,Nik !lie !11wsulL
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Telephone: (208) 887-4800
Facsimile (208) 887~4865
No. 2429
Susan P. Weeks

James, Vernon & Weeks,
1626 Lincoin
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838I4

Telephonc: (208) 667-0683
facsimile: (208) 664-1684

ISB No. 4255
Attorneys for Defendant f ndependent Highway Districr

JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF

COURT OF THE

IDAHDO, n-; AKD

THE COu'"l\TY

BONNER

CASE NO. CV-2013-01342

OF SANDPOINT, a municipal
corporation
State
Idaho.

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO CITY
OF SANl)POINrs MOTION FOR
SUM?vIARY JtJDGMENT

Plainti~
VS.

WAY DISTRICT, a
of the State ofidaho,

subdi

Defendant

I. INTRODUCTION
Plainfrff City

Sandpoint (''Cicy") filed a Complaint and Request for Declaratory and

Injunctive Relief against Independent Highway District ("IHD"). In its Complaint, the Cicy
the District's letter to the City (Exhibits

Code

67-2332

cir 45);

that

and E to the Complaint) violated Idaho

s actions violated the Supreme

IN RESPONSE l'O CITY Of SANDPOlNT"S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

01/09

07/08/2014

'19

2085545741

JAMES VERN

was

judgment

benefit of the bargain negotiated between

Powers Agreement did not violate Article

and District; a decl,:U'ation that the

the

Section Three

the Idaho

· the settlement did not violate

was a
48). The City

§ 40-801; and

enforceable contract between the City and District

preliminary and permanent injunction requiring the district to cease

imerforing

anc desi5t

PAGE

the

operation and maintena."1ce of its streets under the

Joint Powers Agrccm:;nt; and immediately transferring to the Chy

withheld

pcnalt[es

tax revenues, including

the City (~ 51

in its prayer for

l a declarat0ry judgment upholding the Stipulation for Settlement
parties and approved by the Court:

Pov,/crs

is a

and

67-2326 through 67-23

a declaratory judgment that the Joint

exercise or governmental authority under Jdaho Code §§
for a declaratory judgment that the Memorandum of

by the: pa1ties on September 1

an cJrder enjoining
operation and maintenance of

the

-·

Distr1ct from interterine: with the Citv's
,

,.;

streets under the foint Powers ,~.grccment; (5) for an order

to immedialely transfer
a

exercise () f

2005, was a

tO

the

aH ad valorem taxes collected by the

""_,,,..,,.,.,,_,. order against the District recruiting the District to comply with the

Agreement while the matter was under consideration by the Com1: and

costs of suit

including attorney fees- The City has now moved for summary judgment

RESPONSE

OF

s

FOR SUMMARY

02/09

07/08/
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on

pending
, the

interlocatory

the delay a stay

because

interlocutory

Court did not consider a sfay.

Supreme Couit,

to tbe

H.

The district court
an appellate court
353,
P,O

an

creare. IHD noted that a stay was not

appeal. Based on co11cems expressed

an
to

by this

argued against

the City

opposition

its interlocutory appeal request

requested a stay.

STANDARD FOR GRANT OF SUMMARY .JuDGMENT
on a motion for summary judgment as docs

the same standard in

review

a district court

Siale v. Rubbermaid

65,617-8(1
i:.

Loucks

Irrevocable

144 Idaho 233, 237, 159

874 (2007), our Suprer:1e Court reviewed the standard of review for summary judgment
when no my

was requested and held:

appeal from
grnm o a
for si:m:1,ary Judgment. this Comi's
standard of review is the same as the standard used by the district court originally
ling nr: the motion. !nter111m,1J1fain Forest Nfanagement v. Louisiana Pacific
136 Idaho 233,235, 3 t P.3d 921,923 (2001 ). Summary judgment is
appropriate "i the pleadi11gs, depositions, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that
rrnty ,s
w a judgment ss a r:rntter
lavv I.R.CP. 56(c).
The h:rc:cn of proving the absence of material facts is upon the moving party.
Thomson, .., City of Lewiston, 1 Idaho 473, 476, 50 P.3d 488, 491 (2002): see
also
v. Salrnon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 452 P.2d 362 (1969}
The adverse party, however. '\miy not rest upon the mere aHegations or denials
pleadlngs, but his i'Csponse, by uffidavits or as Otherwise provided in this rule,
specific facts showing that there 1s a genuine issue for trial."
1s tbercfore entitled to

03/09

07/08/2014
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the court without
the trial
is cr:titled to arrive at the most probable inferences based

before it
inference.f;_
Forest
31 P.3d at 923. Resolution of the possible
between the inferences is
130
over the entire record

the responsibilities the fact finder. Cameron v.
1237, 239(1
Courtexerciscsfree
was before tl1c district judge to determine
was entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw and reviews the
the district judge to detennine whether the record reasonably
[ntermounta/11 Forest A!cmagement, 136 Idaho at 236,

ir:farcnccs

3l P

at

IL ARGCMENT
A. :'v1..atcrial
Claim

Disputed Fact Exists on the

issues

fa.ct related to the

of comract

complainL

to

valorem taxes coJ:ected
indicates
prevenl:,

claimed

taxes owed under

relation :o

agrccmenrs

there arc material disputed

seeks a summary judgment.

it

undisputed facts

motion to disrniss. The
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corporation of the State of Idaho,

Plaintiff,

Supreme Court Docket No. 42236-2014

vs.
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INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT,
a political subdivision of the State of
Idaho,

CITY OF SANDPOINT'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR APPEAL
BY PERMISSION

Defendant.

1.

Introduction.
Defendant Independent Highway District CIHD") seeks to appeal by permission pursuant

to I.A.R. 12(c). The request is based on the denial of an I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the
underlying action. Both the IHD and the City of Sandpoint ("City") are desirous of a prompt

resolution of the dispute which arises out of a ten (10) year old Joint Power Agreement entered
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BY PERMISSION - l
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17
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The award of costs and fees is an issue of law for the court.
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
IN THE MATIER OF n-fE MOTION FOR

)

APPEAL BY PERMISSION.

)

CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal

)

- - - ------·- ----+.- )

corporation of the State of Idaho
Plaintiff,

.....

· .. ,

·~ rY\.

)

ORDER DENYING Mt)TION"FOR
APPEAL BY PERMISSION

)
)
)

Bonner County No. 2013-1142

V.

)

JNDEPENTIENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a

)
)

political subdivision of the State of Idaho,

)

Supreme Court Docket N o. 42236-201 4

0v

Ref. No. 14-308

)
)

Defendant.

A MOTION FOR APPEAL BY PERMISSION AND STAY OF f!ROCEEDINGS with
attachn1ents and a MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR APPEAL BY
PERMISSION were filed by counsel for Defendant on June 23, 2014, requesting this Court for an
Order granting an appeal by permission of the district court' s Memorandum Decision and Order
Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, file-stamped December 9, 20 13 in Bonner County case no.
!
I

l'

'

CV-2013-1342. Thereafter, CITY OF SANDPOINT'S ~MORANDUM It.f OPPOSITION TO

MOTION FOR APPEAL BY PERMISSION was filed by counsel for Plaintiff on July 3, 201 4. The

l

Court is fully advised; therefore, after due consideration,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Defendant 's MOTION FOR APPEAL BY PERMISSION
AND STAY OF PROCEEDINGS be, and hereby is, DENIED.
DATED this

I''\

July, 2014.
By Order of the Supreme Court

i

cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Judge John T. Mitchell

272
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR i\PPEAL BY PERMISSION - Docket No. 42236-2014

~,ATE OF iDAHO
of BONNER

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO !N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a Municipal
Corporation of the State of Idaho,

)
)
)

Case No.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF CITY
OF SANDPOINT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

Plaintiff,

vs.

)

)
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
)
political subdivision of the State of Idaho, )

________________
Defendant.

BON CV 2013 1342

)
)
)

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND.
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the
plaintiff City of Sandpoint (City).
The Complaint filed on August 15, 2013, arises out of an alleged breach of
contract claim initiated by City. Complaint and Request for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief, p. 7. Long before City filed its Complaint, on July 8, 2003, the parties entered
into the contract, entitled Joint Powers Agreement (Agreement). Id., p. 8. City claims
the defendant Independent Highway District (IHD) breached the Agreement on July 11,
2013, when it refused to perform a material term of the Agreement by withholding funds
from City. Id., Exhibit D. In addition to withholding funds, IHD unilaterally gave notice
of the termination of the Agreement in its entirety on

25,

Id.,

The parties entered into the Agreement as part of a settlement that was reached
on July 3, 2003, following protracted litigation.,
•

C

~

generally Memorandum Decision

Agreement).

Agreement as

The Joint Powers Agreement was intended to be a permanent resolution
as it stated, under the heading "Duration": "The duration of this
agreement shall be perpetual or until such time as the District and the City
jointly and together agree to amend or terminate the same." [Complaint,
Exhibit B, p. 1]. The City would assume responsibility for all the streets
within its limits. Id. The IHD promised to pay the City all ad valorem
property tax funds from levies of properties with the City limits. Id., p. 3.
In return, the City, which had jointly petitioned for the IHD's dissolution
election, would request the Bonner County Board of Commissioners to
vacate the dissolution election and dismiss the action with prejudice. Id.,
p. 5. The parties stipulated that the Joint Powers Agreement could only
be terminated by mutual agreement of both parties. Id., pp. 1, 4.
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, pp. 3-4.
Funds are not currently being withheld due to the stipulated entry of a preliminary
injunction on December 18, 2013. City of Sandpoint's Memorandum

Support of

Summary Judgment, pp. 2-3.
On June 4, 2014, City filed the present motion for summary judgment, requesting
that the Court declare the Agreement and the Memorandum of Understanding to be
legal and enforceable, and for an Order requiring IHD to comply with all obligations of
the Agreement in the form of a permanent injunction. City of Sandpoint's Motion for
Summary Judgment, pp. 1-2. In support of their motion, City filed a supporting
memorandum that expressly "[i]ncorporates the authority and argument made in its
Response to the IHD's Motion to Dismiss, as well as the Court's reasoning set out

its

Memorandum Decision and Order." Id., p. 3. Additionally, City has requested an award
of costs and attorney fees it incurred as a result of the present action.
!HD responded in opposition to the motion for summary

2.
on

8,

2014, alleging that material issues of fact remain disputed in regards to the breach of

Julie Bishop." City filed its reply memorandum on July 1

2014, entitled

Sandpoint's Reply in Support of Summary Judgment."
Hearing on City's motion for summary judgment was held on

22, 2014, at

the conclusion of which the Court took City's motion for summary judgment under
advisement. Because this Court finds no genuine issues of material fact remain for
trial, summary judgment must be granted in favor of City against IHD for the reasons
set forth below.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW.
Summary judgment is proper "[i]f the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
See LRC.P. 56(c). The moving party carries the burden of proving the absence of
genuine issues of material fact. Rouse v. Household Finance Corp., 144 Idaho 68, 70,
156 P.3d 569, 571 (2007) (citing Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902, 905, 935 P.2d 165,
168 (1997). "The burden may be met by establishing the absence of evidence on an
element that the non moving party will be required to prove at trial." Nelson v. Anderson

Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702, 707, 99 P.3d 1092, 1097 (2004) (citing Dunnick v. Elder,
126 Idaho 308, 311, 882 P.2d 475, 478 (Ct. App. 1994)). Any facts in dispute are
liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party, with any inference reasonably drawn
from the record done so
225, 227, 159 P.3d 862, 864

of the nonmoving party.

v. Goss, 144 Idaho

(citing Lockheed Martin Corp. v.

1

1

1,644

a
shifts

there is a genuine issue

trial.

at 228, 159

3d at 864 (citing Hei v. Holzer, 139

Idaho 81, 85, 73 P.3d 94, 98 (2003)). "[l]f the nonmoving party fails to provide a
sufficient showing to establish the essential elements of his or her case, judgment shall
be granted to the moving party." Porterv. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399,403, 195 P.3d 1212,
1216 (citing Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 113, 138 P.3d 310, 313 (2006)). The
nonmoving party may use circumstantial evidence to create a genuine issue of material
fact. Edged In Stone, Inc. v. Northwest Power Systems, LLC, 156 Idaho 176, 321 P.3d
726, 730 (2014) (citing ParkWest Homes, LLC v. Bamson, 154 Idaho 678, 682, 302
P.3d 18, 22 (2013)). To create a genuine issue, "[h]owever, the [nonmoving] party may
not rest on a mere scintilla of evidence." ParkWest Homes, LLC.

Barnson, 154 Idaho

678, 682, 302 P.3d 18, 22 (2013) (citing McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d
360, 364 (1991 )). The nonmoving party may not simply rely upon mere allegations in
the pleadings, but must set forth in affidavits specific facts showing there is a genuine
issue for trial. I.R.C.P. 56(e); see Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 211, 868 P.2d
1224, 1227 (1994). If reasonable people might reach conflicting inferences about the
evidence, the motion for summary judgment must be denied. Ashby v. Hubbard, 100
Idaho 67, 69, 593 P.2d 402, 404 (1979) (citing Otts v. Brough, 90 Idaho 124, 409 P.2d
95 (1965)).
If an action is being tried without a jury, "[t]he trial court as the trier of fact is
entitled

arrive at the most probable inferences based

the

properly before it and grant the summary judgment despite the possibility

evidence
conflicting

, 136 Idaho 233,

P.3d 921, 923

fact

is

responsible for resolution of conflicts between the possible inferences. Id. (citing
Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898, 900, 950 P.2d 1237, 1239

997)). If the Idaho

Supreme Court reviews the decision of a judge serving as fact finder, it "[e]xercises free
review over the entire record that was before the district judge to determine whether
either side was entitled to judgment as a matter of law and reviews the inferences
drawn by the district judge to determine whether the record reasonably supports those
inferences." Id. (citing lntermountain Forest Management, 136 Idaho at 236, 31 P.3d at
924). City's Complaint does not demand a jury trial. IHD has yet to file an Answer and
has not at any time made a demand for a jury trial. Thus, the Court is able to make
reasonable inferences.

Ill. ANALYSIS OF CITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
A. All Provisions of the Joint Powers Agreement and Memorandum of
Understanding are Legal, Valid, and Enforceable and IHD Materially
Breached by Withholding Funds and Unilaterally Terminating the
Agreement.
City argues summary judgment is appropriate declaring the Agreement and
Memorandum of Understanding to be legal, valid, and enforceable, because there are
no genuine issues of material fact remaining for trial. City of Sand point's Memorandum
Support of Summary Judgment, p. 3. It argues that all of IHD's challenges to the
Agreement involve the legal interpretation of Idaho law and the unambiguous terms of
the Agreement itself. Id. Finally, City asserts that if the Agreement is legal, then it is
also enforceable, and they are entitled to relief. Id.
In response, IHD claims material issues of fact remain which prevents summary
C!

has

interest

it is

ad

valorem taxes owed under the Joint Powers Agreement," none of the evidence before
the Court indicates City is entitled to receive anything other than the ad valorem taxes
collected from City residents. Id. Further, !HD reasserts their arguments from the
earlier motion to dismiss: that the termination clause is illusory, that proper
consideration was not given for the agreement, and that a perpetual agreement runs
counter to Idaho law. Id., pp. 5-7. Finally, IHD claims that only highway districts may
abandon or vacate a highway district road and that the alleged delegation of the
authority to City is invalid and unenforceable. Id., p. 6-7.
this case, there are no genuine issues of material fact that would prevent this
Court granting the motion for summary judgment. In support of this conclusion, the
Court must address whether the Agreement obligated IHD to turn over all revenue
collected from City residents including interest and penalties, whether the consideration
given by City was sufficient, whether City may share the power to abandon or vacate a
district road, and whether the relief requested is overly broad. Each of these will be
discussed in turn below. This Court thoroughly and exhaustively addressed any other
issue raised by IHD, including the legality of the contract previously

its Memorandum

Decision and Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss. See generally Memorandum
Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Court's previous
analysis includes a lengthy discussion of whether the Agreement is invalid due to its
perpetual nature.

16-18.

this memorandum

the above-mentioned arguments advanced by IHD.

specifically

1. IHD is Obligated to

.

Over AU Revenues

District

on Prooertv
.,, located Within

revenues

were

allegedly withheld from City. Complaint and Request for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief, p. 11, ,I 51 (b). IHD disputes that City is entitled to penalties and interest from ad
valorem taxes collected because during the course of performance of the Agreement
the IHD has never paid those sources of revenue to City. Memorandum

Response to

City of Sandpoint's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 4. IHD apparently claims that
this discrepancy now creates an ambiguity in the Agreement. Id In response, City
argues that the issue of whether or not IHD has turned over interest in the past is
irrelevant to the legal issue of whether City is entitled to those amounts. City of
Sandpoint's Reply in Support of Summary Judgment, p. 4. City further asserts it is
undisputed City has previously been paid delinquent taxes and that it makes no sense
why the accompanying interest and penalties were not also turned over. Id.
In this case, a plain reading of the Agreement shows IHD was obligated to turn
over to City all revenue from levies on property within city limits. See Joint Powers
Agreement Between the City of Sandpoint and the Sandpoint Independent Highway
District, p. 3. The interpretation of a clear and unambiguous contract is a question of
law. Lamprech v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 75 P.3d 743 (2003) (citing Iron Eagle

Dev't, LLC. v. Quality Design Systems, Inc., 138 Idaho 487,491, 65 P.3d 509, 513
(2003)). Contracts that are unambiguous are given their plain meaning. Id. "The
purpose of interpreting a contract is to determine the intent of the contracting parties at
the time the contract was entered." Id. Intent of the parties is determined from the
contract as a whole. Id. (citing Daugharly v. Post Falls Highway Dist., 134 Idaho 731,
735, 9 P.3d 534, 538 (2000)). "If a contract is found ambiguous, its interpretation is a

'

"

is a

is

interpretations

ambiguous. Id. (citing Lewis v. CEDU Educ. Serv.,

, 135 Idaho 139, 144, 15 P.3d

1147, 1152 (2000)).
Here, the Agreement between City and IHD is not reasonably subject to
conflicting interpretations. Under the relevant section of the Agreement detailing
revenue distribution, the parties agreed to the following:
The District at the present time and in the future will ievy and apply for ad
valorem property taxes under the authority granted in Chapter 13, Title 40,
Idaho Code. The District will pay over to the City all property tax funds
from such District levies on all property located within the city limits.
On the basis of present tax rates this amount is presently approximately
$350,000 per year. District, upon receipt of tax revenues, forward to the
City all tax revenues received by the District ....
Joint Powers Agreement Between the City of Sandpoint and the Sandpoint
Independent Highway District, p. 3 (emphasis added). "All" is defined as "the whole
number, quantity, or amount" Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary p. 71 (1983).
The term "tax," broadly, "embraces all governmental impositions on ... property ..

"

Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). Revenue is defined as "[g]ross income or
receipts." Id. A definition of the plural form of "fund" is "available pecuniary resources."
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary p. 498 (1983). Thus, "all tax revenues" or
"all property tax funds" would encompass the gross amount of money collected for IHD
from City residents in relation to the ad valorem tax.
The gross amount of funds collected for the benefit of !HO includes interest and
costs of delinquent taxes. Under .C. § 40-805, which directs

county tax collector

regarding highway district taxes, the county is to "[p]ay over all moneys then due to the
{+:>

'

J

~

,,

"all tax

then so
revenues" or "all property tax funds" utilized in the Agreement.
Certainly, it must be taken into consideration that IHD has stated

an affidavit to

have "[n]ever paid any penalties or interest coilected on late payments of ad valorem
taxes to the City of Sandpoint" Second Affidavit of Marj Tilley, p. 2. As such, they
dispute that they should pay penalties and interest to City in the future. Memorandum
in Response to City of Sandpoint's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 4.
However, failure to distribute exact monies owed to a city by highway districts
does not in itself imply an ambiguity because such distributions have previously been
subject to simple human error and oversight See generally City of Rexburg v. Madison

County, 115 Idaho 88, 89 764 P.2d 838,839 (1988) (county paid city 5% rather than
statutory minimum of 50% of relevant ad valorem taxes for twenty-two (22) years before
either party discovered the discrepancy but the Court held that despite this the district
had a statutory duty to pay the 50% to the city). While neither party has briefed the
total sum of interest and penalties owing as a result of delinquent taxes collected from
City residents, it is reasonable to infer that the amount is proportionally less than the
shortfall in City of Rexburg. If a city can go twenty-two years without noticing it is only
being paid one-tenth of funds due, it is reasonable to infer that City here may not have
taken notice of the discrepancy in the decade following the formation of the contract.
This alone does not create an ambiguity in the contract. It merely shows oversight by
in failing to realize IHD failed to perform in accordance with the Agreement.
language of the Agreement is clear. !HD should have been paying
ad va!orem taxes,

and penalties.

all revenue

is Supported

The Joint Powers
Consideration.
The Agreement, as previously found

this

Adequate

is supported by adequate

consideration. Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, p. 20. IHD now argues City's agreement to not pursue dissolution of the
highway district cannot serve as adequate consideration because "[n]o statute allows a

city to play any role in determining whether the highway district would be dissolved."
Memorandum in Response to City of Sandpoint's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 5.
City has previously stated in an incorporated briefing that "[a]s consideration for
entering into the JPA, the City agreed to assist in withdrawing the petition to dissolve
the District and agreed not to challenge future annexations to the District The election
did not occur." Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 7. They
further argue that the agreement to not pursue dissolution was part of a stipulated
settlement approved by the District Court for Bonner County and therefore by
forebearing from exercising their right adequate consideration was given. City of
Sandpoint's Reply in Support of Summary Judgment, p. 5. Moreover, they claim
additional consideration was given when "[t]he parties reached an appropriate
cooperation for the maintenance of streets and payment of taxes." Id., p. 6.
No statute prevents City from playing a role in the dissolution of the highway
district. Idaho Code § 40-1802 requires that "All proceedings for the dissolution of
highway districts shall be initiated by a petition of twenty-five (25) or more qualified
electors of the district....

LC.§ 40-1802. Upon petition by the requisite number of

electors, the "[highway district] commissioners shall proceed

consider the petition

and all written objections to it, and shall hear, aJI .fersons in relation to it, and shall
/y

O'

or take testimony as may be offered

as

and

"

§

it

as a

capacity to cast a vote, nothing

no

the plain language of the above statute prevents the

City from testifying or encouraging City residents to vote for dissolution once the
necessary electors have been found.
City has previously demonstrated its ability to offer testimony

favor of the

dissolution of the highway district. The Idaho Supreme Court, in a previous action
involving the present parties, found the testimony of the Sandpoint City Treasurer to be
illustrative when considering whether dissolution would be in the best interest of the
district. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist. v. Board of County Com'rs of Bonner

County, 138 Idaho 887, 892, 71 P.3d 1034, 1039 (2003).

that case, the Idaho

Supreme Court quoted the following testimony of the Sandpoint City Treasurer:
The net effect of the taxpayers in the City of Sandpoint will be slight. The
savings in duplicated services and administrative costs will compensate
for the decreased revenues available to the city Street Departments.
Except for possible changes unrelated to this issue, county residents
should see their tax bill for Bonner County and Bridge decrease.

Id. The reasonable inference to be drawn is that city residents would naturally look to
city officials for guidance as

to whether it was in their interest to support dissolution.

The Idaho Supreme Court itself looked to a city official to support its findings. It is
disingenuous for IHD to argue City could play no role in the dissolution process simply
because it is not immediately apparent from reading the relevant statute.
As the Court previously stated in its Memorandum Decision and Order Denying
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, "[t]here is consideration

the present case because

the IHD has agreed to pay money and the City has agreed to forebear its legal efforts to
dissolve the
MEMORANDUM DECISION

" Memorandum Decision and Order
ORDER GRANTING

Defendant's

dissolution

a

valid consideration existed.

3. City May Share in the Power to Vacate and Abandon IHD Streets.
IHD argues that summary judgment is not appropriate at this time because
"[o]nly highway districts have the power and authority to abandon or vacate a highway
district road." Memorandum in Response to City of Sandpoint's Motion for Summary
Judgment, p. 6 (citing I.C. § 40-203). Further, !HD argues the power cannot be
delegated. Id. (citing Blaha v. Ada County Board of Commissioners, 134 Idaho 770, 9
P.3d 1236 (2000)). The issue of whether the district may delegate authority to vacate
streets was not previously addressed in the motion to dismiss. Id. In response, City
argues that the Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted the statutory scheme differently.
City of Sandpoint's Reply in Support of Summary Judgment, p. 7. They further argue
that the express terms of the Agreement and Memorandum of Understanding, as well
as the entirety of the Idaho statutory scheme, are issues of law for this court to
interpret. Id., p. 8.
City, both of its own authority and sharing in that of IHD pursuant to the
Agreement, may vacate or abandon district streets. The right of a city to vacate streets
has been recognized under statutory law. Idaho Code § 40-1323 addresses the powers
and duties of a city and its city council when included within a highway district. See LC.
§ 40-1323. The relevant portion of that chapter reads as follows:
Each incorporated city, or portion of it, within a highway district, shall
constitute a separate division of the district. The city council of each
incorporated city within the territory of a highway district, so far as relates
to their city, shall have the powers and duties as provided by this
chapter and as provided in chapter 3, title 50, Idaho Code,
case.

extend any street, avenue, alley or lane, annul, vacate or discontinue the same
whenever deemed expedient for the public good .... " LC.§ 50-311 (emphasis added).
The term "highways" is defined by statute to "[m]ean roads, streets, alleys and bridges .
. . ." LC.§ 40-109. Thus, the Idaho Legislature has recognized that a city may have
the authority to vacate streets, including highways. Since cities constitute separate
divisions of the highway district in which they are included, they still must adhere to any
statutory requirements for vacation or abandonment. Id.
The Agreement and Memorandum of Understanding expressly require City to
adhere to statutory requirements. Under the Memorandum of Understanding, City and
IHD agreed to the following:
1. The CITY shall have the right and power to vacate streets and rightsof-way within CITY limits subject to the provisions of this Agreement
and Idaho Code.
2. The CITY shall notify IHD in writing prior to any public hearing regarding
the vacating of a right-of-way within CITY limits.
3. If no written objection to the request to vacate is received from !HD within
thirty (30) days of said notice, the CITY may proceed with such vacation.
The IHD shall also sign off as need be on any documents relinquishing
title to the vacated way.
4. If written objection is received from IHD stating the reasons for the
objection, the CITY shall deny the request to vacate.
5. IHD shall defend any claim related to a IHD objection to vacation request.
6. The CITY shall, at its' sole expense, take all legal steps required by
law to vacate streets and rights-of-way within CITY limits including
provisions for all required notices and public hearings.
Memorandum of Understanding, pp. 1-2 (emphasis added). Thus, City obligated itself
both contractually and statutorily to comply with the requirements of LC.§ 40-203
should it choose to abandon or vacate any street. That particular section of the Idaho
Code does not expressly prohibit City from exercising such power. Rather, the

reads

whichever

or

have jurisdiction of the highway system,

use

abandon and vacate any highway or public right-of-way . . . "

§ 40-203(1

(emphasis added). As shown above, through exercise of the Agreement and the
incorporated Memorandum of Understanding, IHD extended its jurisdictional authority to
a division of the district that by itself may have already had the authority to vacate
streets, that being the City of Sandpoint.
The authority cited by IHD is inapt because it only applies to actions taken by a
city outside of its boundaries. The defendants cited to Blaha v. Board of Ada County
Com'rs, 134 Idaho 770, 9 P.3d 1236 (200), for the proposition that a highway district

could never delegate its authority to vacate streets to a city. That case, however, is
inapposite to the facts before the Court because it dealt with the exercise of co-equal
jurisdiction of a separate matter outside the corporate limits of a city. Blaha, 134 Idaho
at 777, 9 P.3d at 1243. In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that there
were constitutional limitations because the Court had previously held "[t]hat the power
of cities and counties only exists within the sovereign boundaries of the cities and the
counties respectively." Id. (citing Clydes Hess Distributing Co. v. Bonneville County, 69
Idaho 505,210 P.2d 798; Boise City v. Blaser, 98 Idaho 789, 572 P.2d 892 (1977);
Hobbs v. Abrams, 104 Idaho 205, 657 P.2d 1073

983)). Thus, if City were exercising

its authority to abandon or vacate highways outside of its corporate boundaries, there
would be a very real issue.
Here, however, there is no accusation or question of fact that City is exercising
authority outside of its corporate boundaries. Pursuant to the Memorandum of
Understanding, it is made explicitly apparent that the authority of

is limited to its city

no

4. The Relief Requested is Not Overly Broad.
IHD argues City is not entitled to "[a]n order enjoining the District from interfering
with the City's operation and maintenance of its streets under the Joint Powers
Agreement." Memorandum in Response to City of Sandpoint's Motion for Summary
Judgment, p. 7. They argue that, excepting the money being withheld from City, there
are no facts in this case that suggest IHD has interfered with City inside the city limits.

Id. City responded by asserting that none of IHD's arguments prevent summary
judgment in this case "[b]ecause the court fashions that remedy, and IHD's claims do
not defeat the underlying right to the relief." City of Sandpoint's Reply in Support of
Summary Judgment, p. 9. They state that the Court determines the necessary scope of
relief, and as such there is no genuine issue for trial. Id. Further, City argues that the
preliminary injunction in this case needs to be permanent, ensuring that the Agreement
is complied with. Id.
Here, there is not an overly broad request for relief. in its Complaint, City
requested "[a]n order enjoining the District from interference with the City's operation
and maintenance of its streets pursuant to the Joint Powers Agreement .... "
Complaint, p. 12. As this Court has already held, the Agreement is a legal and
enforceable contract. The relief requested by City is only that which the IHD previously
agreed to under the Agreement, with no additional stipulations. Because IHD
unilaterally decided to cease complying with the Agreement previously, it is not
unreasonable to grant relief to City that would prevent the same from happening again
the future.

8. City is the Prevailing Party and Might Be Entitled to Attorneys' Fees and
Costs.
as
allowed by law,

§1

21 and I.

54." City of Sandpoinfs Motion

Summary

Judgment, p. 2. In response, IHD argues City "[h]as advanced no argument or authority
showing that IHD's defense was frivolous. Further, given that a material issue of fact
prevents entry of judgment in favor of the City, there are no grounds for an award of
attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121." Memorandum in Response to City of Sandpoint's
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 8. In response, City has argued that there was no
legitimate basis for IHD to cease compliance with the agreements, an action that forced
City to file suit in order to recover the necessary funds to continue an important public
service. City of Sandpoint's Reply in Support of Summary Judgment, p. 9. Further,
they argue IHD has failed to raise any genuine iegai defense as to why payments under
the Agreement were ceased. Id.
In this case, an award of attorney's fees is likely appropriate. Idaho Code§ 12121 states that "[i]n any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to
the prevailing party or parties .... " LC.§ 12-121. The Idaho Supreme Court has
interpreted that section such that "[a]n award of attorney fees under [LC.]§ 12-121 is
not a matter of right to the prevailing party." Philips v. Blazier-Henry, 154 Idaho 724,
731, 302 P.3d 349, 356 (2013) (quoting Mi/chalk v. Mi/chalk, 148 Idaho 224, 235, 220
P.3d 580, 591 (2009)). The Court "permits the award of attorneys fees to the prevailing
party if the court determines the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation." Id. (quoting Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M.

Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 218-19, 177 P.3d 955, 965-66 (2008)). Finally,
the "entire course of the litigation must be taken into account and if there is at least one

even

the

or
Mi/chalk,

under I.C. § 12-121, IHD is correct

48

p

).

saying there would need to be a showing that the

case was defended frivolously. If, at a later time, City persists in requesting fees under
I.C. § 12-121, the Court will make that analysis.
However, I.C. § 12-121 might not be the most applicable statute. In 2013, the
Sixty-First Idaho Legislature adopted Idaho Senate Bill No. 1332, effective March 27,
2012, revising the language of I.C. § 12-117. Entitled, "Attorney's fees, witness fees,
and expenses awarded in certain instances", the new language reads:
In any civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a
governmental entity and another governmental entity, the court shall
award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and
other reasonable expenses. For purposes of this subsection,
"governmental entity" means any state agency or political subdivision."
LC.§ 12-117(4). That same Chapter defines "political subdivision" as "[meaning] a city,
a county, any taxing district, or a health district .... " I.C. § 12-117(5)(b). The Idaho
Supreme Court has held that "[a] highway district is a "taxing" district" within the
meaning of I.C. § 12-117." Halvorson v. North Latah County Highway Dist., 151 Idaho
196,209,254 P.3d 497,510 (2011) (citing LC.§ 63-3101; I.C. § 40-1308). Because
the City of Sandpoint is a "city" and the Independent Highway district is a "taxing
district," !.C. § 12-117(4) applies to this case.
City did not claim fees under I.C. § 12-117(4) in any filings with this Court prior to
the hearing on the instant motion. At that hearing, the Court inquired of counsel for the
City why that was the case.
At this juncture, City's reason is not relevant. The prevailing party is not required
state with specificity the specific code provision it seeks fees under

Rule

9

see

fee

Eighteen
7

1

17(4),

only

is whether City was the prevailing

§
There is no

in

the Court's mind that City is in all aspects the prevailing party as compared to IHD. The
Court so finds City to be the prevailing party in this litigation_

Thus, if City requests fees under I.C. § 12-117(4), City is entitled to those fees as
the prevailing party and the only issue at the time of a motion under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5}

will be the amount of those fees. Should City request fees only under I.C. § 12-121
then the Court at that time will address the issue of whether IHD defended this case
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation, and, if it concludes that issue in City's
favor, then at that time the amount of fees will be determined
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER.

For the reasons stated above,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED plaintiff City's Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED in all aspects against defendant IHD,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED plaintiff City is the prevailing party in this litigation.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED counsel for plaintiff City shall prepare a judgment
consistent with this memorandum decision and order,
Entered this 31st day of July, 2014.
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6
7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

8
9

CITY OF SANDPOlNT. a municipal
corporation of the State of Idaho,
Case No. CV-13-01342

10
11
12

Plaintiff,

vs.

ORDER GRANTING DECLARATORY
RELIEF

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State of Idaho,

13
Defendant.

14
15

16

THIS MATTER came before the Court on City of Sandpaint's Motion for Surnmai·y Judgment

17

granting declaratory relief pursuant to I.RC.P. 56, 57, 65 and I.C. §10-1201 et. seq. The court having

18
19

considered the:

•

Plaintiff's Verified Complaint and attachments;

•

The Court's Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
entered December 9, 2013;

•

The Court's Reciprocal Preliminary Injunction Order;

•

City of Sandpoint's Motion for Summary Judgment;

•

Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment;

•

Affidavit of Scot Campbell filed 11/7/13;

20
21
22
23

24
25

26

ORDER GRANTING DECLARATORY
RELIEF - PAGE 1
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APROFESSIONAL SERVICE COAPCAATION
250 Nonm,e9t Bl~d.. Svi1e 206
Coeu1 d' Alene. !dllho 83814

~ : (208) ~-2103

1

~'

I,
I

'
_j

9

4

3

•

Affidavit of Ma1j Tilley~

•

Second Affidav1t of Marj Tilley;

•

Affidavit of Julie Bishop;

7

•

City of Sandpoint's Reply in Support of Summary Judgment;

8

•

and the pleadrngs filed in this matter

4

5
6

9

10

The Cou1t having found;
1.

There is a controversy between the parties that is appropriate for declaratory relief.

2.

There are no genume material issues of fact that are actual and in good faith controverted.

3.

Based on the reasoning previously stated by the Court, summary judgment in favor of the

11

12
13

14

15
16

17
18

City of Sandpoint is appropriate.

4.

It is the Court's abiding conviction that the Independent Highway District's defense of

this matter was unreasoned and without foundation.

IT IS NOW THEREFORE ORDERED:
1.

The City of Sandpoint's Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted.

2.

The Memorandum of Understanding of September 14, 2005 between the City of '

19

20
21
22

23
24

25

Sandpoint and the Independent Highway District is legal, valid and enforceable.
3.

The Joint Powers Agreement between the City of Sandpoint and the Independent

Highway District is legal, valid and enforceable.

4.

The Independent Highway District is ordered to comply in all respects wirh its

obligations set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding and the Joint Powers Agreement

26

ORDER GRANTING DECLARATORY
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5.

The Independent Highway D1stnct is directed co inciude in its payment of itd vil.i.01cff1

2

taxes to the City of Sandpoint all truces collected pursuant to I.C. §40-800 et.seq., including withou t

3

limitation any collection for delinquent taxes, interest and costs, that are collected as a result of

4

Independent Highway District levies on the taxpayers of the City of Sandpoint.

5
6

7

6.

Counsel for the parties shall confer and submit for consideration by the Court the

appropriate Permanent Injunction.

8

7.

The City of Sandpoint is awarded its costs as permitted by the rule of rhe Court.

9

8.

The City of Sandpoint ls awarded its attorney's fees .~

10

9.

The trial date in this matter and all other deadlines are hereby stride.en. ,,.

11

DONE IN OPEN COURT this

3 l C. +-- day of CL.)

4i~tJ...rt'n:~.
J..~~C~- ~'1

l7 ,

V

<-(.

6
u,...:t ~ ,

2014.

12
13

14
15
16

17
18

19
20

With respect to the issues determine by the

ove order, it is hereby CERTIFIED, in accordance

with I.R.C.P. 54(b), that the Court has determined chat there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a
final judgment and that the Court has and does herby direct that the above order shall be a final
judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho

21

22
23

Appellate Rules.
DATED this

- 0~
.) l sr day of ,J

, 2014.

24

25
26
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W ANDERSEN, ISB No. 3581
CASHATT
Attorneys for Plaintiff

7

8
9

SUSAN P. WEEKS, ISB No, 4255
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, PA
Attorneys f01- Independent High,vay District
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complete copy of the foregoing to be
mailed,
postage prepaid;
h~d delivered; [&1 sent
via facsimile on July ---21._, 2014, to:

D

C. Matthew Andersen
Winston & Cashatt
601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1900
Spokane, WA 99201
509-838-1416 (fax)

R. Scot Campbell
Sandpoint City Attorney
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, ID 83864
(208) 255-1368 (fax)
David E. Wynkoop
Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP
P.O. Box 31
Boise, ID 83680
(208) 887-4865 (fax)
Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
(208) 664-1684 (fax)

17
18

19

CLERK OF THE cbtJRT ·

20

21

22
23
24

25
26
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250 No tth'fl6'SI Blvd., Sulla 200
Coeur d'fll-'n@. Idaho 83814

Phone: {208) &&7-2103

2
3
4

5

Lake
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Telephone: (208) 263-0534
Facsimile: (208)
1368
11

6
7
8
9

10
11

12

C. MATTHEW At"'J"DERSEN, ISB No. 3581
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS,
a Professional Service Corporation
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 814
Telephone: (208) 667-2103
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121
cma@winstoncashatt.com

Attorneys for City of Sandpoint

13
14

15

16

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
OF IDAHO,
AND FOR
COUNTY OF BONNER

CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal
corporation of the State of Idaho,
Case No. CV-1

17
18
19
20

1342

Plaintiff,
NOTICE OF PRESENTMENT

vs.

(without oral argument)

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State Idaho,

21

Defendant.

22
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Plaintiff will bring on for presentment, without oral

23
24

25

argument, its Motion for Award

Attorney's Fees and Costs on Wednesday, August 27, 2014, or as

soon thereafter, before the Honorable John

26

NOTICE OF
PAGE I

Mitchell.

II

I'
31
411
s

a Professional Service Corporation

I'

6

SCOT R. C.t\MPBELL, ISB No. 4121
SAl~DPOINT CITY ATTORNEY

7

Attorneys for City of Sandpoint

8
9

10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17

I hereby certify that I caused a true and
to be
complete copy the
postage prepaid;
hand delivered; IZ] sent
_ _,
to:
facsimile on

D

David R. Wynkoop
Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP
730 N. Main Street
P.O. Box 31
Meridian, ID 83680
Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

18
19
20

21

I c.

22

23
24

25

NOTICE OF PRESENTMEJ\JT
PAGE2

D

1
2
3

Lake Street
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Telephone: (208) 263-0534
Facsimile: (208) 255-1368
scampbel1@ci.sandpoint.id. us

4

5
6
7

8
9

10
11

12

I

C. MATTHEW ANDERSEN, ISB No. 3581
WINSTON &CASHATT, LAWYERS,
a Professional Service Corporation
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-2103
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121
cma@winstoncashatt.com
Attorneys for City of Sandpoint

13
14
15

16

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal
corporation of the State of Idaho,
Case No. CV-13-01342

17
18

19

20

Plaintiff.
CITY OF SAiNDPOINT'S MOTION FOR
AW ARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
COSTS

VS.

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State of Idaho.

21

Defendant.

22
23

The City of Sandpoint requests that the Court enter an order and judgment awarding it

24

$56,131.75

attorney fees as permitted

LC. §12-117 as well as discretionary costs of $775.29 as

25
allowed by LR.C.P. 54(d)(l

incurred in commencement

CITY OF SAl~DPOINTS MOTION FOR AWARD OF
ATTORN'EY'S FEES A.7\fD COSTS
PAGE l

this action.

1
2
3
4

a Professional Service Corporation

5
6

SCOT R. CA.iVIPBELL ISB No. 412
SA.t~DPOINT CITY ATTORNEY

7

Attorneys for

8

9
I hereby certify that I caused a true and
the foregoing to be
mailed,
complete copy
postage prepaid;
hand delivered; ~ sent
facsimile on August
2014, to:

10

D

11
12

D

David R Wynkoop
Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP
730 N. Main Street
P.O. Box 31
Meridian, ID 83680

13
14

15

Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24

25

I

26 I

CITY OF SANDPOINT'S MOTION FOR AWARD OF
ATTOR1'.'EY' S FEES At'\TD COSTS
PAGE2

Sandpoint

1

4

s

II

Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Telephone: (208)
c208) 2ss-1368

6
7
8

9

10
11

12

MATTHEW Al'JDERSEN, ISB
3581
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS,
a Professional Service Corporation
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-2103
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121
cma@winstoncashatt.com
Attorneys for City of Sandpoint

13
14

IN

15
16

DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICL\L DISTRICT OF THE STATE
FOR
COUNTY
BONNER

CITY OF SANDPOINT, a .,,~,,,~.
corporation of the State of Idaho,
Case No. CV-13-01342

17
18

19

20

Plaintiff,
CITY OF SANDPOINTS MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES A1'J'D
COSTS

VS.

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
Idaho,
political subdivision of the State

21
22
23
24

25

1. Relief Requested.
City of Sandpoint
$56,131.75 in attorney

that the

as permitted

26

enter an order

LC. §12-117 as well as discretionary costs of $775.29 as
commencement

CITY OF SA.NDPOINTS MEMORANDlTM IN
SUPPORT OF A TTORl'JEY. S FEES AND COSTS
PAGE

judgment awarding it

1

3

is the amount

4
5

6
7

the

of fees

pursuant to I. C. § 1 121 as now

s

to LC. § 12-1

its

Further, briefing on the issue

entitlement is not necessary.

for

As required by I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5), the request

8

of Costs as well as supported

the Affidavit of C. Matthew Andersen.

9

10
11

3. Basis for Amount Requested for Award of Attorney Fees.
The action was commenced

the City of Sandpoint' s Attorney, Scot R. Campbell. The City

12

subsequently engaged Winston & Cashatt to appear in the matter.

13

request an award of attorney's fees for

14

15

The City

Mr. Campbell or

Sandpoint does not
costs incurred by the

City of Sandpoint.
This case has had resolution based on legal principals.

There has not been any significant

16
discovery beyond the several affidavits filed for the Court·s consideration. Thus, the request for an

17
18

award of attorney's fees consists in the main for the background investigation, significant legal research,

19

preparation of filings and argument to the Court. In addition, there has been an LA.R 12(c) request to

20

the Supreme Court for appeal by permission, which has been denied. The City of Sandpoint requests its

21

fees for responding to the request for permission to appeal both before this Court and before the

22

Supreme Court.

23

The principal legal matters

Court that

services were the

of the

24

25
26

Complaint, the response to the IHD · s motion to dismiss,
perrmss1on

CITY OF SANDPOINT'S MEMORAt'fDUM IN
SUPPORT OF ATIORJ.JEY' S FEES AND COSTS
PAGE2

response to the motion for appeal

nature
2

3
4

determining

amount

factors set

be

5

applicable to

case,

I.R.C.P.
Andersen.

are

6

7

8

4. Basis for A ward of Costs.
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l) sets forth recoverable costs. The

of Sandpoint' s recoverable discretionary

9

10

11

costs requested is $775.29. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D).
DATED

12

ANDERSEN, ISB No.
& CASHATT, LAWYERS,
Corporation
a Professional

13
14

SCOT
ISB
4121
SAl"\TDPOINT CITY A TTOR.l\J"EY

15
16

Attorneys for City of Sandpoint

17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26 !

CITY OF SANDPOINTS MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF ATTORt'\ffiY·s FEES AND COSTS
PAGE3

11

1
2
3
4

5
6
7
8

9

David R. Wynkoop
Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP
730 N. Main Street
P.O. Box 31
Meridian, ID 83680
Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

10
11
12

C. MATIHEW ANDERSEN

13
14
15
16
17
18

19
20
21

22

23
24

25
26

CITY OF SAi~DPOINT'S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF ATTORJ\i'EY-S FEES .A.ND COSTS
PAGE

1
2
3

:SAS'<Ut'UlN l Lil Y

4

5
6

7
8
9

10
11

II

1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Tele~h~.ne: ~2~8) 263~~5?4
Facsnmle: (LOl:S) 255- Uo8
scampbell@ci.sandpoint.id.us
C. MATTHEW ANDERSEN, ISB No. 3581
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS,
a Professional Service Corporation
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-2103
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121
cma@winstoncashatt.com

12
Attorneys for City of Sandpoint

13
14
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

15

STATE

16

17

CITY OF SAJ~DPOINT, a municipal
corporation of the State of Idaho,
Case No. CV-13-01342

18

Plaintiff,
vs.

19
20

21

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State of Idaho,

MEMORANDUM OF COSTS Al'TD
AFFIDAVIT OF C. MATTHEW A..NDERSEN
IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
COSTS

22
23

The Court having entered is Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiff City

24

Sandpoint's Motion for Summary Judgment on July 31, 2014 in the above-entitled action, Plaintiff asks

25
26

that the

costs be awarded against Defendant Independent Highway District:

MEMORANDUM OF COTS AND AFFIDAVIT OF C
MATTHEW ANDERSEN IN SUPPORT OF
ATTO&"lEY" S FEES Ail\JD COSTS - PAGE

2
3
4

5
6

4) Federal Express Charges
5) Travel Expense to Coeur d'Alene, Idaho for Hearings

$21.39
$117.95

TOTAL COSTS REQUESTED:

$775.29

7

8

The above is a trne bill of costs and disbursements which were necessarily incurred by Plaintiff

9

in prosecuting this case. To the best of Plaintiffs knowledge and belief the items are correct and the

10

costs claimed are

compliance with I.RC.P. 54(d)(5).

11

12

DATED

13
Al'\lDERSEN, ISB No. 3581
& CASHATT, LAWYERS,
a Professional
Corporation

14
15

16

SCOT R. CAi\,fPBELL. ISB No. 4121
SANDPOINT CITY ATTORNEY

17

Attorneys for City

18

Sandpoint

19
20

21

ST ATE OF WASHINGTON J
:ss
County of Spokane

22

I, C. MATTHEW ANDERSEN, being first duly sworn on oath, say:

23

1.

24

25

I am one of the attorneys of record for Plaintiff in this matter. I submit this Affidavit

support of Plaintiffs request for attorney's fees and costs. The attorneys' fees requested are $56,131.75,
costs

are $77529 for a total

26
MEMORANDUM OF COTS AJ'lD AFFIDAVIT OF C
MATTHEW ANDERSEN IN SUPPORT OF
ATTORI'\JEY'S FEES AND COSTS - PAGE 2

of

2

3
4

litigation matters. My practice

clients in

Washington providing legal
5

and appeals

My practice

federal and state

6
7

courts: Washington State Supreme Court

courts. I have been admitted to practice in the

8

(October 1976); Federal Court, District of Maryland (May I

9

(November 1982); U.S. Court

10
11

, United States Supreme Court

Appeals, Ninth Circuit (November 1982): Federal Court of Claims

(September 1980); U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington (May 1980); Federal U.S.

v,.res tern District

Appeals (March 1977); Federal

Military Court

12
1992); U.S. District Court, State

Washington (December

Idaho (1987); Idaho State Supreme Court (September 1986); U.S.

13

14
15
16
17
18

19

the Federal

Court of Appeals
Lawyers
3.

Cashatt is a

(October 1991

I am a fellow

the American College

2006).

I have been a principal in the law firm

Winston & Cashatt since 1983. Winston &

of approximately 25 lawyers and has

existence since 1972 following the merger

The

focuses its practice on litigation, with an

of two respected

Spokane law

emphasis on complex matters.

20

21
22

23

4.

My practice is principally focused on commercial and employment litigation. I have

been retained from
5.

to time to represent the interests of public entities.

My partner, Beverly Anderson was first admitted to practice

1984, and has been a

24

principal at Winston & Cashatt since 1989. Winston & Cashatt offers a unique service to our

25

Ms. Anderson spearheads our research effort

26 I

conducts or supervises research
MEMORA.NDUM OF COTS AND AFFIDAVIT OF C
MATTHEW ANDERSEN IN SUPPORT OF
A TTORl'{EY' FEES A.~D COSTS - PAGE

litigation counsel,
for

phases

4

numerous cases

state and federal

Washington Courts of Appeal,

5

.S.

6

7

Appeals, Federal Claims

8

the Washington Court

10

11

She has also argued cases

the Federal Circuit and

Appeals. Ms. Anderson has also been an adjunct professor of legal research

representation on identifying and researching !HD legal theories and the law applicable to the motion to
dismiss and motion for

judgment filed

this case.

Anderson is not admitted to practice

12
m

state

Idaho, but her directed research was done under my supervision.

13
14

This case

6.

out

a

Powers Agreement "JPA") executed with

Independent

15
Plaintiff retained Winston & Cashatt on or about September

16

17

2013 to represent its

I am the principal attorney appearing in the matter. All matters were under my supervision

18
19
REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS
20

21
22

8.

In making this affidavit in support of fees, I have considered the effort required to prepare

this matter for

and submission of dispositive motions to resolve the matter short of trial, all in light

23

of the requirements of Idaho

24

set forth

25

26

, and after due consideration of the factors in setting a reasonable fee as

I.R.CP. 54( e )(3 ). These factors were considered in my assessment of the appropriateness of
Based on this review, it is
are

opinion the request is

and applicable to

MEMORANDUM OF COTS AND AFFIDAVIT OF C.
MATTHEW Al'JDERSEN IN SUPPORT OF
A TTOR:r,..,tY" S FEES AND COSTS - PAGE 4

request as

In summary, the

2
3
4

agreements; that the
5

6

IPowers Act

arguments
333; as

set forth in IC

as

-~a.. ,_,-u,,.",

8

in positon by the parties operate as legal consideration.

9

10
11

by IHD were substantial and required significant legal research to aid the

The arguments
court

the agreements and changes

legal

7

the

arriving at its order. The necessity of analysis to arrive at a conclusion

by the breath of the Court's

page order

amply demonstrated

13.

December

12
IHD's filings on its LR.CP. l

motion presented procedural hurdles to an early appeal.

13
14

appeal

15

request

16

successful. However, while that effort was being pursued, to comply

17

it was necessary

18

19

an

success.

a procedural resolution

The parties attempted to

the

This Court agreed with
appeal. That effort was not

an

of Sandpoint to

Although the

Judgment.

its motion

judgment motion relied upon the

vigorous objection asserting certain matters

the Court's scheduling order,

law should be

s earlier ruling, IHD filed a
as disputed facts. This response

20
21

22

23
24

required a more detailed reply.
The novelty and difficulty of the questions.
issues raised by IHD, and the manner m which they were raised, created a difficult
procedural posture. In essence, the case needed

25

be

that was not appealable, but

out on a
are

26

MEMORAl"JDUM OF COTS A.~D AFFIDAVIT OF C
MATTHEW ANDERSEN IN SUPPORT OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS - PAGE 5

1
2
a

3

permitted procedures.

4

5

State Supreme

6
7

& Cassatt's

and the prospect

a history of over twenty
yet

trip

matter.

appeal is for the Court to

responding to IHD and

determine.

8

d.

The prevailin£ charges for like work.

9

hourly rate is $375.00 per

My current and

10
11

hour on this matter as I am representing a public

12

$225.00 per

I

agreed to charge $325.00 per

Ms. Anderson has been billed at the rate of

These are commensurate with the skill and

of experience necessary to represent
work was being performed.

14

15

The rate is prevailing

cases that

travel, expertise and skill

the level

support, resources for trial preparation,

trial as are present in this case. Where appropriate, the services

other

16
lawyers, both principals and associates, at Winston & Cashatt were utilized to minimize the costs to the
17

18
19

clients. They have been billed at an hourly rate between $195.00 and $350.00 an hour. In my opinion
these rates for legal services are prevailing and competitive m the area.

20
21

performing

on

work.

22

23
24

25
26

MEMORA.1-~DlJlvI OF COTS AND AFFIDAVIT OF C.
MATTHEW ANDERSEN IN SUPPORT OF
FEES
COSTS-PAGE

The hourly rates for the

hourly rates for this type of legal

A:

7
8

I also directed the use of paralegals and law clerks in this case.

9

Law clerks employed by

10

Winston & Cashatt are

at $95.00 and paralegals at $1

11

paralegals were necessary

this matter.

supervised by an attorney;

law clerks and paralegal are qualified to perform the work; the nature

12
13

services is detailed

The use of both

clerks and

The services they performed were legal in nature; were

the

rates charged are

In

14
customary and market rates charged

comparable

area.

These services are used to

15
decrease the costs to our clients. In

16
17

opinion the

clerk and paralegal

charged are more than

reasonable and summarized as:

18

Hourly Rate
!1

19

Law Clerk
Paralegal

20

TOTAL

21

1

Tyler R. Whitney

!
i

$95.00

Cheryl L Krengel

I

$120.00

I
i

Total Hours
20.5

I
i
I

4.4
I

24.9

I

22
All of the time worked, the attorneys'

23
24

case

25

the prevailing party.

26

I

MEMOR&T\l'DUM OF COTS AND AFFIDAVIT OF C
MATTHEW ANDERSEN IN SUPPORT OF
A TTORt"\fEY' S FEES Ai'l"D COSTS · PAGE

the staff fees and the costs incurred in defending
and reasonable to obtain the result for Defendants as

1
2

3
4

f
5

7

8

the taxpayers,

parties

6

factor

not

been of significance in the matter.
g.

The amount involved and the results obtained.

9

This matter was commenced because IHD ceased making the agreed upon payments.

10

payments annually due to the City of Sandpoint exceed $300,000. This sum is a substantial portion of

11

The

streets. IHD threatened to seek recoupment

12
the entire amount paid over the ten (10) years, plus interest.

The defense was rejected and summary

13
14

15
16
17

h.

This factor is not applicable. It is respectfully noted that not all firms

the area would have the

resources to pursue the matter on behalf of the City of Sandpoint.

18

19

City of Sandpoint.

judgment was entered

The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
This matter was the first engagement of Winston & Cashatt by the City of Sandpoint.

20

21
22

23

J.

Awards in similar cases.

This is known to the Court.
k.

The reasonable cost of automated legal research if the Court finds it was
reasonably necessary in preparing the parties case.

24

25

Winston & Cashatt regularly and effectively utilizes Westlaw as its principal automated research
Beverly Anderson, the firm's

research partner

MEMORANDUM OF COTS A..~D AFFIDAVIT OF C.
MATTHEW ANDERSEN IN SUPPORT OF
ATTORJ\tY·s FEES At"'l"D COSTS - PAGE 8

years of experience

use

2

3

case

4

working on the case to reduce the costs to

Electronic research is critical to the

5
6

for a

The use

7

electronic research is cost effective.

8

significant legal research in this case.

9

10

The Westlaw charges incurred

As shown by the briefing filed

the Court

this case were $586.50. Without

has

benefit of this electronic

tooL the charges for attorney research time would have been greateL

11

9.

Time billed on an hourly basis for legal services provided

& Cashatt is kept

12
by each individual performing legal services who record their effort with the use of a computer based

13
14

program. The computer program used by Winston & Cashatt is

as

the time keeper are

15

alia, for tracking

time. Billing

16

with the service rendered.

Bills are produced from the recorded data

and is tailored,
contemporaneously
a computer-

17
18
19

performed
that effort. The City of Sandpoint was

and the time expanded

basis and has

remained current on the billings in this case.

20
10.

21

22
23

attached as Exhibit

. The work performed is identified by the

individual performing

the work, the type of work done and the date of the work and the time spent performing

24

IL

25

26

this matter is

A copy of the recorded data for the legal services rendered

Exhibit
amount

includes a summary of the requested attorneys'
$56,13L

case.
MEMORANDUM OF COTS A..ND AFFIDAVIT OF C.
MATTHEW ANDERSEN IN SUPPORT OF
FEES A..ND COSTS

were reasonably

work.
fees and law
to defend the

2
3
4

5
6

7

of August,

8

14.

9

10

Washington
Residing at_;_--::..~--::..~"--""=
My appointment expires: ----'--'-'=-+-"--

11
12
13
14

15

I hereby certify that I caused a true and
complete copy of the foregoing to be
mailed,
postage prepaid;
hand delivered; ~ sent
via facsimile on August
to:

D

16
17
18

19
20

21
22

David R. Wynkoop
Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP
730 N. Main Street
P.O. Box 31
Meridian, ID 83680
Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

23
24

25
26

MEMORAt"l'DUM OF COTS AND AFFIDAVIT OF C.
MATTHEW A.1'\JDERSEN IN SUPPORT OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS - PAGE

Tax ID. No.
1""14

LAVVTEriS

4r\A"1".)-..,>"':

;;;; 1- !V""t l.J>J&'-

PROFESSIONAL SERV!CE CORPORATION

601

Riverside
Suite 900
Spokane, WA 99201
(509)838-6131

E-MAIL ADDRESS: info@winsioncashatt.com
WEB SITE: www.winstoncashatt.com

Statement Date:

September 30, 2013

ReferTo:
Invoice No:

113103-118687
54664

City of Sandpoint
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, ID 83864

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
Invoice for fees due for legal services performed and for costs advanced are for period of first date through last date shown below.

Sandpoint Independent Highway District
Professional Fees
Hours

Amount

Conference with M. Andersen re outline of issues and course of
pleadings to move for declaratory relief.

0.60

135.00

CMA

Work on outline of motion. Phone conference with S.Campbell.

1.00

325.00

9/27/2013

BLA

Review Complaint for Declaratory Relief. Review correspondence
re claim that Joint Powers Agreement is invalid. Research re
unconstitutionality claim.

1.20

270.00

9/27/2013

CLK

Prepare notice of association. Email to S. Campbell.

0.30

36.00

9/30/2013

BLA

Research re constitutional basis to object to Joint Powers
Agreement.

1.90

427.50

Sub-total Fees: $

1,193.50

Date

Initials Description

9/26/2013

BLA

9/27/2013

Rate Summary
C. Matthew Andersen
Beverly L. Anderson
Cheryl L. Krengel
Total hours:

1.00 hours at$
3.70 hours at$
0.30 hours at$

$
$
$

325.00
832.50
36.00
1,193.50

5.00

EXHIBIT

I

325 00/hr
225.00/hr
120 00/hr

Winston & Cashatt lawyers, P.S.

September

Tax 1.0. No.: 91-1041332

ReferTo:
Invoice No

3103-1 8687
54664

Current Invoice A.mount Due (Fees+ Expenses):

$

1,193.50

Previous lnvoice(s) Balance Due:

$

0.00

Applicable Interest:

$

0.00

Total Balance Due {Current & Previous Invoices):

$

1,193.50

Balance History
$0.00

2013
Page: 2

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

Tax LO. No.

L.,..,.,.,.

r,4

£RS

:;:;, ! -

4 ("IA ,t

...,-:>"1

1 V"T l Vs..14

PROFESSIONAL SERV!CE CORPORATION

601 W. Riverside
Suite 1900
Spokane, WA 99201

(509) 838-6131
E-MAIL ADDRESS: info@winstoncashatt.com
WEB SITE: www.winstoncashatt.com

Statement Date:

November 12, 2013

ReferTo:
Invoice No:

113103-118687
54665

City of Sandpoint
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, ID 83864

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
Invoice for fees due for legal services performed and for costs advanced are for period of first date through last date shown below.

Sandpoint Independent Highway District
Professional Fees

Date

Initials Description

10/4/2013

BLA

10/7/2013

Hours

Amount

Research re Joint Powers agreement, constitutionality of contract.
Review legislative history and other statutes from S. Campbell.

220

495.00

BLA

Research re ownership of city streets by county, types of
unconstitutional indebtedness of municipality.

2.20

495.00

10/8/2013

BLA

Research re ownership of city streets by city if Highway District
cedes ownership.

1.40

315.00

10/9/2013

BLA

Research re ownership of city streets, and ability of Highway
District to return title to City as opposed to County ownership.
Email to S. Campbell.

2.60

585.00

10/11i2013

TRW

isolate relevant caselaw from Westlaw.

3.10

294.50

10/14/2013

BLA

Review District's brief in support of motion to dismiss.

0.80

180.00

10/16/2013

TRW

Work on directed research re response to motion to dismiss.

3.50

332.50

10/16/2013

BLA

Research re constitutionality of joint powers agreement.

2.30

517.50

10/16/2013

TRW

Worked on reply to motion to dismiss.

3.20

304.00

10/17/2013

BLA

Research re statutory scheme and validity of joint powers
agreement.

3.80

855.00

10/18/2013

CMA

Work on structure of response brief. .

1.00

325.00

10/22/2013

CMA

Review of filings. Phone conference with S. Campbell. Prepare no
objection.

100

325.00

10/23/2013

TRW

Work on response to motion to dismiss.

0.40

38.00

10/23/2013

CMA

Work on outline of response brief.

2.00

650.00

10/25/2013

TRW

Work on response to motion to dismiss.

2.00

190.00

10/28/2013

TRW

Work on response to motion to dismiss

0.30

0.00

10/28/2013

BLA

Research re constitutionality of apportionment under Joint Powers

1.50

337.50

Winston & Cashatt Lawyers, P.S.
1.D.

November 2, 2013

91-1041332

Page: 2
ReferTo:
Invoice

03-118687
54665

10/30/2013

CMA

Work on response to District's Motion to Dismiss

5.00

1,625.00

10/31/2013

CMA

Work on form of response brief.

4.00

1,300.00

0/31/2013

BLA

Research re joint powers agreements and constitutional and
statutory validity.

3.30

742.50

Sub-total Fees

$

9,906.50

Rate Summary
C. Matthew Andersen
Beverly L. Anderson
Tyler R. Whitney
Tyler R. Whitney

13.00
20.10
0.30
12.20

Total hours:

hours at $
hours at $
hours at$
hours at $

325.00/hr
225.00/hr
0.00/hr
95.00/hr

45.60

$
$
$
$

4.225.00
4,522.50
0.00
1,159.00
9,906.50

Current Invoice Amount Due (Fees+ Expenses):

$

Previous lnvoice(s) Balance Due:

$

1.193.50

Applicable Interest:

$

0.00

Total Balance Due (Current & Previous Invoices):

$

11,100.00

Balance History
$0.00

$1,:193.50

$0.00

$0.00

9,906.50

======

Tax

No,

,,.,, ....... ,.... -04,... .... ,..,

:::;1-JV"TlJ,:u:,..
PROFESS!ONAL SERVICE CORPORATION

601

Riverside
Suite 900
Spokane, WA 99201
(509)838-6131

E-MAIL ADDRESS: info@winstoncashattcorn
WEB SITE: www,winstoncashattcorn

Statement Date:

December 9, 2013

ReferTo:
Invoice No:

113103-118687
55018

City of Sandpoint

1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, ID 83864

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
Invoice for fees due for legal services performed and for costs advanced are for period of first date through last date shown below,

Sandpoint Independent Highway District
Professional Fees
Date

Initials Description

11/1/2013

TRW

11/1/2013

Hours

Amount

Worked on response to motion to dismiss (no charge),

0.80

0.00

BLA

Research re indebtedness under constitutional prohibitions,
consideration for joint powers agreements, judicial estoppel, other
application of joint powers agreements nationwide,

4.80

i ,080.00

11/4/2013

TRW

Worked on response to motion to dismiss,

1.40

133.00

1/4/2013

BLA

Research re duration requirement Work on brief in opposition to
motion to dismiss,

2.90

652.50

11/5/2013

TRW

Worked on response to motion to dismiss,

3.40

323.00

11/5/2013

BLA

Work on brief in opposition to motion to dismiss.

2.20

495.00

11/5/2013

CMA

Work on brief Meeting with S.Campbell. Draft affidavits of S.
Campbell and S. Syth.

6.00

1,950.00

11/6/2013

CLK

Work on stipulation for extension of time. Work on motion for
extension of time. Phone call with S. Weeks' office,

0.80

96.00

11/6/2013

TRW

Worked on response to motion to dismiss.

3.50

332.50

11/6/2013

BLA

Work on brief in opposition to motion to dismiss.

4.10

922.50

11/6/2013

CMA

Response to Defs Motion to Dismiss.

10.00

3,250,00

1117/2013

CMA

Finalize Response to Defs Motion to Dismiss.

5.00

1,625.00

1117/2013

BLA

Work on brief in opposition to motion to dismiss.

3.00

675.00

11/8/2013

TRW

Researched standard for conversion to summary judgment (no
charge).

1,00

0.00

11/8/2013

CMA

Review of motion to strike. Direct preparation of response,
Message to S. Campbe!L

1.00

325.00

11/8/2013

BLA

Review motion to strike. Conference with M. Andersen re
response. (no charge).

0.50

0.00

December 9, 2013
Page: 2

Winston & Cashatt lawyers, P.S.
Tax

No .. 91-1041332

ReferTo:
Invoice No:

03-118687
55018

11/11/2013

TRW

Pulled cases from Westlaw Worked on response to motion to
strike. (no charge).

1 00

0 00

11/11/2013

BLA

Research re basis for court to exercise discretion to exclude
declarations submitted in response to 12(b)(6) motion. Final brief
in opposition to motion to strike.

0.50

125.00

11/11/2013

CMA

Revise response to objection to motion to strike. Message to S.
Campbell.

1.00

325.00

11/12/2013

BLA

Review reply brief from District. Research re provisions of statute
regarding District's authorities.

1.10

247.50

11/12/2013

CMA

Prepareforhearing.

4.00

1,300.00

11/13/2013

TRW

Researched case law. Attended hearing. (no charge).

3.50

0.00

11/13/2013

CMA

Prepare for hearing on motion to dismiss. Prepare and file
supplemental authorities. Travel. Meet with clients. Attend
hearing.

8.00

2,600 00

11/14/2013

CMA

Letter to counsel. Consult with S. Campbell.

1.00

325.00

Sub-total Fees: $

16,782.00

Rate Summary

C. Matthew Andersen
Beverly L. Anderson
Beverly L. Anderson
Beverly L. Anderson
Cheryl L. Krengei
Tyler R. Whitney
Tyler R. Whitney
Tota! hours:

36.00
0.50
18.10
0.50
0.80
6.30
8.30
70.50

hours
hours
hours
hours
hours
hours
hours

at$
at $
at$
at$
at$
at$
at$

325.00/hr
0.00/hr
225.00/hr
250.00/hr
120 00/hr
0.00/hr
95.00/hr

$
$
$
$
$

$
$

11.700.00
0.00
4,072.50
125.00
96.00
0.00
788.50
16,782.00

Expenses

Date
11/7/2013

Amount
39.45

Description
Photocopy charges.

11/8/2013

Messenger Service.

11/12/2013

Westlaw.

10.00
105.88
Sub-total Expenses:

$

Payments Received Since Previous Invoice:

Date

Description

11/15/2013

City of Sandpoint

Amount
1,193.50

155.33

Winston & Cashatt

P.S.

December 9, 2013
Page: 3

Tax 1.0. No. 91-1041332

ReferTo:
Invoice No:

31

18687
55018

9,906.50

1 /?? /?O 1'.i

Sub-total Payments:

$

11,100.00

Current Invoice Amount Due (Fees+ Expenses):

$

Previous !nvoice(s) Balance Due:

$

0.00

Applicable Interest

$

-----

Total Balance Due (Current & Previous Invoices):

$

16,937.33

Balance History
$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

16,937.33

=======
0.00

Tax LO. No.
i...Ariv~YEN5
A PROFESSIONAL SERVJCE CORPORATION

601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 900
Spokane, WA 99201
(509) 838-6131
E-MAIL ADDRESS: info@winstoncashatt.com
WEB SITE: www.winstoncashatt.com

Statement Date:

January 15, 2014

ReferTo:
Invoice No:

113103-118687
55426

City of Sandpoint
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint. ID 83864

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
Invoice for fees due for legal services performed and for costs advanced are for period of first date through last date shown below.

Sandpoint Independent Highway District
Professional Fees
Date

Initials Description

Hours

Amount

12/11/2013

CMA

Review of court's order. Phone conference with S. Campbell.
Letter to counsel re reinstituting payments.

2.00

650.00

12/11/2013

BLA

Review and analyze decision on motion to dismiss. Conference
with M. Andersen re potential necessity for new motion, or agreed
order. Phone conference with S. Campbell and M. Andersen.

0.80

12/12/2013

CMA

File review to as certain status of the need for follow on pleadings.

0.50

162.50

12/16/2013

BLA

Research re basis for Temporary Restraining Order for potential
motion.

2.70

607.50

12/16/2013

CMA

Begin preparation of injunction hearing. Messages to counsel.
Phone conference with S. Weeks.

2.50

812.50

12/17/2013

BLA

Review proposed order on preliminary injunction. Phone
conference with M. Andersen and S. Campbell. (no charge).

0.40

0.00

12/17/2013

CMA

Work on form of an injunction. Numerous phone calls with S.
Weeks. Phone conference with S. Campbell.

3.00

975.00

12/18/2013

CMA

Finalize form of agreed injunction. Numerous drafts and
conversations with counsel. Travel and attend hearing.

5.00

1,625.00

Sub-total Fees: $

5,012.50

Rate Summary
C. Matthew Andersen
Beverly L Anderson
Beverly L Anderson
Total hours:

13.00 hours at$
0.40 hours at$
3.50 hours at$
16.90

325.00/hr
0.00/hr
225.00/hr

$
$
$

4,225.00
0.00
787.50
5.012.50

January 5, 2014
Page: 2

Winston & Cashatt Lawyers, P.S.
Taxl.D.No .. 91-1041332

ReferTo:
Invoice

Date
12/16/2013

03-118687
55426

Amount
345.17

Description
Westlaw.
Sub-total Expenses:

$

345.17

------

Payments Received Since Previous Invoice:
Date

Description

1/6/2014

City of Sandpoint

Amount

16,937.33
Sub-total Payments:

$

16,937.33

Current Invoice Amount Due (Fees+ Expenses):

$

Previous lnvoice(s) Balance Due:

$

Applicable Interest:

$

Total Balance Due (Current & Previous Invoices):

$

Balance History
$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

5,357.67

======

0.00
0.00

------

5,357.67

Tax LO. No.
L A

W
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A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION

601

Riverside
Suite 1900
Spokane, WA 99201
(509) 838-6131

E-MAIL ADDRESS: info@winstoncashatt.com
WEB SITE: www.winstoncashatt.com

City of Sandpoint
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, ID 83864

Statement Date:

February 10, 2014

ReferTo:
Invoice No:

113103-118687
55763

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
Invoice for fees due for legal services performed and for costs advanced are for period of first date through last date shown below.

Sandpoint Independent Highway District
Professional Fees
Date

Initials Description

1/22/2014

CMA

Phone conference with S. Weeks. Prepare ADR report. Review
issues related to certification. Phone conference with S.
Campbel!.

Amount

1/22/2014

BLA

Analyze court's order, preliminary injunction, and requested relief
in the Complaint. Outline potential courses of action to trigger
appeal, necessity to move for summary judgment. Conference
with M. Andersen re litigation plan. Phone call with S. Campbell
and M. Andersen re litigation plan.

0.80

180.00

1/23/2014

CMA

Phone conference with S. Campbell re annexation issues.
Message to S. Weeks.

0.50

162.50

1/24/2014

CMA

Work on structure of certifcation. Phone conference with S
Weeks. Message to S. Campbell.

1.00

325.00

Sub-total Fees: $

1,155.00

487.50

Rate Summary
C. Matthew Andersen
Beverly L. Anderson
Total hours:

3.00 hours at$
0.80 hours at $

325.00/hr
225.00/hr

3.80

$
$

975.00
180.00
1,155.00

Expenses
Date

Description

1/3/2014

To C. Matthew Andersen for travel to/from Coeur d'Alene for
hearing on motion to dismiss on November 13, 2013.

Amount
39.55

Winston & Cashatt Lawyers, P.S.
Tax

No .. 91-1041332

ReferTo
Invoice No:
Sub-total Expenses:

$

31

8687
55763
39.55

------

Payments Received Since Previous Invoice:
Date

Description

2/10/2014

City of Sandpoint

Amount
5,357.67
Sub-total Payments:

$

5,357.67

Current Invoice Amount Due (Fees+ Expenses):

$

Previous lnvoice(s) Balance Due:

$

Applicable Interest:

$

Total Balance Due (Current & Previous Invoices):

$

Balance History
$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

1,194.55

======

0.00

------

0.00

------

1,194.55

Taxl.D. No.
;Qt?":332
PROFESS!Ol'JAL SERVICE CORPORATION

601

Riverside
Suite 900
Spokane, \NA 99201
(509) 838-6131

E-MAIL ADDRESS: info@winstoncashatt.com
WEB SITE: www.winstoncashatt.com

City of Sandpoint
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, ID 83864

Statement Date:

March 6, 2014

ReferTo:
Invoice No:

113103-118687
56168

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
Invoice for fees due for legal services performed and for costs advanced are for period of first date through last date shown below.

Sandpoint Independent Highway District
Professional Fees
Date

Initials Description

Hours

Amount

2/5/2014

CMA

Review of Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion to
Dismiss. First draft of 54(b) iangauge. Redraft joint report to the
court.

1.50

487.50

2/20/2014

CMA

\Nork on certification issues. Research. Messages to S.
Campbell. Phone conference with S. Campbell. Efforts at reaching
S. \Neeks.

2.00

650.00

2/20/2014

BLA

Research re language requirements for 54(b) certification in Idaho.
Review proposed language.

040

90.00

2/21/2014

CMA

\Nork on issues related to 54(c) cerrification. Phone conference
with S. \Neeks. (no charge}.

1.00

0.00

2/21/2014

BLA

Research re propriety of use of judgment on the pleadings
stipulation to achieve appealable issue. Review court order,
pleadings.

1.60

360.00

2/23/2014

BLA

Research re propriety of use of judgment on the pleadings
stipulation to achieve appealab!e issue.

1.00

225.00

2/25/2014

CMA

Review case law. Messages to S. \Neeks re result of approach on
judgment on the pleadings. Communications with S. Campbell.

1.50

487.50

Sub-total Fees: $

2.300.00

Rate Summary
C. Matthew Andersen
C. Matthew Andersen
Beverly L. Anderson
Total hours:

1.00 hours at $
5.00 hours at$
3.00 hours at$
9.00

0.00/hr
325.00/hr
225.00/hr

$
$
$

0.00
1,625.00
675.00
2,300.00

Winston & Cashatt

P.S.

March 6, 2014

Taxl.D.No .. 91-1041332

Page: 2
ReferTo:

3103-118687

Invoice No:

56168

Payments Received Since Previous invoice:

Date
2/21/2014

Description

Amount

of Sandpoint

1,194.55
Sub-totai Payments:

$

1,194.55

Current Invoice Amount Due (Fees+ Expenses):

$

Previous lnvoice(s) Balance Due:

$

Applicable Interest:

$

Total Balance Due (Current & Previous Invoices):

$

Balance History
. 31~1)
$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

2,300.00

======

0.00
0.00

------

2,300.00

Tax
No.
':041332
A PROFESSIONAL SERViCE CORPORATION

Riverside
Suite 1900
Spokane, VVA 99201
(509) 838-6131
E-MAIL ADDRESS: info@winsloncashattcom
WEB SITE: www.winstoncashattcom

Statement Date:

April 2, 2014

ReferTo:
Invoice No:

113103-118687
56472

City of Sandpoint
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, ID 83864

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
Invoice for fees due for legal services performed and for costs advanced are for period of first date through last date shown below.

Sandpoint Independent Highway District
Professional Fees
Date

Initials Description

3/3/2014

CLK

3/5/2014

CMA

Hours

Amount

Prepare proposed order re motion to vacate. Email to counsel.

0.50

60.00

Prepare response to Auditor's Letter.

1.50

487.50

Sub-total Fees: $

547.50

Rate Summary

C. Matthew Andersen
Cheryl L. Krengel
Total hours:

1.50 hours at$
0.50 hours at$

325.00/hr
120.00/hr

$
$

487.50
60.00
547.50

2.00

Expenses
Date
3/14/2014

Amount
69.21

Description
Westlaw.
Sub-total Expenses:

$

Payments Received Since Previous Invoice:
Date

Description

3/21/2014

City of Sandpoint

Amount
2,300.00
Sub-total Payments:

$

2,300.00

69.21
------

Winston & Cashatt lawyers, P.S.

2, 2014
Page: 2

Tax ID. No.: 91-1041332

ReferTo:
Invoice No:

Current Invoice Amount Due {Fees+ Expenses):

$

616.71

Previous lnvoice(s) Balance Due

$

0.00

Applicable Interest:

$

0.00

Total Balance Due (Current & Previous Invoices):

$

616.71

Balance History
$0.00

3103-118687
56472

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

Taxl.D. No.
A PROFESSIONAL SERViCE COAPORAT!CN

601

Riverside
Suite 900
Spokane, WA 99201
(509) 838-6131

E-MAIL ADDRESS: info@winstoncashatl.com
WEB SITE: www.winstoncashatt.com

Statement Date:

June 6, 2014

ReferTo:
Invoice No:

113103-118687
57395

City of Sandpoint
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, ID 83864

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
Invoice for fees due for legal services performed and for costs advanced are for period of first date through last date shown below.

Sandpoint Independent Highway District
Professional Fees
Date

Initials Description

517/2014

CMA

5/13/2014

Hours

Amount

Review of motion for interlocutory appeal. Message to S.
Campbell.

1.00

325.00

CMA

Review and begin work on form of response brief to motion for
interlocutory appeal. Direct research.

1.50

487.50

5/13/2014

BLA

Review and analyze brief in support of IHD motion for interlocutory
appeal. Research re requisites for interlocutory appeal. Draft
response in opposition to motion for interlocutory appeaL

2.80

630.00

5/14/2014

CLK

Work on response to motion re interlocutory appeal (no charge).

5/14/2014

BLA

Research re denial of interlocutory review based on trial court
denial of motion, despite trial court certification. Final brief in
opposition to motion for interlocutory review.

5/14/2014

CMA

Finalize brief to be submitted.

1.50

487.50

5/19/2014

BLA

Review cases cited in Response Memo for oral argument
preparation.

0.40

90.00

5/19/2014

CMA

Review of IHD reply. Formulate response positions at hearing.
Message to S. Campbell.

0.80

260.00

5/21/2014

CMA

Prepare for, travel and attend hearing on Motion for Permissive
Appeal.

2.50

812.50

5/23/2014

BLA

Phone conference with M. Andersen and S. Campbell re hearing
results and plan for summary judgment (no charge).

0.30

67.50

5/23/2014

CMA

Phone conference with S. Campbell. Arrange for hearing date.
Direct work on motion for summary judgment. (no charge).

1.00

325.00

Sub-total Fees: $

3,732.50

0.00
247.50

Tax LO. No.
01 1f'\A1'?:~".)
PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION

601

Riverside
Suite 900
Spokane, WA 99201
(509)838-6131

E-MAIL ADDRESS: info@winstoncashatt.com
WEB SITE: www.winstoncashatt.com

Statement Date:

July 15, 2014

ReferTo:
Invoice No:

113103-118687
58031

City of Sandpoint
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, ID 83864

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
Invoice for fees due for legal services performed and for costs advanced are for period of first date through last date shown below.

Sandpoint Independent Highway District
Professional Fees
Hours

Amount

Review previous pleadings. Draft and edit motion/memorandum in
support of summary judgment.

1.40

315.00

CMA

Edit memo and motion.

1.00

325.00

6/2/2014

CLK

Work on summary judgment memo. Draft motion.

0.60

72.00

6/3/2014

CMA

Finalize form of motion and review/insert applicable rules re
motion. Confer re filing of earlier affidavits with the clerk.

1.45

471.25

6/24/2014

CMA

Work on issues related to request for discretionary appeaL

1.00

325.00

6/24/2014

BLA

Review and analyze District's motion and brief for discretionary
appeal.

0.90

202.50

6/25/2014

BLA

Research re case law cited in motion for interlocutory appeal.
Draft response in opposition to motion for discretionary appeal.

3.30

742.50

6/25/2014

CMA

Work on objection to motion for discretionary appeal.

2.00

650.00

6/26/2014

CMA

Work on objection to discretionary appeal (no charge).

L50

0.00

6/26/2014

BLA

Work on brief in opposition to motion for discretionary appeal.

1.40

315.00

6/30/2014

BLA

Work on brief in opposition to motion for discretionary appeal.

4.40

990.00

Sub-total Fees: $

4.408.25

Date

Initials Description

5/30/2014

BLA

6/2/2014

Rate Summary
C. Matthew Andersen
C. Matthew Andersen
Beverly L. Anderson
L Krengel

1.50
5.45
11.40
0.60

hours
hours
hours
hours

at$
at$
at$
at$

0.00/hr
325.00/hr
225.00/hr
120.00/hr

$

0.00
1,771.25
2,565.00

$

72.00

$
$

Winston & Cashatt Lawyers, P.S.
Tax

No .. 91-1041332

ReferTo
Invoice
Total hours:

18.95

18687
58031

4,408.25

Expenses

Date
6/16/2014

Description
Westlaw.

Amount
66.24
Sub-total Expenses:

$

66.24

Payments Received Since Previous Invoice:

Date

Description

717/2014

City of Sandpoint

Amount
3,771.70
Sub-total Payments:

$

3,771.70

Current Invoice Amount Due (Fees+ Expenses):

$

Previous lnvoice(s) Balance Due:

$

Applicable Interest:

$

Total Balance Due (Current & Previous Invoices):

$

Balance History
$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

4,474.49

======

0.00
0.00

----4,474.49

Taxl.D. No.
I,

L.

..

~

..... 7

..-w
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PROFESS!ONAL SERVICE CORPORATION

Riverside Avenue, Suite 900
Spokane, \NA 99201
(509) 838-6131
E-MAIL ADDRESS: info@winstoncashatt.com
WEB SITE: www.winstoncashatt.com

Statement Date:

August 11, 2014

ReferTo:
Invoice No:

113103-118687
58512

City of Sandpoint
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, ID 83864

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
Invoice for fees due for legal services performed and for costs advanced are for period of first date through last date shown below.

Sandpoint Independent Highway District
Professional Fees
Hours

Amount

BLA

Final brief in opposition to motion for interlocutory appeal.

3.00

675.00

7/1/2014

BRB

Prepare letter to Idaho Supreme Court/Court of Appeals (no
charge).

0.10

0.00

7/2/2014

BLA

Final brief in opposition to motion for permissive appeal. Email
correspondence with S. Campbell and M. Andersen.

1.10

247.50

7/9/2014

BLA

Review and analyze IHD's response in opposition to motion for
summary judgment for reply.

0.90

202.50

7/10/2014

CMA

\Nork on reply brief re summary judgement. Task map with B.
Anderson.

1.00

325.00

7/10/2014

BLA

Initial draft reply brief in support of motion for summary judgment.

4.20

945.00

7/11/2014

BLA

\Nork on reply brief in support of summary judgment.

4.00

900.00

7/11/2014

CMA

\Nork on reply brief. Phone conference with S. Campbeli.

1.50

487.50

7/14/2014

BLA

Research re right of City to vacate streets, consideration for
contract, statutory interpretation on issues of law, attorneys fees
recovery for frivolous suit. \Nork on reply brief in support of motion
for summary judgment.

4.80

1,080.00

7/14/2014

CMA

\Nork on reply re summary judgment.

2.00

650.00

7/15/2014

BLA

Conference with M. Andersen. Conference with S. Campbell.
\Nork on and final reply brief in support of summary judgment.

1.10

247.50

7/21/2014

CMA

Prepare for hearing on summary judgment. Prepare form of order.
Message to S. Campbell.

4.00

1,300.00

7/22/2014

CMA

Prepare, travel, attend hearing re summary judgment and meet
with counsel.

4.00

1,300.00

7/29/2014

CMA

Review of order from Supreme Court and determine if fees and
cost can be awarded at this juncture.

0.50

162.50

Date
7/1/2014

Initials Description

P.S.

Winston & Cashatt

1, 2014
Page: 2

Tax LO. No .. 91-1041332

ReferTo:
Invoice

8687
58512

Sub-total Fees: $

8,522.50

Rate Summary
C. Matthew Andersen
Beverly L Anderson
Beverly R Briggs
Total hours:

13.00 hours at$
19.10 hours at$
0.10 hours at$

325.00/hr
225.00/hr
0.00/hr

$
$
$

4,225.00
4,297.50
0.00
8,522.50

32.20

Expenses
Description

Date

Amount

7/16/2014

To FEDEX for postal charges on July 2, 2014.

21.39

7/22/2014

To C. Matthew Andersen for travel to Coeur d'Alene for hearing on
Summary Judgment motion July 22, 2014.

39.20

Sub-total Expenses:

$

60.59

Payments Received Since Previous Invoice:
Date

Description

8/8/2014

City of Sandpoint

Amount
4,474.49
Sub-total Payments:

$

4,474.49

Current Invoice Amount Due (Fees+ Expenses):

$

Previous lnvoice(s) Balance Due:

$

0.00

Applicable Interest:

$

0.00

Total Balance Due (Current & Previous Invoices}: $

8,583.09

Balance History
$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

8,583.09

======

Tax I.D. No.
91-1041332

LAWYERS

601

Riverside

(l:;nQ)

Suite
WA 99201

R~R-R1~1

E-MAIL ADDRESS: info@winstoncashatt.com
WEB SITE: www.winstoncashatt.com

of Sandpoint

1

Lake Street

Statement Date:

August 12, 2014

Refer To:

113103-118687

Sandpoint, ID 83864

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
Invoice for fees due for legal services performed and for costs advanced are for period of first date through last date shown below.

Sandpoint Independent Highway District
Professional Fees
Date

Hours

Amount

8/1/2014

CMA

Research and provide guidance on fee application. Message to S.
Campbell.

Description

0.60

195.00

8/5/2014

CMA

Initiate review re fee petition.

050

162.50

8/11/2014

CLK

Work on memo in support of fees and costs, memorandum of
costs and affidavit of M. Andersen. Draft proposed order.

2.20

264.00

8/11/2014

CMA

Work on Memo re Costs; Cost Memo and affidavit,; Judgment and
Permanent Injunction (Draft). Message to S. Campbell.

6.00

1,950.00

Sub-total Fees: $

2,571.50

Rate Summary
C. Matthew Andersen
Cheryl L. Krengel
Total hours:

7 .10 hours at $
2.20 hours at$
9.30

325. 00/hr
120.00/hr

$

$

2,307.50
264.00
2,571.50

[

N.

8PM

2

I

3
4

5

6
7
8

9

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal
corporation of the State of Idaho,

10
11

12

Case No. CV-13-01342
Plaintiff,

vs.

ORDER GRANTING REQUEST FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES Ml]) COSTS

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State of Idaho,

13
Defendant.

14
15

16

THIS MATTER came before the Court on City of Sandpoint's request for attorney's fees and

17

costs permitted by LC. § 12-117 as well as discretionary costs incurred in commencement of the action

18

as allowed by lR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). The court having considered the:

19

•

Court's Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiff City of Sandpoint' s Motion
for Summary Judgment;

21

•

City of Sandpoint' s Memorandum in Support of Attorney's Fees and Costs;

22

•

City of Sandpoint's Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit of C. Matthew Andersen in
Support of Attorney's Fees and Costs;

•

and the pleadings filed in this matter

20

23

24
25

The Court having found good cause to grant Plaintiffs request for attorney's fees and costs:

26
ORDER GRANTING REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS PAGE l

W~~Wa,./MU

A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORAllOM
~50 Nc,rltt,,r8'!! Blvd., Suits 2il6

ldaholl38H
6li7-2100

1

ff IS N OW TttcREFORE ORDERED:

2

1.

3

$._ _

The

City

__,CIf--- -

4

cost award of$
5

No. 69t6

Mit,'he11, Haynes, cr,edlander, Pete

r1u g. 21. 20i 4 1: 38PM

of

Sandpoint

is

awarded

attorney's

and discretionai:y costs in the amount of$

fees

in

the

P. 6/ 7

amount

of

S'-,' 13 I 7'>-fora total of fee and
1

(J 'l',- ~f '{M

DONE IN OPEN COURT this i v,t-d•yof

6

AolJi//. 2014_

7
8
9

10

Presented by:

11

12
13

14

Attorneys for Plaintiff

15
16

17
18

19
20

21

22
23
24
25

26
ORDER GRANTING REQlJEST FOR AITORNEY' S
PEES AND COSTS - PAGE 2

lt?~~w~

._,•_; 3 ';..

A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION

2M Nonflw831. Blvd.. Suha 206
Coeur d' Alane, Idaho 63814
p~; {208) 667-2103

4
5
6

7

8

9

10
11

C. Manhew Andersen
Winston & Cashatt
601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1900
Spokane. WA 9920 l
509-838-1416 (fax)

Scot R. Campbell
Sandpoint City Attorney
I 123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, ID 83864
(208) 255- 1368 (fax)

David E. Wynkoop
Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP

12 P.O. Box 31
Boise, ID 83680

13

14
15
16

17

(208) 887-4865 (fax)
Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
(208) 664-1684 (fax)

18

19
20
21

22
23

24

25

ORDER GRANTING REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS - PAGE 3

lv't?lJll#tb r:c/ZJM~

A PROFESS!ONAL SERVICE CORPORATION

250 Nolfmtest Blvd., Sulla 206
Coow d' Afene. ldllho B3814

Ph~:

P, ug. 21. 201 4 1: 37 PM

r
U
Nr•• ' 6"'
7 L. t)

Mitcrell, Hay nes , cri ed l and er , Pet e

P. i/7

1
..., -~ ~ ! •

2
3
4
5

SCOT R. CAMPBELL, ISB No. 4121
'
SA. NDPOINT CITY
,ATTORl\YEY
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Telephone: (208) 263-0534
Facsimile: (208) 255-1368

,, ..,.
_:¥J.

f"\

l

4 \

•· C • "

scampbell@ci.sandpoint. id.us
6

7
8
9
10

C. MATI'HEW ANDERSEN, ISB No. 3581
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS,
a Professional Service Corporation
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-2103

11

Facsimile: (208) 765-2121
cma@winstoncashau.com

12

Anorneys for City of Sandpoint

13

14

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FlRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

15
16

CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal
corporation of the State of Idaho,

Case No. CV-13-01342

17
Plaintiff,

18
19
20

vs.

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State of Idaho,

21
22

23

DECLARATORY AND MONETARY
JUDGMENT
[PROPOSED]

Defendant.
JUDGMENT CREDITOR:

City of Sandpoint

JUDGMENT DEBTOR:

Independent Highway District

ATTORNEYS FOR JUDGMENT

C. Matthew Andersen
WINSTON & CASHATT LAWYERS

24

25

CREDITOR:

26

601 W. Riverside Ave ., Suite 1900
Spokane, WA 99201

DECLARATORY AND MONETARY JUDGMENT
PAGE l

tt7in<lltm~ CfjaJM//
A ?RCrESS!ONAL SEFIVIOE CORPORATION
250 Norihv,eat Blvd.• SJ~e ~06
Coeur d' Alel'18, fdnho 8381-4

p~; (200) 007-2103

Mi

2
c~~*-

0

t.J\.,,VL ..1:\..,.

3

f"'n.-v,,,J,=11

'\.....,,C1...u.1puv.u.

SANDPOINT CITY ATTORNEY
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864

4
5

6

ATTORNEYS FOR JUDGMENT
DEBTOR:

7

8

David R Wynkoop
Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP
730 N. Main Street
P.O. Box 31
Meridian, ID 83680

9

Susan P. Weeks

10

James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

11

12

JUDGMENT AMOUNT

13
14
15

ATTORNEY'S FEES Af.tl])
COSTS:
POST JUDGMENT INTEREST:

To accrue at the legal rate allowed by Idaho law

DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT

16
17

The Court entered its Order Granting Declaratory Relief and its Memorandum Decision and

18

Order Granting Plaintiff City of Sandpoint's Motion for Summary Judgment both on July 31, 2014. For

19

20

the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Decision, the Court hereby declares pursuant to I.C. §10-1201
et. seq., the following rights, status and legal relations between the City of Sandpoint and the

21
22

Independent Highway District:

23
24

L

The Memorandum of Understanding of September 14, 2005 between the City of

Sandpoint and the Independent Highway District is legal. valid and enforceable.

25
26

DECLARATORY AND MONETARY JUDGMENT
PAGB2

~?1~11,~~~
A !"RdFESS!ONAL SERVICE COFl?OAA'rlON
200 No1~11Wt Slv<:i.. Sona 206
C::!em d' Alam,, ldllho 03814

I

y

es,

r,

1

a

e(

IS

3

4

is ordered to

3.

ID

respects with its

obligations set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding and the Joint Powers Agreement and

5

Permanent Injunction shall issue with regard to that obligation.
6

4.

7
8
9

10

The Independent Highway District is directed to include in its payment of ad valorem

taxes to the City of Sandpoint all taxes collected pursuant to I.C. §40-800 eL seq., including without
limitation any collection for delinquent taxes, interest and costs, that are collected as a result of
Independent Highway District levies on the taxpayers of the City of Sandpoint.

11

MONETARY JUDGMENT

12
The Court having entered its Order awarding Plaintiffs Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs

13

A:;i iyi\J,\ J.-t, t'::l , 2014, and based the Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit of Counsel

14

on

15

thereon. the Court enters judgment in favor of Plaintiff, City of Sandpoint, and against Defendant)

16

Independent Highway District.

17
18
19

20

21
22

23

JUDGMENT is entered this date against Plaintiff in favor of Defendant in the amount of

t

$___::,,:.-- for costs and $

t,{/-;

Q'('-- ""i/
(b . I 3 l. 7:(" for attombyi

fees for a total judgment of

~<-t;;....,.3~L-1.S:.
.....

$_ _

Post judgment interest to bear at the legal rate allowed by Idaho law from the date of this

Judgment until paid in full_

DONE JN OPEN COURT thi~day of

A:~\,-::

, 2014.

24

25
26 I
DECLARATORY AND MONETARY JUDGMENT
PAGE3

~~/}~~
A PflOFESS!ONAL SERI/fee CORPORATION

250 Nontt11set Blvd,. &;ile 201.'l
Cosu, d' Aieos, Idaho 83lH4

(208) &67-2103

"L

7
8
9

10
11

12

Mi :h~

1,Hay E:,

r,

6

I hereby certify that I caused a tme and
complete copy of the foregoing to be
mailed,
postage prepaid; D hand delivered; 0 sent
via facsimile on August
2014, to:

D

C. Matthew Andersen

Winston & Cashatt
601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1900
Spokane, WA 9920 l
509-838-1416 (fax)

13

14
15

16
17
18

19

Scot R. Campbell
Sandpoint City Attomey
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, ID 83864
(208) 255-1368 (fax)
David E. Wynkoop
Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP
P.O. Box 31
Boise, ID 83680
(208) 887-4865 (fax)

20

21
22
23

Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
(208) 664-1684 (fax)

24

25

CLERK OF THE COURI,

26
DECLARATORY AND MONETARY JUDGMENT
PAGE4

ft'~.6W~
A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE COR?ORATION
250 Notthwee ! Blvd~ S.J~e 206

Coeur d'Alene_ ldoho 83814

r''v~

g,

ay1:, Frie

a

3

4
5
6

7

8
9

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIIE STATE

OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIB C01J1\1TY OF BONNER

CI1Y OF SA. J.~1DP0INT, a municipal
corporation of the State ofidaho,

;
I

10

11

12

Plaintiff,

Case No_ CV-13-01342

II AMENDED ORDER GRANTING REQUEST

I FOR ATIORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

vs.
INDEPENDENT IIlGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State ofldaho,

13

Defendant.
14

I
I

15
16

THIS MATTER came before the Court on City of Sandpoint's request for attorney's fees and

17

costs pennitted by I.C. §12-117 as well as discretionary costs incurred in commencement of the action

18

as allowed by I.RC.P. 54(d)(l)(D). The court having considered the:

19

•

Court's Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiff City of Sandpoint's Motion
for Summary Judgment;

20

21

•

City of Sandpoint's Memorandum in Support of Attorney's Fees and Costs;

22

•

City of Sandpoint's Memorandum of Costs and A:ffida:vit of C. Matthew Andersen in
Support of Attorney's Fees and Costs;

•

and the pleadings filed in this matter

23

24
25 ·

The Court having found good cause to grant Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees and costs:

26

AMENDED ORDER GRJ\1\;'TlN{t REQUEST FOR
ATTOR..'NBY' SFEES .Al'H) COSTS - PAGE l
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1.

The City of Sandpoint is awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $56,131.75 and

discretionary costs in the amount of $0 for a total of fee and cost award of $56,131.75.
DONE IN OPEN COURTthis . ~1,~y of

5

Av ,\ "?t:, 2014.

6

7

8
9

10

Presented by:

11

12

13
14

15

C. MAITHEW ANDERSEN, ISB No. 3581
WINSTON & CASHATT
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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C. Matthew Andersen
Winston & Cashatt
601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1900
Spokane, WA99201

509-838-1416 (fax)

Scot R. Campbell
Sandpoint City Attorney
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, ID 83864
(208) 255-1368 (fax)

12

David E. Wynkoop
Sherer & Wynkoop. LLP
P .O. Box31

13

Boise, ID 83680
(208) 887~4865 (fax)

11

1

I

14

Susan P. Weeks

15

James, Vernon & Weeks
1626 Lincoln Way

16

Coeur d'Alene. ID 83814
(208) 664-1684 (fax)

17
18

19
20

21
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23
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1

2 -SCOTR CAMPBELL, ISBNo. 412 1
S.A-NDPOINT CITY ATIOF~'EY
3
1123 Lllke Street
4 Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Telephone: (208) 263-0534
5 Facsi.tnile: (208) 255-1368
scampbell@ci.sandpoint.id.us

6
7
8
9

10
11

12

C. MATIHEW ANDERSEN. ISB No. 3581
WINSTON & CASHATI, LAWYERS,
a Professional Service Corporation
250 Northwest Boulevard. Suite 206
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83814
Telephone: (208) 667~2103
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121
cmata1winstoncashatt.com

Attomeys for City of Sandpoint

13

14

IN TifE DISTRICT COURT OF TifE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTIUCT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

15

16

CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal
corporation of the State of Idaho,

Case No. CV-13-01342

17
Plaintiff.
18

19
20

AMEhlDED DECLARATORY AND
MONETARY JUDGMENT

vs.

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT. a
political subdivision of the State of Idaho.
Defendant.

21
22

23

[PROPOSED]

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
JUOOMENT CREDITOR:

City of Sandpoint

JUOOME:NT DEBTOR:

Independent Highway District

24

25
26

AMENDED DECLARATORY AND

MON"ETARY JUDGMEN1
PAGE1
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ATT0Ri~~YSFOR1UDGMENT

CREDITOR:

1

p
, .

2,/"v

C. Matthew Andersen
WINSTON & CASHATT LAWYERS

601 W. Riverside Ave .• Suite 1900

Spok~ne, VvA 99201

3

4

and

5

Scot R Campbell
SANDPOINT CITY ATTORNEY
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoiut, Idaho 83 864

6

7
8

7(.,J "6
.J 0:07

ATTORNEYS FOR JUDGMENT
DEBTOR:

9

10

David R Wynkoop
Sherer & Wynkoop; LLP
730 N. Main Street

P.O. Box31
Meridian, ID 83680

11

Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

12
13

14

15

JU001vfE:NT AlvIOUNT
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND

16

COSTS:

$56,131.75

17

POST JUDGMENT INTEREST:

To accrue at the legal rate allowed by Idaho law

18

19
20

DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT
The Court entered its Order Granting Declaratory Relief and its Memorandum Decision and
Order Granting Plaintiff City of Sandpoint's Motion for Summary Judgment both on July 31, 2014. For

21
the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Decision, the Court grants the City of Sandpoint its requested
22

23

relief and hereby declares pursuant to I.C. §10-1201 et seq., the following rights, status and legal

-24

relations between the City of Sandpoint and the Independent Highway District:

25

26
AMENDED DECLARATORY AND
MON"ETARY JUDG:Mffi',;"T
PAGE2
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between
IS

The Joint Powers Agreement between the

of Sandpoint and

District is legal, valid and enforceable.
5

3.

I

Independent f

The Independent Highway District is ordered to comply m all respects with its

I

6
7

8
9

obligations set forth in

Poivers Agreement and

Memorandum of Understanding and the

Permanent Injunction shall issue with regard to that obligation..

4.

The Independent Highway District is directed to include in its payment of ad valorem

10

taxes to the City of Sandpoint all taxes collected pursuant to I.C. §40-800 et. seq .• including without

11

limitation any collection for delinquent taxes, interest and costs, that are collected as a result of

12

Independent Highway District levies on the taxpayers of the City of Sandpo.int.

13

MONETARY JUDGMENT

14
15

The Court having entered its Amended Order av,,arding Plaintiff's Request for Attorney's Fees
, 2014, based the I.RC.P. 54(eX5) Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit of

16

and Costs on August Uf

17

Counsel thereon, the Court enters judgment in favor of Plaintiff, City of Sandpoint, and again.st

18

Defendant, Independent Highway District.

I

19

MONETARY JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
20

21
22

L

Plaintiff shall recover froru. Defendant in the amount of $0 for costs and $56,131.75 for

attorney's fees for a total monetary judgment of $56,

23

24

25

26
.AMENDED DECLARATORY AND
MONETARY JUDCfMENT
PAGE:3
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Presented by:
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WINSTON & CASHATT, LAW\'"ERS

11
12

13

14

C. MATIHEW Ai~DERSEN, ISB No. 3581
Attorneys for Plaintiff

15
16

17
18
19
20

21

22

23
24

25
26
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MONETARY JODOJv.lENT
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Scot R. Campbell
Sandpoint City Attorney
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, ID 83864
(208) 255-1368 (fax)
David E. Wynkoop
Sherer & Wynkoop, ILP
P.O. Box31
Boise, ID 83680
(208) 887-4865 (fax)

Susan P. Weeks

15

fames, Vernon & Weeks
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
(208) 664-1684 (fax)

17

e r.

C. Matthew Andersen.
Winston & Cashatt
601 W. Riverside A venue. Suite 1900
Spokane, WA 99201
509-838~1416 (fax)

14

16

a

18
19

20
21

22

23
24

25

26
.A:MENDED DECLARATORY A~

MONETARY JUDG1:v1BNT
PAC-E 5

?P'~A~

A PROFESStOW>.l SBWfCI= C()Rl"OMTlON
250 Nol~ Blllll, Suit9 200
Ooemd' Alana, ld11tro~14-
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208-887-4800
208-887-4865
I.S.B. 2429
SUSANP. WEEKS
JAMES, VER~ON & WEEKS, PA
1626 LINCOLN WAY
COEUR D-ALENE, IDAHO 83814
208-667-0683
FAX 208-664-1684
LS.B. 4255
Attorneys for Defendant
Independent Highway District
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND OF

COlJNTY OF BONNER

CITY
SANDPOINT, a municipal
corporation the State
Case

CV

3-01342

Plaintiff,
vs.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT,
a political subdivision of the State of Idaho,
Defendant.

COMES

Defendant, Independent Highway District, by and through its attorneys

record, David E. \Vynkoop of Sherer & \Vynkoop, LLP and Susan

Weeks of James, Vernon &

Weeks, P.A. and moves this Court, pursuant to LR.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B) for reconsideration of this
Court's August 2L 2014 Order Granting Request

Costs and this Court's

Amended Order

s

to such fees and costs.
2.

Defendant Independent Highway District

an objection which should be

considered by the Court.
This motion is supported by a memorandum and affidavit filed herewith. Oral argument
is requested.
DATED this 27th day of August,
JAMES, VER.~ON & WEEKS, PA

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day of August, 2014, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION upon the following, by the method
indicated below:
Scot R. Campbell
Sandpoint City Attorney
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, Idaho 83 864

XX via facsimile to 208-255-1368

C. Matthew A.ndersen

X,X via facsimile to 208-765-2121

WINSTON & CASHATT, LA WYERS
250 Northwest Boulevard,
206
Coeur
Idaho 83814

2

3

208-887-4865
LS.B. 2429

SUSANP. WEEKS
JAMES, VER1'l0N & \VEEKS, PA
1626 LINCOLN WAY
COEUR D-ALENE, IDAHO 83814
208-667-0683
FAX 208-664-1684
I.S.B. 4255
Attorneys for Defendant
Independent Highvvay

IN

DISTRICT COURT OF

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
COlJNTY OF B01'.1NER

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND
OF SANDPOINT, a municipal
corporation
State
Idaho,
Case

13-01342

Plaintiff,
vs.
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT,
a political subdivision the State Idaho,

OBJECTION TO MEMOR/\NDUM OF
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES AND
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND
A TTOR.}..JEY FEES

Defendant.

Independent
hereby object to the Memorandum

pursuant to

and

54e(6) and

Attorney's Fees and Costs requested by City

Sandpoint.

objection is supported by the supporting memorandum filed herein. Oral argument is
requested.

AND MOTION TO

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day of August, 2014, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF MARJ TILLEY upon the following,
the method
indicated below:
Scot R Campbell
Sandpoint City Attorney
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864

XX via facsimile to 208-255-1368

C. Matthew Andersen

XX via facsimile to 208-765-2121

WINSTON & CASHATT, LA WYERS
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur
Idaho 83 814
John T. Mitchell
Chamber Copy

XX via facsimile to 208-446-1132

OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTOR.i"JEY
2

SUSAN P. WEEKS
JAMES, VER.NON & \VEEKS, PA
1626 LINCOLN \VAY
COEUR D-ALENE, IDAHO 83814
208-66 7-0683
FAX 208-664-1684
LS.R 4255

Attorneys for Defendant
Independent Highway District
IN

DISTRICT

OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND OF

COUNTY

B01'rNER

OF SANDPOINT, a municipal
corporation of the State of Idaho,
Case No. CV-2013-01342
Plaintiff,
vs.
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT,
a political subdivision the State of Idaho,

AFFIDAVIT OF SUSAN P. WEEKS IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
ATTO~~EY FEES

Defendant.

)

: ss
County of Kootenai

1. I, Susan

)

Weeks, after first being duly sworn, depose and say:

AFFIDAVIT OF SUSAN P. WEEKS IN SUPPORT OF

TO

as
3. I

been practicing

on

September 20, 1990. I am

i ~. . .

the

u,,,~,

rate

attorneys

the First Judicial District.
4. Attorneys

First Judicial District

more

experience bill

15

between $225 an hour to $285 an hour. It has been my experience that the $285 rate
is reserved for complex

litigation.

5. I recently concluded a matter before the

of Appeals wherein the attorney

representing the opposing party, Eric Stidham
charged $285 an

Boise branch

for complex litigation

Holland & Hart,
to federal

issues

environmental laws (CERCLA and RCRA.) and bankruptcy issues.
6. I recently concluded a trial on a foreclosure

involving non-complex business

litigation, and the opposing counsel, John Miller, charged $200 per hour.
7. My billing rate

complex

non-complex

litigation is $225 an hour. My billing rate for

litigation is $250 an hour. Certain clients are charged less based upon

the duration

their relationship

and the fact that

client brings

repeat business to the
8. I have contacted four local firms to inquire
Hazel is charging $285 an hour at

highest rate. Doug Marfice is billing $250 an
lS

P.

litigation rates. Joel

their

IN SUPPORT OF

at

FEE

Susan P. Weeks

Notary for the State of Idaho
Commission Expires: ____;::;:L,L.-~L,L.-~~Z:::...S-c.__

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day of August, 2014, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF SUSAN P. \VEEKS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION upon the following, by the method indicated below:
Scot R. Campbell
Sandpoint City Attorney
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864

XX via facsimile to 208-255-1368

C. Matthew Andersen

XX via facsimile to 208-765-2121

WINSTON & CASHATT, LA WYERS
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Hon. John T. MitcheH
Chamber Copy

XX via facsimile to 208-446-113 2

AFFIDAVIT OF SUSAN P. WEEKS fN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION TO ATTORi""JEY FEE
REQUEST: 3

208-887-4800
FAX 208-887-4865
LS.B. 2429
SUSAN P. WEEKS
JAMES, VERi~ON & WEEKS, PA
1626 LINCOLN WAY
COEUR D-ALENK IDAHO 83814
208-667-0683
FAX 208-664-1684
LS.B. 4255

Attorneys for Defendant
Independent Highway District
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND

THE COlJNTY OF B01'.'NER

CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal
corporation of the State
Case No. CV-2013-01342
Plaintiff,
vs.
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT,
a political subdivision of the State ofldaho,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM OF
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES AND
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND
A TTORL~EY FEES

Defendant.

Plaintiff filed a Memorandum

of

Costs and

Support

Attorney's Fees and Costs on August 13, 2014. Seven days later, on August 21, 2014, prior to
the expiration of time for Defendant to object to such costs and attorney fees, the Court entered
Order Granting Requests for
131.75in

costs.

Fees and
22,

awarding no attorney

1

an

and

3

STANDARD
district court's decision to award attorney fees is a

decision, subject to the

abuse of discretion standard ofreview. Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho 744, 753, 86 P.3d 458, 467
(2004). In determining whether a party prevailed entirely or partially, a court must consider three
things: "(a) the final judgment or result obtained in the action in relation to the relief sought

the

respective parties; (b) whether there were multiple claims or issues between the parties; and

the

extent to which each of the parties prevailed on each of the issues or claims." Chadderdon v. King,
104 Idaho 406, 411, 659 P .2d 160, 165 (1983); Jerry J Joseph CL U Ins.

v.

Vaught,

117 Idaho 555,557,789P.2d1146, I 148 (Ct.App. 1990).

ARGUMENT
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e)( 1) provides that a trial court

mvard reasonable

attorney fees to a prevailing party in a civil action where a statute or contract provide for such
relief. Whether a party has prevailed is determined by the trial court in the exercise of its
discretion by considering "the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief
sought by the respective parties." The Court previously determined that Plaintiff prevailed in
this action.
The Rule also specifies the factors the trial court must consider

determining the

reasonableness of an award of attorney fees:
Amount of Attorney Fees. In the event the court grants attorney fees to a
party or parties in a civil action it shall consider the following factors in
determining the amount of such fees:
The time and labor required.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
AND

OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM
TO
COSTS

or
The time limitations imposed
circumstances of the case.
(G) The amount involved and the results
(H) The undesirability of the case.
The nature and length of the professional relationship
with the client.
(J) A wards in similar cases.
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research
(Computer Assisted Legal Research), if the court finds it
was reasonably necessary preparing a party's case.
Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in
the particular case.
vVJ.UUii",'-,H

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3).
In determining whether a party prevailed entirely or partially, a court must consider three
the final judgment or result obtained
respective parties;

the action

relation to

relief sought by the

whether there were multiple claims or issues between the parties; and

the

extent to which each of the parties prevailed on each of the issues or claims." Chadderdon v. King,
104 Idaho 406,411,659 P.2d 160, 165 (1983);

T

J.

CL.

Assoc .. Inc. v. Vaught,

117 Idaho 555,557,789 P.2d 1146, I 148 (Ct.App. 1990).

1.

Entitlement to Attornev Fees

City of Sandpoint requested attorney fees under
judgment,

Court inquired into why

§ 12-120. At

hearing on the

of Sandpoint was not

requesting attorney fees under LC.§ 12-117. In its Memorandum of Costs, the City requested
attorney fees under

§ 12-117. In relevant part, Idaho Code § 12-117 provides:

(4) In any civil judicial proceeding
as adverse parties a
governmental entity and another governmental entity, the court shall award
prevailing party
attorney's
other reasonable

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
FEES
DISALLOW
FEES: 3

means

state

was
of Matthew Andersen,

to represent its interest. According to
retained September
City's counsel

2013 to represent the

Sandpoint.

billing

time entries describing the services

support of its request contains

provided by the City's attorneys and paralegals

firm was

201

September

and August 11,

14.
On September 30, 2013, C. Matthew- Andersen filed a notice of appearance and notice
association. On October 22, 2013, City's counsel filed a non-objection to the District's request
for additional time to file a brief in support of a motion to dismiss. On November 7, 201
counsel filed a response to District's motion to dismiss. On November
affidavits related to

City's

2013, City filed two

struck. On November 13, 2013,

Motion to Dismiss, which this

City filed a supplemental citation to authority, and a response to District's motion to strike. The
Court conducted a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss on November 13,

13. On December 18,

2013, the City and District stipulated to entry of a reciprocal preliminary injunction. On March
3, 2014, the City and District filed a stipulated motion to vacate the trial. On May 14, 2014, the

City filed a response to the District's motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal. The City
attended a hearing on the interlocutory appeal on May 21, 2014. The City filed an opposition
with the Supreme Court to the request to grant an interlocutory appeal. On May 27, 2014, the
City moved for summary judgment, notice of hearing and memorandum
on

judgment.
response to the motion for summary judgment. On

15,

support of summary
pleadings filed in

a

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
FEES
COSTS AND
4

brief

4

an

costs

costs.
case,
case mainly

were

two parties, no exchange

legal, rather than factual, issues). no use

discovery (because

expert witnesses, no trial

preparation and no trial. This case ··--··---. presented pure questions of law and simply involved
an exchange of dispositive motions on these legal issues. This case did not transcend the
boundaries

an

attorney's abilities. Despite the limited litigation necessary to conclude

case. the
performed by

& Cashatt and discretionary costs

Criterion

$775.29.

to consider

Rule

work." The Idaho Supreme Court stated

Lettunich v.

prevailing charges for
141 Idaho 425,435, 111

P.3d 110, 120 (2005) that the trial court "should consider the fee rates generally prevailing in the
pertinent geographic area, rather than what any particular segment of the

community may

charging." The District respectfully asserts that the costs and fees claimed by Plaintiff are
excessive and should be reduced. First,
accordance with

hourly rates charged by Plaintiffs counsel are not

prevailing rate

. Mr. Andersen's claimed hourly rate

rate is $225. Cheryl KrengeI's hourly rate for
paralegal work is $120. Another person, Tyler

, identified as a law

was billed at a

rate of $95.00 per hour.
skills and

rate
and

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION
ATTORNEY FEES
MOTION

MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
AND ATTORNEY FEES: 5

as Mr.

IS

resources
trial. Because this case was determined on dispositive motions
without
skilled.

discovery, this argument lacks merit.

legal cases require the attorney be

this case was not complex and did not require extraordinary commitments by

Winston & Cashatt.
In Samuel v. Black Rock Development, Inc., et al., Kootenai County Case No. CV 20124492, in an opinion issued March 18, 2013, this Court found Robert A. Dunn's hourly rate of
$400.00 per hour to be unreasonable; a rate of $275.00 per hour for an attorney licensed five
years unreasonable; a fee
and a rate

$225.00 per hour for an attorney licensed seven years unreasonable,

$220.00 per

years unreasonable. The Court also

an

found paralegal fees of $95.00 per hour and $110.00 per hour unreasonable. This Court adjusted
the fees doivnward by 33%.

like Samuel, District submits the rates billed in this case were not

reasonable.
Further, the time committed to the matter was not reasonable. Mr. Andersen indicates in
his affidavit he has extensive experience in civil litigation, and Ms. Andersen has extensive
expenence

legal research and VvTiting

all kinds. Given this experience and background, and

that research and writing is a routine task for these attorneys, the time dedicated to these tasks is
not reasonable. The District moved to dismiss. The City prepared a response. The billing
records indicate that the City spent 36. 7 hours dedicated to research related to its response.
Another 57 1 hours was spent

response brief,

response brief, and
accounts

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES
AND
6

2

unreasonable.
preliminary injunction.
7.8
under Rule

to

to dismiss

Although not as excessive as

be

spent on the response brief, these hours

remain high for such limited legal tasks.
Counsel for the

billed 1 7 hours to oppose the motion for leave to file a permissive

appeal, which includes the time to attend
memorandum to the Idaho Supreme Court,
court.

was expended to prepare a
covered the same arguments raised to the

33.8

of

appeal. Again, this

is not reasonable given the task.

On the motion for summary judgment, which largely incorporated the previous briefing
of the parties, the City's counsel expended 32.95 hours. This time inciuded appearance at the
hearing. Once again, especially in light of the 118.9 hours expended on the motion to dismiss,
these hours are not reasonable.
the District should not be charged is 1.5 for preparation an

unrelated charge

"auditor's letter" on March 5, 2014. Presumably this was a letter to the auditor regarding
the

annual audit It was unrelated to the litigation.

Given the litigation, the fees sought are excessive. The City participated in three
and

MEMORANDUM IN

an

appeal. There was no

TO MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
7

a

costs
costs.
costs when

court power to
and which,

the interest

gives a
costs were necessary

justice, should be awarded. The City seeks

charges, claiming they were

does not

of the discretionary costs submitted by the City are

why the costs were exceptionaL

litigation. Nothing about them are exceptional. Therefore, the

normal costs associated

should decline to award these costs.
DATED

exceptional costs

day

2014.

a true

Scot R. Campbell
Sandpoint City Attorney
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, Idaho 83 864

xx

facsimile to 208-255-1368

C. Matthew Andersen

xx

facsimile to 208-765-2121

xx

facsimile to 208-446-1132

WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 814
Hon. John Mitchell
Chamber Copy

correct

2014

1:55

2085545741

JAMES VERN

DAVIDE. WYNKOOP
SHERER & WYNKOOP,
730 N. MAIN ST.
P.0.BOX31
MERIDIAN, IDAHO 83680
208-8874800
FAX 208-887-4865
I.S.B.2429

SUSAN P. WEEKS
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, PA
1626 LINCOLN WAY
COEUR D-ALENE, IDAHO 83814
208-.667--0683
FAX 208-664-1684
LS.B.4255

Attorneys fur Defendant
Independent Highway District
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIB FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STAIB OF IDAHO, IN AN""D OF THE COUNIY OF BONNER

CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal corporation

)

of the State ofidaho,

)

CASE NO. CV 2013-01342

)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF

vs.

}

BRENT FEATHERSTON

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision ofthe State of Idaho,

}
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

Defendmt.

)

STATE OF IDAHO )

CountyofBonner

) ss.
)

BRENT FEA!HERSTON, being first duly sworn deposes and states:
1.

J make the following statements of my own personal knovrledge.

AFFIDAVIT OF BRENT FEATHERSTON: 1

PAGE

01/03

08/

. 55

20865457!!1

JAMES

PAGE

Iaman
September
3.

I prootke

the First Judicial District and I am fmr.iliar with the local morney

~te for attorneys in both Kootenai County and Bonner County fur municipal litigation, civil

litiga:d.014 com.merci.al litiga:ti~ contract claims and oonsti.tutional issues.

4.

My cun-ent billing rate is $2:50 per hour, although I bill some clients less.

5.

A rate of $325.00 per hour for an attorney in the First Judicial District 'With a

similar background and expe.!:iznce as mine is above the market ntte.
DATED this _2'/ day of August, 2014.

SUBSCRJBED AND SWORN TO before me this

AFF.IDAV1T OF BRB.NT FEATHERSTON: 2

c:28:

day of August, 2014.

02/03

4

: 56

JAMES VERN

20866467"

c:28

I HEREBY CERH¥Y that on this
- f ~ of August, 20i4, I served a ttue and
oorrect copy ofthe foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF MARJ filLEY upon the following, by the
method indicated below:
Scot R. Campbell
Sandpoh:rt City Attorney

XX via facsimile to 208-255~ 1368

1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
C. Matthew Andersen
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d·Atene, Idaho 83814

XX via facsimile to 208~765-2121

Hon. John T, Mitchell
Chamber Copy

XX via facsimile to 208~446-1132

AFFIDAVIT OF BRENT FEATHE'.RSTON': 3

PAGE

03/03

83680
Telephone: (208) 887-4800
Facsimile: (208) 887-4865
ISB
2429
Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814
Telephone: (208) 667-0683
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684
ISB No. 4255
Attorneys for Defendant Independent Highway District
THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHDO, IN AND FOR THE COlJ'NTY OF BONNER

CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal
corporation of the State of Idaho,

CASE NO. CV-2013-01342
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff,
vs.

FILING CATEGORY: L4

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State of Idaho,

FILING FEE: $129.00
(Exempt I.C. § 67-2301)
Hon. John

Mitchell presiding

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF, CITY OF SANDPOINT, AND THE
PARTIES' ATTORNEYS, SCOT CAMPBELL C. MATTHEW ANDERSEN, AND THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Appellant, Independent Highway District, appeal against the
Sandpoint,

1

the August 21, 2014

4

and

to Rule 11

),

Idaho Appellate Rules.
3.

preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellants then
to assert

the appeal; provided, such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the

Appellants from asserting other issues on appeal:
(a)

Did the District Court err

granting summary judgment to Plaintiff on the

grounds enunciated therein?
4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

The Appellant has request no preparation of any portion of any reporter's transcript:

6.

The Appellants request the following records from the Clerk's records pursuant to

I.A.R. 27(b).
08/16/2013
09/09/2013
09/20/2013
10/11/2013
11/07/2013
11/07/2013
11/07/2013
11/08/2013
11/12/2013
11/13/2013
11/13/2013
12/09/2013
12/18/2013
8/2013

Complaint and Request for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
Motion to Dismiss
Defendant's Motion for Enlargement of Time to File Brief
Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Affidavit of Scot R. Campbell
Affidavit of Shannon Syth
Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs Response Brief and Affidavits
Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs Supplemental Citation to Authority
Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Strike Response Brief and
Affidavits
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Stipulation for Reciprocal Preliminary Injunction
Reciprocal Preliminary
Order

2

14
06/12/2014
07/08/2014
07/08/2014
07/08/2014
07/08/2014
07/15/2014
07/29/2014
07/31/2014
07/31/2014
08/13/2014
08/13/2014
08/13/2014
08/13/2014
08/21/2014
08/21/2014
08/22/2014
08/22/2014
08/28/2014

City of Sandpoint's
Support
Order Granting Rule 12 Interlocutory Appeal Certification
Affidavit of Marj
Second Affidavit of Marj Tilley
Affidavit of Julie Bishop
Memorandum in Response to City of Sandpoint's Motion for Summary
Judgment
City of Sandpoint's Reply in Support of Summary Judgment
Order Denying Motion for Appeal by Permission
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiff City of Sandpoint's
Motion for Summary Judgment
Order Granting Declaratory Relief
Notice of Presentment (without oral argument)
City of Sandpoint's Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs
City of Sandpoint's Memorandum in Support of Attorney's Fees anc Costs
Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit of C. Matthew Andersen in Support of
Attorney's Fees and Costs
Order Granting Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs
Declaratory and Monetary Judgment
Amended Order Granting Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs
Amended Declaratory and Monetary Judgment
Affidavit of Brent Featherston

7.

Exhibits: There are no exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court.

8.

I certify:
(a)

That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated
fees for preparation of the reporter's transcript and clerk's record.

(c)

The appellate filing fee has been paid.

(d)

Service has been made upon all the parties required to be served pursuant

Susan P. Weeks
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4TH day of September, 2014, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing upon the following, by the method indicated below:
C. Matthew Anderson
Winston & Cashatt
250 Northwest Blvd., Ste 206
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

XX via facsimile to 208-765-2121

Scot R. Campbell
Sandpoint City Attorney
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864

XX via facsimile to 208-255-1368

APPEAL: 4

2082651447 @rda,.cor

+·12082651447

R.

"'.>

I SANDPOINT

,;,

1123 Lake Street

4

Sandpoint, Idaho 83864

5

I

Telephone: (208) 263-0534
Facsimile: (208) 255-1368

6

7

a
9
10

11
12

C. MATTHEW ANDERSEN, ISB No. 3581
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS,
a Professional Service Corporation
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-2103
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121

I £!lli!.~115.!Q~!!fil.!j£Qm
Attorneys for City of Sandpoint

13
14

IN THE DISTRICT COtJRT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

15
16

17

CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal
corporation of the State of Idaho,
Case No. CV-13-01342

Plaintiff/Appellant,

18

19
20

REQUEST FOR ADDIDONAL RECORD

VS.

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State of Idaho,

21

Defendant/Respondent.

22
THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLAt""'IT AND THE PARTY'S ATTORJ.'IBY

23

TO:

24

AND: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT

25

26

REQUEST FOR ADDIDONAL RECORD
PAGE 1

~~~rtadatt

A ?'OOrESSIONA!. SE!'MCE CCIR?ORATION
250 ~ Blvd.. Sull9 2fl6
Coeur d' Alana. !d&ho.93814
Pl'looe· (21)8J 667-21CG

2DB265!447@rcfa:,: ..::or: Fa:-:: +12082651447

3

addition to that required to

4

included

additional

4

to be provided in electronic format pursuant to I.AR. 27(b):

5
6
7

8

I

I Register Date
/ 9/20/2013

I

Description
' Notice of Hearing re: Defendant's Motion for Enlargement
of Time to File Brief

12/3/2013

Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and Initial Pretrial I

9

11

Order
Ii 6/12/2014

Motion for Appeal by Permission and Stay of Proceedings

I 6123/2014

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Appeal by
Permission

i

12

7/9/2014

City of Sandpoint' s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion
for Appeal by Permission

13

Motion for Reconsideration

14

8/27/2014
8/27/2014

15

8/27/2014

Objection to Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees and
Motion
to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees
1
J

1

16
8/27/2014

17

18

19/4/2014

I
I

Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Opposition to Motion
Attorney Fees

I

Memorandum in Support of Objection to Memorandum of
Costs and Attorney Fees and Motion to Disallow Costs and
Attomey Fees

I

I

/ Notice of Appeal

19
20

21

I certify that a copy of this request for additional record has been served upon the clerk of the
district court and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule

22
23

24

25

26

REQUEST FOR ADDITTONAL RECORD
PAGE2

~~el}~
A?RO~StlWICE COR?ORATION
200 ~ Blvd, Sui18 2D!l

Coaurd' Alene" !daho014
!"holle: {200) 657-2103

is

+12082651447

To:

I
'2

.,

I
I!

I

C.
TIHEW k'IDERSEN, ISB No. 3581
WIN TON & CASHATT, LAWYERS,
a Professional Service Corporation

4

5

SCOT R. CAMPBELL, ISB No. 4121
SANDPOINT CITY ATTORNEY
Attorneys for Respondent City of Sandpoint

8

9
10

11
12

13

I hereby certify that I caused a true and
complete copy of the foregoing to be lX] mailed,
postage prepaid;
hand delivered;
sent
via facsimile on September 18 , 2014, to:

D

D

David R. Wynkoop
Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP
730 N. Main Street

14
15
16
17

P.O. Box 31
Meridian, ID 83680

Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

18

19

20

Bonner County District Court
Attn: Civil Clerk
215 S. First Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864

21
22
23 'I+----=-__/;.~~~......::!:~:::::::::::::...~

24

25
26

REQUEST FOR ADDITTONAL RECORD
PAGE3

~~~Wada#

APROFESSIONAL SERViCE OORPORATU)N
250 ~ Bli;d.,, S!lllB 200
Coeur d' Alsnei. !lklho 83814
1"11cn!!; (20B) 667-2103

,..,
!

IS

cc:

TO

a

Matthew Anderson

Winston & Cashatt
Northwest Blvd., Ste
83814

Scot R. Campbell
Sandpoint City Attorney
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864

BE

In h

n
... eme

CITY OF ANDPO

ou

T,
...)

0

.}

V.

INDEPE DENT HTGHWAY DI TR.JCT,
Defendant-Appellant.

a o

~

)

.'
ORDER. GRANTING EXTENSJON OF
TIME TO OBTAIN A FINAL

)

JUDG

--Plaintiff-Respondent,

t

)
)
)
)
)

upreme Court Docket No. 251 -201 4
Bonner Co ty No. 2013- l 342
Ref.

o. 14483

An ORDER CO DmO ALLY DISM1SSING APPEAL was e ered by this Court

eptember 22 2014 for the reason a final judgment had not been entered y the District Court.

RESPO SE TO CO DITIONAL DISMl

A

AL AND REQUEST APPEAL BE RETAINED was

filed by counsel for Appellant October 1 • 2014. Therefore,

IT HEREBY

ORDERED that Appellants request that this appea] be retained i

GRANTED. Appellant shall obtain a final judgment on or before

ovem

r JO 201

appeaJ may be dismissedt:'

DATED this

_1_ day of November 2014.
y Order of the Supreme Court

cc:

Counsel o Record
District Court Clerk
District CoW1 Judge

ORDER ·.

o. 42517-2014

'

or this

20ll4461132@rcfax .coli Fa1': +12084461132

From:

'age 2 of

11107120'14 3:02

11

I

3
4
5

6

7
8

R
I SANDPOINT

I

1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Telephone: (208) 263-0534
Facsimile: (208) 255-1368
scampbell@ci.sandpoint.id.us
C. MATTHEW A.1~DERSEN, ISB No. 3581

WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS,

lO
11

a Professional Service Corporation
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-2103
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121
cma@winstoncashatt.com

12

Attorneys for City of Sandpoint

9

13
14

15
16

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF IBE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDA.HO, IN Ar"\1D FOR IBE COUNTY OF BOl\TNER

CITY OF SAr~DPOINT, a municipal
corporation of the State ofidaho,

17
18

19
20

Case No. CV-13-01342

Plaintiff,
vs.

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State ofidaho,

SECOND AMENDED DECLARATORY AND
MON'ETARY JlJDGl\,fENT
[PROPOSED]

21
22
23

JlJDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
JlJOOME1'1T CREDITOR:

City of Sandpoint

JUOOMENT DEBTOR:

Independent Highway District

24

25
26

SECOJ\JD Alv1ENvED DEC..."LARATORY AJ\lv
MOJ:\1ETARY JUDG1vllil\.1T
PAGEl

?#!4tdh-l'tllfa:JM.tt
APROfESS!O!'lAl SERVICE OORf''OHAT'.Of,I

250 linr!hme! Blvd~ S1!i18 200
Oo;im d' Aten&, Idaho 831H4
~ : (ZOB} 001·2103

2084461132@rcfa)[.C0!1 Fa)[: +12084461132

l;Fax: (509) 202-4304

ol 5 i 110712014

age

3
4

and

5

Scot R. Campbell

6

SANDPOINT CITY ATTOR.t,TEY
1123 Lake Street

Sandpoint, Idaho 83864

7

A TIORNEYS FOR JUDGMENT
DEBTOR:

8

9
10

11

Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

12
13

David R. Wynkoop
Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP
730 N. Main Street
P.O. Box31
Meridian, ID 83680

I

14
15

JUIXI1v1EN'T AMOUNT

16

ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
COSTS:

$56,131.75

17

POST JtJDGMENT INTEREST:

To accrue at the legal rate allowed by Idaho lav,i

18
19
20

DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT
The Court grants the City of Sandpoint its requested relief and hereby declares pursuant to LC.
I §10-1201 et seq., the foHowing rights, status and legal relations between the City of Sandpoint and the

21
22

23
24

Independent Highway District:
1.

The Memorandum of Understanding of September 14, 2005 between the City of

Sandpoint and the Independent Highway Distdct is legal, valid and enforceable.

25

26
SECOND A!v1El\TDED DECLA.c~TORY Ai"\iu
MOl\TETARY JUDG:MEJ\.1T
PAGE2

tiUbJlun,irf~
A PROFESSIONAL Sffi'ef!GE ClJRPOAATIOl'f
250 Nor!n'lleet Bi'ro~ S'llite 206

Coi<ur d'Alene. kllll!oil3&l4
Phone: (20!!} 657-2103

LiFax: (609) 202-4304

To: 20844S1132@rda:,u::oo Fax: +12084461132

5 1110712014

.g!I

is legal,

3

3.

4

The Independent Highway District is ordered to comply

all respects with

and other obligations set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding and the Joint Powers Agreement.

5

6

7

4.

A Permanent Uliunction shall issue with regard to that obligation.

5.

The Independent Highway District is directed to include in its payment of ad valorem

8

taxes to the City of Sandpoint all taxes collected pursuant to LC. §40-800 et seq., including without

9

limitation any collection for past, present or future delinquent taxes, interest and costs, that are collected

10

as a result of Independent Highway District levies on the taxpayers of the City of Sandpoint.

11

MONETARY JUDGMENT

12
13

14

1

The Court enters judgment in favor of Plaintiff, City of Sandpo.int, and against Defendant,
Independent Higlnvay District.

15

MON'ETARY IDDGME:NTIS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:

16

1.

17

Plaintiff shall recover from Defendant in the amount of $0 for costs and $56,131.75 for

attorney's fees for a total monetary judgment of $56,131.75.

18

2.

Post judgment interest to bear at the legal rate allowed by Idaho law from the date of this

19
20

21

Judgment until paid in fuU.

DONE IN OPEN COURT this

\,v~'\l-day of_"-'{l,._,,_,Jb=-"'\ -\!£,=<"'::l.=·i.1,_'I ¥'_,,____, 2014.

22
23

24

HOJ'jORAB\E JOHN T. MITCHELL
f
\

l

25

\
\

\

\

·,

26

"'~

SECOND j1JvlEJ,,1DED t ,r.- ,! ,!-'," ,._
MOl'-l'ETARY JUDGlvillNT

PAGE3

AND

I
~

1/(,~.&n,b ~,JAd/,1
A ?ROFESS!ONAl S9'VfGE OORPOAATJON

2:50 ~1~m1et Bi11d. ~ 200
Coi;m d' Alena, lm!l!o83814
~ : 120!:lj 651-2103

{509} 202,4304

To: 20S44S1132@rcfax.con

II
2 II
31

41
5
6

/ C. MAITHEW
Attorneys for Plaintiff

7
8
9

I hereby certify that I caused a true and
complete copy of the foregoing to be
mailed,
hand delivered;
sent
postage prepaid;
via facsimile on November
, 2014, to:

D

10
C. Matthew Andersen

11
12
13
14

15
16

Winston & Cashatt
601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1900
Spokane, WA 99201
509-838-1416(fax)
Scot R. Campbell
Sandpoint City Attorney
1123 Lake Stree1
Sandpoint, ID 83864
(208) 255-1368 (fax)

17
18
19

20
21
22
23

David E. Wynkoop
Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP
P.O. Box31
Boise, ID 83680
(208) 887-4865 (fax)

Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
(208) 664-1684 (fax)

24

25
26
SECOND AMENDED DECLARATORY ANTI
MO}lETARY JlJDGlvlEl'l'T
PAGE4

11/J~n.,#~J~
A PROFESBlONAL SERVlCE CORPORATION
200 Mort!ltnoot Blvd~ Su,'18 200
Co!itn d' Al!m;;, !<ll!ho 83!H4
~ : (208) 667·2103

L,Fax: {509) 202-4304

,ge 3

2084461132@rdax.con Fax: +12084461132

5

4:14

I
11

3

4
5
6

11

SANDPOINT
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Telephone: (208) 263-0534
Facsimile: (208) 255-1368
scampbell@ci.sandpoint.id.us

11

C. MATTIIE\:V ANDERSEN, ISB No. 3581
\:VINSTON &CASHATT, LAWYERS,
a Professional Service Corporation
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-2103
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121
cma@winstoncashatt.com

12

Attorneys for City of Sandpoint

7
8

9
10

13

14

15

16

IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
OF IDAHO, IN Al\TD FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal
corporation of the State ofldaho,

Case No. CV-13-01342

17
18
19
20

Plaintiff,
vs.

FINAL JUDGMENT
[PROPOSED]

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTR1CT, a
political subdivision of the State of Idaho,

21
22

23

DECLARATORY AND MONETARY JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
The Court grants the City of Sandpoint its requested relief and hereby declares pursuant to LC.

24
§10-1201 et. seq., the following rights, status and legal relations between the City of Sandpoint and the

25
26

Independent Highway District:

FINAL JUDGMEI'\:11'
PAGEl

1/tJMJ.hHblff124Aaft
A Pf!OFESSlONAl SERVICE CORPOAATlON
250 Northweet Blvd, Suite 200
Coi!m d' Afene, ldMO a31H4

!'hon11: !200} e67 -210~

l,F ax: (50S) 202-4304

20844S1132@rcfax.con Fax: +12084461132

age 4

and
enforceable.
5
6

7

3.

The Independent High\vay District is ordered to comply in all respects with

monetary

and other obligations set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding and the Joint Powers Agreement.

8

4.

A Permanent I:q_junction shall issue with regard to that obligation.

9

5.

The Independent Highway District is directed to include in its payment of ad valorern

taxes to the City of Sandpoint all taxes collected pursuant to LC. §40-800 et. seq., including without

11
12

limitation any collection for past, present or future delinquent taxes, interest and costs, that are collected
as a result of Independent Highway District levies on the taxpayers ofthe City of Sandpoint.

13

14
15

16
17
18

6.

Plaintiff shall recover from Defendant in the amount of $0 for costs and $56,131.75 for

attorney's fees for a total monetary judgment of $56,131.75.

7.

Post judgment interest to bear at the legal rate allowed by Idaho law from the date of this

Judgment until paid in full.

DONEINOPENCOURTthis

J.2vAdayof t J ~ ~

, 2014.

19

20
21
22
23

24
25
26
FINAL JlJDG:tvJE\.'T
PAGE2

?ot?tJtvnb~.Jiut
A PROFESSIONAL SSW!GE CORPORATION
250 1«)11h'H&e! Eht<I, Suite 200
~ui d' Afemi, Idaho 838!4
~ ; (208) 007-2103

2084451132@,cfax.con Fax: +i20844Sl132

"age 5

5

lf21120U

4

5
C. MATTHEW A1'\JDERSEN, ISB No. 3581
Attorneys for Plaintiff

6
7
8

9

10

I hereby certify that I caused a true and
complete copy of the foregoing to be
mailed,
postage prepaid; D hand delivered;
sent
via facsimile on November
2014, to:

i,

12
13

14

15
16

C. Matthevi. Andersen
Winston & Cashatt
601 \\7. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1900
Spokane, WA 99201
509-838-1416 (fax)
1

-.1.

I

Scot R. Campbell
Sandpoint City Attorney
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint, ID 83864
(208) 255-1368 (fax)

17
18

19
20

21
22
23

David E. Wynkoop
Sherer & Wynkoop, ILP
P.O. Box 31
Boise, ID 83680
(208) 887-4865 (fax)

Susan P. \\ieeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
(208) 664-1684 (fax)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, Il'l AND FOR THB COUNTY OF BONNER
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal
corporation of the State of Idaho,
Case No. CV-13-01342

10
11

Plaintiff,

vs.

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO ALTER OR
AMEND ruDGMENT

12· INDEPENDENT IIlGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State of Idaho,
13

Defendant.

14
15

THIS MATTER came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment.
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The court having considered the:
•

Defendant' s Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment~

•

Defendant's Amended Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Alter or
Amend Judgment;

•

City of Sandpoint's Response to Defendant' s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment;

•

Declaration of C. Matthew Andersen;

•

Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment;

•

and the pleadings filed in this matter
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DONE IN OPEN COURT this

lQ!day of Arv':) l
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Presented by:
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C. MATTI W ANDERSEN. ISB No. 3581
WlNSTO & CASHATT
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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I hereby certify that I caused a true an~

2

postage prepaid; D hand!.Jlivered; ffisent
via facsimile on April') LS; ' • 2015, to:

complete copy of the foregoing to be
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@mailed,

C. Matthew Andersen
Winston & Cashatt
601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1900

Spokane, WA 9920 l
6 509-838-1416 (fax)
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R. Scot Campbell
Sandpoint City Attorney
1123 Lake Street
Sandpoint. ID 83864

· (208) 255-1368 (fax)
David B. Wynkoop
Sherer & Wynkoop. LLP
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P.O. Box 31
Boise, ID 83680

13

(208) 887-4865 (fax)

14

SusanP. Weeks

15

James, Vernon & Weeks
1626 Lincoln Way

16 coeuf'd'Alene, ID 83814
17

(208) 664-1684 (fax)
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

CITY OF SANDPOINT,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

)
)
)

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT,

Defendant- Appellant.

SUPREME COURT NO. 42517-2014
BONNER COUNTY CV2013-1342

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

)
)
)
)

I, Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner, do certify that the foregoing Record in this
cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct and complete
Record of the pleadings and documents requested by Appellant Rule 28.

IN WITNES~ WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the
said Court this J:f day of:J;nne, 2015.
0

MICHAEL W. ROSEDALE
Clerk of the District Court

Clerk's Certificate 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

CITY OF SANDPOINT,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

)
)
)

INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT,

Defendant- Appellant.

SUPREME COURT NO. 42517-2014
BONNER COUNTY CV2013-1342

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

)
)
)
)

I, Michael R. Rosedale, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner, do hereby certify that the following is
offered as the Clerk's exhibit on appeal:
NONE

IN WITNESS ,WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the
/j?v"tl
said Court this ,;:1c?r day of JJ.H:1e, 2015.
MICHAEL R. ROSEDALE
Clerk of the District Court

Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

CITY OF SANDPOINT,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT,

)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO. 42517-2014
BONNER COUNTY CV2013-1342

)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

)
)
)

Defendant- Appellant.

)

I, Michael R. Rosedale, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State
of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner, do hereby certify that I have personally served
or mailed, by United Parcel Service, one copy of the CLERK'S RECORD to each of the
Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:
MR. SCOT R. CAMPBELL
1123 LAKE STREET
SANDPOINT, ID 83864

MS. SUSAN P. WEEKS
1626 LINCOLN WAY
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83814

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

IN WITNES§4WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the
day
2015.
said Court this

.;rt

MICHAEL R. ROSEDALE

Clerk's Certificate of Service 1

